NIVERSITY  OF  CA  RIVERSIDE,  LIBRARY 


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THE  LIBRARY 

OF 

THE  UNIVERSITY 

OF  CALIFORNIA 

RIVERSIDE 


THE   PROCESSES   OF   HISTORY 


The   Processes  of  History 

FREDERICK    J.    TEGGART 

(^Associate  'Professor  of  History  in  the 

UNIVERSITY    OF    CALIFORNIA 


NEW    HAVEN 
YALE   UNIVERSITY    PRESS 

LONDON:    HUMPHREY   MILFORD 

OXFORD  UNIVERSITY   PRESS 

MDCCCCXVni 


Copyright,    1918 
By  Yale  University  Press 


First  published,  April,  191 8 


PREFACE 

The  question  "Is  History  a  science?"  has  now 
been  debated  by  successive  generations  of  histo- 
rians without  any  general  agreement  having  been 
reached.  It  would  seem,  therefore,  that  in  some 
particular  the  problem  had  been  wrongly  stated. 
Hence,  following  the  critique  presented  in  my 
Prolegomena  to  History,  I  have  approached  the 
whole  matter  from  a  new  angle  by  asking  what 
sort  of  results  might  be  obtained  by  a  strict  appli- 
cation of  the  method  of  science  to  the  facts  of  his- 
tory. The  outcome  of  this  procedure,  stated  in 
general  terms,  is  an  attempt  to  do  for  human  his- 
tory what  biologists  are  engaged  in  doing  for  the 
history  of  the  forms  of  life,  and  this  publication 
offers  in  summary  form  a  first  analysis  of  the  fac- 
tors and  processes  manifested  in  the  history  of 
man. 

For  the  sake  of  clearness,  and  in  order  that  the 
essential  considerations  might  be  brought  within 
a  brief  comprehensive  view,  the  argument  has 
been  condensed  and  made  as  explicit  as  circum- 
stances would  permit.  Since  footnotes  and  cita- 

[v] 


PREFACE 


tions  of  authorities  have  also  been  eliminated  in 
the  interest  of  brevity  and  directness,  it  should 
be  understood  that  there  is  no  view  expressed 
which,  I  believe,  is  not  already  familiar  to  stu- 
dents in  one  or  another  branch  of  humanistic  in- 
quiry. So  far  as  I  am  aware,  all  that  is  new  in  the 
present  contribution  is  the  co-ordination  into  one 
consistent  statement  of  results  which  are  well 
known,  but  which  are  widely  scattered  through- 
out the  literature  of  anthropology,  history,  po- 
litical science,  philology,  education,  geography, 
and  other  studies.  Further  than  this,  the  most 
significant  feature  of  the  book  is  an  insistence 
that,  in  dealing  with  a  problem  of  this  magni- 
tude, the  prime  requisite  must  be  an  exacting 
care  in  regard  to  the  method  employed.  Hence, 
it  seems  to  me,  that  the  questions  for  immediate 
consideration  are:  first,  whether  the  problems  of 
method  have  been  correctly  stated;  and,  second, 
whether  the  factors  and  processes  indicated  are 
correctly  described. 

More  generally,  there  is  no  disguising  the  fact 
that  the  present  world-situation  is  imperative  in 
forcing  men  to  question  searchingly  the  validity 
of  their  own  activities.  Are,  then,  those  of  us  who 
are  engaged  in  the  study  of  History  doing  all  that 

[vi] 


PREFACE 


lies  within  our  power  to  make  our  inquiries  con- 
tributory to  the  well-being  of  our  fellow-men? 
We  must  admit  that  while,  during  the  last  fifty 
years,  the  students  of  Nature  have  most  signifi- 
cantly enlarged  the  knowledge  of  the  world  in 
which  we  live,  the  students  of  Man  have  made 
no  such  striking  advance  in  their  field  of  investi- 
tion.  It  is  true  that  we  have  been  persistent  in  the 
collection  of  facts,  and  in  the  refinement  of  the 
technique  of  investigation,  but  it  would  seem  as 
if  the  utilization  of  all  this  accumulated  knowl- 
edge in  the  spirit  of  modern  science  might  now 
be  undertaken.  What,  then,  is  presented  here  is  a 
tentative  statement,  based  upon  the  application 
of  the  method  of  science  to  the  facts  of  History, 
made  in  the  earnest  belief  that  inquiry  conducted 
along  the  lines  marked  out  must  ultimately  lead 
to  an  understanding  of  the  difficulties  that  beset 
our  civilization,  and  to  a  furtherance  of  the  wel- 
fare of  mankind. 


[vii] 


CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  PAGE 

I.  The  Nature  and  Scope  of  the  In- 
quiry    .....  I 

II.  The  Geographical  Factor  in  His- 
tory      .....         41 

III.  The  Human  Factor  in  History       .         79 

IV.  Method  and  Results     .  .  .124 


[ix] 


THE  NATURE   AND   SCOPE   OF  THE 
INQUIRY 

I.  Science  is,  fundamentally,  a  method  of  deal- 
ing with  problems,  and  the  initial  step  in  any 
scientific  undertaking  is  the  determination  of  the 
problem  to  be  investigated. 

A  survey  of  the  present  situation,  in  which  men 
everywhere  find  themselves  involved  on  one  or 
the  other  side  of  a  world-conflict,  stimulates  in- 
terest in  the  wide  differences  that  exist  between 
the  many  and  various  groups  into  which  man- 
kind is  broken  up.  Thus,  in  the  foreground,  we 
are  vividly  conscious  of  differing  characteristics 
when  we  speak  of  French,  Belgians,  and  Italians, 
Germans,  Austrians,  and  Magyars;  and  impres- 
sions associate  themselves  with  the  thought  of 
Canadians,  Australians,  and  New  Zealanders 
which  are  not  suggested  by  mention  of  English, 
Scotch,  and  Irish.  But  the  present  conflict  is  not 
restricted  to  inheritors  of  a  western  European 
tradition,  and  the  sense  of  difference  becomes 

[>] 


PROCESSES    OF    HISTORY 

more  acute  when  we  turn  to  think  of  the  eastern 
panicipants.  Few  of  us  have  any  extended  first- 
hand knowledge  of  Russians,  Rumanians,  and 
Serbs,  of  Turks  and  Bulgarians,  but  even  the 
daily  recurrence  of  these  names  fails  to  remove 
the  feeling  that  attaches  to  them  of  remoteness 
and  unfamiliarity.  Yet  further  off,  in  Asia, 
peoples  of  a  wholly  un-European  aspect  are 
bearing  arms  in  the  same  cause — Japanese, 
Chinese,  Annamese;  Sikhs,  Rajputs,  Afghans; 
Arabs,  Kurds.  Armenians;  Buddhists.  Brahman- 
ists,  Mohammedans.  In  what  terms,  indeed,  do 
we  think  of  the  men  who  hold  the  Khyber  Pass, 
of  those  who  actually  oppose  each  other  when 
Turks  and  Russians  meet  in  Persia,  of  those  who 
earn,'  on  a  European  war  in  equatorial  Africa? 
At  best  we  comprehend  vaguely  that  similarity 
of  military  equipment  does  not  at  once  bring  all 
these  various  races  to  the  similitude  of  English- 
men or  Germans.  But  behind  the  combatants,  as 
it  were,  stand  other  peoples,  now  in  the  turmoil 
forgotten :  tribes  of  furthest  Siberia,  unsubdued 
aboriginals  of  interior  China,  forest  denizens  of 
India,  desert  dwellers  of  Australia,  peoples 
whose  names  are  to  us  but  as  technical  terms 
of    anthropological    specialists,    peoples   whose 

[2] 


THE    NATURE   AND    SCOPE 

strange  implements  we  gather  into  museums,  and 
whose  uncouth  ways  provide  materials,  in  every 
generation,  for  travellers'  tales. 
There  are  differences  enough  and  to  spare,  and, 
at  times,  when  the  subject  is  brought  forward, 
we  recollect  that  in  appearance,  practices,  and 
beliefs  the  men  who  people  the  earth  are  of  the 
most  heterogeneous  description;  but,  ordinarily, 
we  dismiss  the  fact,  or  entertain  it  momentarily 
as  contributor}-  to  our  self-esteem.  These  others, 
indeed,  even  though  our  comrades  in  arms,  are 
'different,'  are  'backward,'  are  'colored,'  while 
we  (whoever  we  may  be)  are  'civilized'  and 
'progressive.'  With  such  indefinite  phrases  we 
escape  the  sense  of  a  problem,  and  shield  our- 
selves from  the  embarrassment  of  the  direct  ques- 
tion: "In  what  respect  are  these  others  different 
from  ourselves?"  So  we  are  able  to  ignore  the 
fact  that  even  the  'white'  race  is  not  without  its 
lowly  members;  and  our  complacence  is  un- 
shaken either  by  observation  of  our  own  byways 
or  by  recognizing  that  such  primitive  groups  as 
the  Ainus  of  Japan,  Maotzi  of  China,  Todas  of 
India,  Veddas  of  Ceylon,  and  even  the  much- 
discussed  aborigines  of  Australia  have  been 
classified  as  "Caucasian."    Furthermore,  though 

[3] 


PROCESSES  OF  HISTORY 
the  knowledge  is  a  commonplace,  we  tend,  in 
forming  judgments  of  our  contemporaries,  to 
forget  that,  not  many  generations  back,  our  own 
progenitors  fought  with  crude  weapons,  wore 
skins,  and  painted  their  bodies.  We  tend,  for  ex- 
ample, to  forget  that  even  in  the  eighteenth  cen- 
tury the  civilization  of  China  was  regarded  by 
European  travellers  as  superior  to  their  own. 
We  ignore  the  consideration  that  our  religion 
was  derived  from  a  land  we  now  regard  as  'back- 
ward,' and  the  fundamentals  of  our  thought  from 
a  people  whose  present  representatives  we  are 
disposed  to  patronize. 
Nevertheless,  the  conflict  has  already  had  the 
result  of  lessening  the  exclusiveness  and  self- 
confidence  of  the  western  European,  and  has 
induced  in  him  an  awakening  appreciation  of 
the  manhood  and  common  human  quality  of  out- 
lying peoples.  In  truth,  a  new  current  of  feeling 
has  made  itself  felt,  and  we  come  to  regard  the 
differences  and  contrasts  among  men,  not  as  a 
basis  for  disparagement,  but  as  something  to  be 
explained.  And  here  we  may  discern  the  nature 
of  the  problem  with  which  we  are  confronted. 
Every  human  group,  white,  black,  or  yellow,  en- 
tertains precisely  the  same  attitude  of  superiority 

[4] 


THE    NATURE   AND    SCOPE 

towards  all  the  others,  and  the  vindication  of  this 
attitude  in  ourselves  requires  that  we,  for  the 
sake  of  all,  should  endeavor  to  determine,  not  the 
reason  for  our  own  superiority,  but  how  man 
everywhere  has  come  to  he  as  he  is. 

2.  The  problem  so  stated  is  not  new,  and  many 
theories  have  been  advanced  to  account  for  the 
manifest  differences  in  human  groups.  Of  these 
theories,  the  most  popular  and  persistent  is  that 
which  attributes  the  diversities  among  peoples  to 
physical  differences  in  race.  Thus  it  is  widely 
believed  that  difference  of  race  implies  a  real 
and  deep-rooted  distinction  in  physical,  mental, 
and  moral  qualities,  and  that  the  contrasts  in  the 
achievements  of  the  various  peoples  are  due  to 
differences  in  physical  characteristics.  Hence  it 
is  thought  that  one  race  becomes  a  master  because 
of  its  physique,  courage,  brain-power,  and  mo- 
rale, while  another  sinks  in  the  struggle  or  lags 
behind  owing  to  its  inferiority  in  these  qualities. 
This  view  naturally  implies  that  the  same  race 
preserves  its  character,  not  only  in  every  region 
of  the  world,  but  in  every  period  of  history,  and 
so  the  course  of  history  would  appear  as  a  sus- 
tained process  of  selection  between  the  races  that 
are  sluggish,  cowardly,  and  retrogressive,  and 

[5] 


PROCESSES    OF    HISTORY 

those  that  are  energetic,  brave,  and  progressive — 
while  the  latter  press  forward,  the  former  die  out 
or  stagnate  in  lazy  passivity.  A  slightly  different 
turn  is  given  to  the  explanation  by  those  who 
maintain  that  the  present  savage  races  are  those 
which  have  been  left  impoverished  and  station- 
ary as  a  result  of  the  migration  of  their  more 
vigorous  or  stronger  elements;  the  younger  and 
more  alert  in  each  generation,  it  is  thought,  go 
out  to  seek  new  homes,  and  leave  the  older  and 
more  conservative  to  perpetuate  the  original 
group. 
While  the  explanation  in  terms  of  race  has  been 
supported,  in  recent  discussions,  by  an  appeal  to 
biology,  there  can  be  little  doubt  that  its  princi- 
pal foundation  lies  in  that  inevitable  human  pro- 
pensity to  classify  all  those  who  are  in  any  way 
unlike  ourselves,  or  who  merely  lie  outside  our 
own  group,  as  'fiends,'  'aliens,'  and  'barbarians.' 
The  Hebrews,  though  perhaps  the  best-known 
example,  have  not  been  the  only  group  to  regard 
themselves  a  'chosen  people' ;  and  while  we  may 
point  to  Dante's  opinion  that  the  Romans  of  his 
time  were  ordained  to  command,  and  to  the  mod- 
ern German  equivalent  of  the  same  doctrine,  it 
must  be  admitted  that  the  passionate  assertion  of 

[6] 


THE    NATURE   AND    SCOPE 

nationality  in  the  nineteenth  century  has  been 
colored  at  least  by  this  feeling  of  a  special  worth 
or  importance  in  ourselves  as  contrasted  with 
others,  a  feeling,  we  must  not  forget,  which  the 
Negro,  Hindu,  and  Chinaman  shares  with  the 
most  progressive  of  Europeans. 

Once  entertained,  the  idea  that  there  have  been 
certain  unique  races  in  the  past,  and  that  there  is 
one  such  race  in  the  present,  yields  itself  readily 
to  interested  elaboration.  So  the  Hegelian  theory 
has  been  replaced,  on  further  consideration,  by 
the  view  which  sees  all  human  advancement  as 
the  varied  expression  of  the  power  and  genius, 
not  of  the  Absolute,  but  of  the  Aryan  race;  and 
while  this  conception  permitted,  at  first,  of  a 
fairly  generous  interpretation,  a  more  thorough 
application  has  restricted  the  definition  of  the 
conquering  race  to  the  dolichocephalic  (or  long- 
headed) blonds  from  northern  Europe.  Wher- 
ever this  race  has  penetrated,  there,  it  would  ap- 
pear, the  surrounding  peoples  have  been  subju- 
gated, and  there  prosperity  and  a  great  civiliza- 
tion have  sprung  up.  So  complete  is  this  clue, 
indeed,  that  any  manifestation  of  genius,  whether 
in  Palestine,  Greece,  Italy,  or  Germany,  becomes 
an  unequivocal  proof  of  the  presence  of,  at  least, 

[7] 


PROCESSES    OF   HISTORY 

some  members  of  this  supreme  race.  Conversely, 
wherever  the  brachycephalic  (or  short-headed) 
races  have  made  their  appearance,  decadence  has 
straightway  followed;  nor  do  the  advocates  of 
this  thorough-going  conception  shrink  from  the 
conclusion  that  progress  in  the  future  must  de- 
pend upon  the  increased  propagation  and  the 
physical  dominance  of  the  long-headed  variety. 
An  equally  positive,  though  perhaps  less  ani- 
mating theory  places  the  emphasis,  in  seeking  to 
account  for  the  differences  of  human  groups,  not 
on  the  physical,  but  on  the  mental  characteristics 
of  races,  and  from  this  root  has  grown  the  exten- 
sive literature  of  "race  psychology."  According 
to  this  view,  the  part  played  in  history  by  any 
aggregation  of  men  is  a  direct  reflection  of  its 
collective  character  and  mentality.  The  subject 
and  method  of  this  psychology,  initiated  by  Wil- 
helm  von  Humboldt,  seems  first  to  have  been 
cultivated  by  Steinthal  and  Lazarus,  but  owes  its 
vogue,  apparently,  to  men  like  Mommsen  and 
Renan.  While  the  interest  enlisted  by  the  sum- 
mary descriptions  of  the  psychology  of  peoples 
has  been  widely  extended,  the  explanation  af- 
forded by  the  procedure  is  not  illuminating,  for 
it  consists  merely  in  saying  that  events  and  insti- 

[8] 


THE    NATURE    AND    SCOPE 

tutions  are  the  outcome  of  the  genius  of  peoples. 
Thus,  for  example,  it  appears  that  the  Greeks 
were  a  people  distinctly  marked  out  by  nature  as 
freer  than  other  mortals  from  all  that  hinders  and 
oppresses  the  activities  of  the  spirit;  or,  briefly, 
that  Greek  civilization  was  the  creation  of  the 
inborn  genius  of  the  Greek  race.  Furthermore, 
the  mode  of  determining  the  collective  charac- 
teristics of  groups  leaves  much  room  for  debate, 
since  while  one  authority  may  regard  the  Celt, 
as  "a  gentle  obstinate,"  another  thinks  him  "tur- 
bulent and  vain,"  and  a  third  declares  him  to  be 
the  embodiment  of  "an  indomitable  passion  for 
danger  and  adventure." 
When  pressed,  each  of  these  theories,  physical 
and  psychological,  tends  more  and  more  to  fall 
back  upon  the  influence  of  habitat  or  climate  in 
determining  the  character  of  groups,  and  we  are 
thus  led  to  consider  the  type  of  explanation  of- 
fered by  anthropogeography.  It  is  argued,  for 
instance,  that  all  human  varieties  are  the  outcome 
of  their  several  environments.  Groups  are  what 
climate,  soil,  diet,  pursuits,  and  inherited  quali- 
ties have  made  them.  What  is  true  of  man  him- 
self is  no  less  true  of  his  works,  and  so  it  follows 
that  racial  and  cultural  zones  must  coincide, 

[9] 


&■ 


PROCESSES    OF    HISTORY 


while  a  correspondence  must  exist  between  these 
and  the  zones  of  temperature.  Hence  we  arrive 
at  the  theory  that,  in  both  hemispheres,  the  iso- 
cultural  bands  follow  the  isothermal  bands  in  all 
their  deflections.  In  this  view,  it  is  evident,  all 
the  specific  characteristics  of  humanity — phy- 
sique, temperament,  institutions,  occupations, 
and  ideas — are  the  more  or  less  immediate  reflec- 
tion of  habitat,  and  it  is  maintained  that  each 
breed  of  man  which  has  changed  its  place  of 
domicile  has  had  to  adopt  the  type  of  culture 
appropriate  to  the  region  into  which  it  has  pene- 
trated. 
The  forms  taken  by  this  theory  of  the  depend- 
ence of  man  on  habitat  are  very  numerous,  but  a 
few  illustrations  may  serve  to  suggest  the  wide 
scope  of  its  applications.  Thus  it  has  long  been 
held  that  the  advancement  of  man  in  northern 
Europe  was  a  direct  result  of  the  inhospitable 
conditions  which  forced  him  to  cultivate  un- 
precedented habits  of  industry.  Again,  it  has 
been  explained  that  the  extremes  of  character 
attributed  to  the  Slav  are  due  to  the  extremes  of 
climate  on  the  wind-swept  steppes.  The  long  and 
bitter  cold,  it  is  said,  has  enabled  the  Russian 
peasants  to  survive,  since  it  has  fostered  the  spirit 

[10] 


THE   NATURE   AND    SCOPE 


of  comradeship,  and  this,  in  turn,  has  held  them 
together  in  their  mir  or  village-community.  The 
habitat,  it  also  seems,  provides  the  conditions 
which  determine  the  progress  or  stagnation  of 
the  group,  for  agricultural  tribes,  being  bound 
to  the  soil,  are  conservative,  apathetic,  and  non- 
progressive, while  the  nomadic  or  semi-nomadic 
life  sharpens  the  wits  and  calls  forth  courage, 
self-reliance,  and  ingenuity.  By  others,  again,  it 
is  argued  that  the  birth  and  precocious  growth  of 
civilization  are  encouraged  by  a  small,  isolated, 
and  protected  habitat,  though  at  a  later  stage  this 
cramps  progress,  and  lends  the  stamp  of  arrested 
development  to  a  people  like  the  Greeks. 
The  types  of  theory  thus  briefly  indicated  have 
this  in  common,  that  they  attempt  to  describe  fac- 
tors which  may  be  regarded  as  operative  in  all 
human  groups,  and  are  thus  to  be  considered  as 
offering  an  explanation  on  a  scientific  basis.  To 
all  appearance,  however,  it  has  not  seemed  neces- 
sary to  the  exponents  of  these  views  to  show  how 
the  factors  described  could  have  produced  the 
differences  which  we  see  around  us.  Indeed,  the 
mode  of  procedure  adopted  has  been  simply  to 
explain  evident  differences  by  alleging  the  ante- 
cedence of  other  differences,  less  obvious,  but 

["] 


PROCESSES  OF  HISTORY 
still  unexplained.  Knowledge  is  not  really  ad- 
vanced by  asserting  that  all  human  advancement 
has  been  due  to  the  presence  of  some  particular 
race.  In  point  of  method,  the  failure  lies  in  the 
fact  that  the  theory  gives  no  insight  into  the  pro- 
cesses through  which  the  assumed  physical  su- 
periority of  the  Aryan  or  Teuton  has  been  trans- 
muted into  cultural  advancement.  But,  taken  on 
its  own  terms,  and  supposing,  for  the  moment, 
that  the  beginnings  of  cultural  development  in 
China  and  India  were  associated  with  the  intru- 
sion of  Aryans,  the  theory  does  not  suggest  how 
later  advances  have  taken  place  in  these  lands, 
and  it  ignores  the  fact  that  there  is  ample  evi- 
dence of  notable  advancement  in  Mesopotamia 
and  in  Egypt  prior  to  any  appearance  of  the 
Aryan  race.  Similarly,  it  throws  no  light  upon 
the  problem  in  hand  to  attribute  the  special  cul- 
tural characteristics  of  a  people  to  correspond- 
ingly particularized  innate  qualities. 

In  regard  to  anthropogeography,  it  may  be  said 
more  particularly  that  it  represents  not  so  much 
an  explicit  theory  as  an  almost  unlimited  mass  of 
correlations,  some  vague  and  unimportant,  others 
penetrating  and  of  the  highest  value.  In  some 
respects,  indeed,  this  subject,  at  once  new  and  of 

[12] 


THE   NATURE   AND    SCOPE 

a  remote  antiquity,  represents,  at  the  present 
time,  one  of  the  most  hopeful  aspects  of  the  study 
of  man,  for,  from  its  association,  however  in- 
determinate, with  geology,  it  has  gained  a 
breadth  and  an  inclusiveness  of  vision  that  has 
been  denied  the  better  established  humanistic 
studies.  Nevertheless,  a  too  close  association  with 
a  science  already  highly  elaborated,  and  a  too 
great  dependence  upon  the  work  of  pioneers  who 
had  not  fully  entered  into  the  spirit  of  modern 
scientific  method,  have  led  to  a  logical  formalism 
in  dealing  with  its  subject-matter  which  has  not 
wholly  been  in  the  interests  of  scientific  progress. 
Anthropogeography,  in  short,  provides  a  great 
body  of  observations  assembled  under  logically 
arranged  headings,  but  has  failed  to  recognize 
that  investigation  to  be  effective  must  be  con- 
ducted in  presence  of  a  specific  problem. 

Furthermore,  in  the  actual  consideration  of  the 
influence  of  habitat  upon  human  affairs,  there  is 
almost  invariably  apparent,  on  the  part  of  geog- 
raphers, a  certain  laxity  in  regard  to  the  facts  of 
vhistorical  change.  Though  habitat  and  climate 
have,  in  general,  remained  constant  throughout 
the  historical  period,  civilizations  have  arisen 
and  decayed,  to  be  followed  by  other  civiliza- 

['3] 


PROCESSES  OF  HISTORY 
tions  under  different  environmental  conditions. 
If  it  is  the  hardy  northerner  who  is  'progressive' 
at  one  time,  at  another  it  is  the  Akkadian  and 
Sumerian  in  the  hothouse  of  the  Persian  Gulf. 
If  the  village-community  is  a  response  to  the 
relentless  winter  of  the  Russian  steppes,  it  has 
also  persisted  in  torrid  India.  Egypt,  Phoenicia, 
Crete,  and  Greece  may  possibly  be  regarded  as 
protected  areas,  but  if  the  rise  of  civilization  is 
dependent  upon  isolation,  how  shall  we  account 
for  the  early  development  of  Lagash  and  Nip- 
pur? How,  too,  shall  we  account  for  the  absence 
of  such  developments  in  a  hundred  spots  more 
isolated  and  protected  still?  If  Greek  climate 
and  habitat  are  to  be  accepted  as  prepotent  in- 
fluences in  the  production  of  Periclean  Athens, 
and  German  climate  and  habitat  as  determining 
factors  in  the  development  of  the  military  power 
of  today,  why  have  not  these  relatively  constant 
factors  been  equally  operative  in  past  and  present 
times? 

Evidently,  then,  neither  the  race  theory,  nor 
that  of  habitat  offers  an  adequate  basis  for  an  ex- 
planation of  how  man  has  come  to  be  as  he  is,  and 
hence  we  are  driven  to  inquire  what  other  types 
of  theory  have  been  advanced. 

[■4] 


THE    NATURE    AND    SCOPE 

3.  From  a  wholly  different  point  of  view  there 
has  been  presented  a  theory  to  account  for  the 
inequalities  among  men  which  has  been  accorded 
an  acceptance  as  wide  as  the  theory  of  race,  but 
by  a  very  different  constituency,  for  while  the 
former  may  be  said  to  appeal  more  directly  to 
militarists  and  certain  groups  attracted  by  mod- 
ern biological  ideas,  the  economic  theory  of 
Marx  and  Engels  has  found  the  great  body  of  its 
adherents  among  the  workers  immediately  in- 
volved in  the  "class  struggle." 

Fundamentally,  the  point  of  departure  of  Marx 
is  the  idea  that  the  economic  factor  dominates  all 
the  other  factors  of  human  existence,  and  his  in- 
sistence on  this  view,  notwithstanding  the  exag- 
geration it  involves,  has  had  the  beneficial  effect 
of  directing  the  attention  of  students  to  the  im- 
portance of  a  series  of  facts  which,  previously, 
had  been  very  generally  ignored.  In  a  measure, 
Marx  also  may  be  said  to  have  employed  the 
method  of  science,  for  what  he  attempted  to  do 
was  to  isolate  and  describe  a  particular  factor  or 
process  manifested  in  human  affairs.  But  in  this 
undertaking,  notwithstanding  the  profound  in- 
fluence which  his  writings  have  had  upon  mod- 
ern thought,  the  limitations  of  his  outlook,  and 

[15] 


PROCESSES  OF  HISTORY 
his  imperfect  appreciation  of  the  complexities  of 
the  problem,  have  stood  in  the  way  of  a  perma- 
nent success.  It  should,  however,  be  remembered 
that  Marx  did  not  set  himself  to  work  out  a  scien- 
tific problem,  but  to  carry  forward  a  social  prop- 
aganda; he  was  not  attempting  to  analyze  the 
elements  of  history;  his  interest  was  excited  by 
the  special  problem  of  labor  under  modern  con- 
ditions, and  his  dominating  aim  was  to  account 
for  this  particular  phenomenon  in  its  present 
aspect.  Hence  he  neither  considered  the  entire 
field  of  economic  activity  in  modern  life,  nor  the 
conditions  of  labor  in  any  other  than  the  capital- 
istic form  of  society. 

It  must  not  be  supposed,  however,  that  Marx 
and  Engels,  while  maintaining  that  the  great 
moving  power  in  all  historical  events  was  the 
economic  development  of  society,  failed  to  recog- 
nize that  they  had  investigated  only  that  form  of 
economic  organization  under  which  they  them- 
selves were  actually  living.  "We  ought,"  Engels 
remarked,  "to  study,  at  least  in  their  essential 
features  and  taken  as  terms  of  comparison,  the 
other  forms  which  have  preceded  it  in  time,  or 
exist  alongside  of  it  in  less  developed  countries." 
And  he  stated  frankly:  "Marx  and  I  are  partly 

[i6] 


THE    NATURE    AND    SCOPE 

responsible  for  the  fact  that  the  younger  men 
have  sometimes  laid  more  stress  on  the  economic 
fact  than  was  necessary" ;  but  this  overemphasis, 
as  he  explained,  arose  from  the  exigencies  of  the 
debate  into  which  their  main  contention  precipi- 
tated them.  It  is  not  remarkable,  therefore,  that 
the  Marxian  interpretation  of  history  should 
have  failed  to  elucidate  the  means  through  which 
so  different  results  have  been  arrived  at  in  Asia 
and  in  Europe,  in  ancient  and  in  modern  times. 
The  fault,  if  there  be  any,  lies  not  with  these  great 
initiators  who  demonstrated  the  practical  utility 
of  an  investigation  of  the  elements  of  history,  but 
with  their  successors  who  have  failed  to  carry 
forward  and  to  broaden  the  scope  of  the  inquiries 
which  they  set  on  foot. 
This  theory,  then,  like  those  previously  men- 
tioned, is  unacceptable  as  an  explanation  of  how 
man  has  come  to  be  as  he  is,  for,  like  the  others, 
it  is  based  upon  a  limited  view  of  the  facts,  and 
represents  a  projection  of  a  single  factor  upon  the 
complexity  of  human  experience.  Practically 
speaking,  the  failure  in  all  these  cases  has  been 
due  to  a  lack  of  appreciation  of  the  necessity  of 
a  preliminary  study  of  method.  To  be  acceptable,^ 
any  such  theory  must  be  applicable  to  'backward' 

[17] 


PROCESSES    OF   HISTORY 

as  well  as  to  'advanced'  groups;  it  must  apply 
equally  to  all  periods  of  history  in  all  lands;  it 
must  apply,  furthermore,  to  the  'backward'  and 
'advanced'  members  of  all  groups,  and  hence  to 
the  experience  of  the  individual  in  the  world 
today. 

4.  The  number  and  variety  of  the  theories 
which  have  heretofore  been  advanced  should  be 
convincing  proof  that  in  approaching  a  problem 
of  this  magnitude  we  must  first  endeavor  to  ar- 
rive at  a  clear  understanding  of  the  method  to  be 
followed  in  conducting  the  inquiry.  There  can  be 
no  question  that  the  investigation  before  us  must 
rest  upon  an  examination  of  the  facts  of  human 
history,  for  we  ourselves  are  aware  that  any  pres- 
ent situation  in  which  we  may  happen  to  be  in- 
volved is  the  outcome  of  what  has  gone  before. 
But  the  practical  problem  with  which  we  are 
confronted  appears  only  when  we  come  to  ask 
how  the  concrete  facts  of  history  are  to  be  util- 
ized in  order  to  explain  the  status  of  man  as  we 
find  him  everywhere  throughout  the  world. 

During  the  nineteenth  century,  and  indeed  up 
to  the  present,  the  student  of  history  has  carried 
on  his  work  in  accordance  with  the  assumption 
that  such  an  explanation  would  be  afforded  by  a 

[18] 


THE   NATURE    AND    SCOPE 

statement,  in  the  form  of  narrative,  of  what  had 
happened  in  the  past. 

Now,  of  all  possible  modes  of  explanation,  the 
earliest  and  the  most  universal  is  that  naive  form 
which  is  represented  in  story-telling.  This  con- 
sists in  going  back  to  some  selected  beginning, 
and  carrying  forward  a  narrative  of  happenings 
from  that  point  to  the  situation  which  the  narra- 
tor has  undertaken  to  make  clear.  It  matters 
nothing  that,  in  its  earliest  manifestations,  his- 
torical narrative  starts  with  some  imaginary  be- 
ginning, such  as  the  Mosaic  account  of  Creation 
or  Hesiod's  Golden  Age,  the  principle  is  the 
same  in  all  cases,  namely,  the  acceptance  of  a 
situation  that  comes  first,  and  the  emergence 
from  this  of  a  complexity  which  has  its  conclu- 
sion in  a  known  eventuality. 

The  initial  difficulty  for  the  historian,  once  his 
starting-point  has  been  decided  upon,  is  that  he 
cannot  include  all  the  available  facts  of  past  oc- 
currences in  the  narrative  which  as  a  literary 
artist  he  is  bent  upon  creating.  The  creation,  as 
in  all  art,  involves  the  selection  of  facts  for  pre- 
sentation, and  while  this  selection  must  depend 
ultimately  upon  what  the  narrator  or  artist  him- 
self is,  it  can  be  made  only  in  the  light  of  some 

[■9] 


PROCESSES    OF   HISTORY 

conception  he  has  formed  of  the  course  of  events, 
of  some  interest  or  emotion  awakened  by  what 
he  believes  has  taken  place. 
The  most  obvious  basis  of  selection  is  the  inter- 
est enlisted  by  what  is  simply  curious  or  unusual. 
This  is  represented,  in  earlier  writings,  by  the 
miscellaneous  nature  of  the  records  set  down  by 
medieval  chroniclers  and  annalists,  and,  in  the 
work  of  contemporary  scholars,  by  the  recurrent 
statement:  "What  really  happened  was  not  what 
you  and  everyone  else  has  believed,  but  this  that 
I  alone  have  discovered."  On  a  broader  plane, 
the  selection  is  determined  by  the  interest  taken 
in  the  outcome  of  some  specific  series  of  events, 
more  particularly  when  this  leads  to  an  impres- 
sive denouement,  such  as  the  defeat  of  Xerxes  by 
the  relatively  insignificant  forces  of  the  Greeks. 
As,  however,  events  but  rarely  work  out  to  a  com- 
pletely satisfactory  ending — witness  Thucydides 
— historical  writers  have  fallen  back  upon  the 
method,  characteristic  in  the  drama,  of  depicting 
personal  character  revealing  itself  in  the  stress  of 
critical  circumstances.  Following  this  line  of  de- 
velopment, historiography  has  tended  to  empha- 
size the  part  played  by  the  individual  in  what 
has  happened,  relying  more  and  more  for  its  ex- 

[20] 


THE    NATURE    AND    SCOPE 

planations  upon  the  speculative  interpretation  of 
individual  motives,  and  justifying  this  procedure 
j  on  an  assumed  similarity  of  the  workings  of  the 
'  human  mind  in  similar  situations. 

At  a  later  stage,  reflection  on  the  seemingly 
meaningless  changes  of  fortune  revealed  in 
events  leads  to  the  conscious  effort  to  reach  an 
explanatory  basis  through  the  formulation  of 
some  concept  of  the  underlying  meaning  of  the 
course  of  history.  Thus,  for  example,  one  recent 
effort  is  directed  towards  showing  that  the  mean- 
ing lies  in  ''the  existence  of  a  mental  conflict  as  to 
the  means  by  which  happiness  is  to  be  attained," 
while  another  discovers  history  to  be  "the  story 
of  man's  increasing  ability  to  control  energy." 
Such  projections  of  abstract  points  of  view  have 
been  infinite  in  their  variety,  ranging  from  that 
of  Orosius  who  saw  in  events  the  hand  of  God  so 
ordering  at  all  times  the  affairs  of  men  that  dire 
calamity  should  unfailingly  overtake  neglect  of 
his  service,  to  that  of  a  contemporary  who  be- 
lieves that  "modern  science  is  crowned  by  the 
conception  of  an  ordered  progress  in  history." 
But  while,  at  this  point,  an  extended  resume  of 
theories  would  be  of  advantage  as  emphasizing 
the  fact  that  every  successive  generation  attains 

[21] 


PROCESSES    OF    HISTORY 

new  points  of  view,  one  must  perforce  assume 
familiarity  with  such  expositions  of  philosophies 
of  history  as  have  been  provided  by  Flint  and 
Barth,  for  what  is  really  germane  to  the  present 
discussion  is  the  residual  fact  that  today  the 
search  for  an  underlying  principle  in  history  is 
dominated  by  the  concept  of  "progress." 

It  may  be  well  here  to  point  out  that  the  idea  of 
"progress"  stands  in  much  the  same  relation  to 
the  study  of  man  as  that  of  "evolution"  to  the 
study  of  the  forms  of  life.  But,  whereas,  in  the 
hands  of  Darwin,  the  study  of  biological  evolu- 
tion passed  from  the  merely  speculative  into  the 
scientific  stage,  the  study  of  human  progress  is 
still  in  the  pre-Darwinian  period.  Thus  the  so- 
ciologist still  sets  before  himself  the  aim  of  dis- 
covering "the  law  of  progress,"  while  the  histo- 
rian, assuming  "progress"  without  further  ques- 
tion, displays  in  narrative  form  the  gradual  emer- 
gence of  features  which  he  personally  regards  as 
distinctively  modern  or  as  particularly  desirable. 
In  neither  the  one  case  or  the  other  has  the  inves- 
tigator concerned  himself  to  apply  to  the  subject- 
matter  in  hand  the  method  of  analysis  by  which 
Darwin  was  enabled  to  substantiate  the  specu- 

[22] 


THE    NATURE   AND    SCOPE 

lative  concept  of  "evolution"  by  the  scientific 
theory  of  "natural  selection." 

If  we  are  to  appreciate  the  implications  of  the 
idea  of  "progress,"  it  will  be  necessary  to  observe 
that  this  concept  is  based  upon  the  assumption 
that  history — the  entire  course  of  events  in  time — 
is  unitary,  that  it  constitutes  a  single  sequence  of 
happenings  in  which  progress  is  revealed.  Now, 
disregarding  the  use  which  is  being  made  of  this 
idea  in  contemporary  philosophical  discussions, 
and  concerning  ourselves  only  with  its  place  in 
historical  study,  it  will  readily  be  perceived  that 
the  concept  of  "progress"  is  just  the  reflection  of 
a  convention  in  accordance  with  which  we  base 
our  presentation  of  what  has  happened  on  the 
records  handed  down  to  us  by  certain  European 
peoples  with  whose  languages  we  are  more  or 
less  familiar.  Frankly,  our  concepts  are  at  the 
mercy  of  such  information  as  we  have  at  com- 
mand, and  so  the  term  "ancient  history"  suggests, 
not  diversified  series  of  facts  embodying  the 
experiences  of  mankind  during  a  certain  period 
of  time,  but  a  narrative  restatement  of  accounts 
which  record  the  varying  fortunes  of  some  of  the 
political  units  of  Mediterranean  lands,  more 
particularly  Greece  and  Rome.  We  of  the  twenti- 

[23] 


PROCESSES  OF  HISTORY 
eth  century,  with  all  our  opportunities  for  ac- 
quaintance with  the  history  of  Asia,  have  not 
risen  above  the  limitations  of  our  predecessors, 
and  continue  to  imagine  that  we  have  arrived  at 
a  synthesis  of  human  history  when  we  have  con- 
structed a  narrative  by  selecting  parts  or  periods 
of  the  history  of  one  European  country  after 
another  which  seem  to  us  as  of  special  and  pecu- 
liar significance.  On  the  other  hand,  if  we  look  a 
little  further,  it  will  be  to  discover  that  human 
history  is  not  unitary,  but  pluralistic;  that  what 
we  are  given  is  not  one  history,  but  many;  and, 
that  the  concept  of  "progress"  is  arrived  at  by  the 
maintenance  of  a  Europocentric  tradition  and 
the  elimination  from  consideration  of  the  activi- 
ties of  all  peoples  whose  civilization  does  not  at 
once  appear  as  contributory  to  our  own. 

What,  then,  is  essential  for  us  to  realize  is  that 
the  methodological  assumption  upon  which  the 
work  of  the  historian  is  based,  namely,  that  we 
may  hope  to  arrive  at  an  explanation  of  how  man 
has  come  to  be  as  he  is  through  the  narrative  state- 
ment of  what  has  happened  in  the  past,  is,  criti- 
cally considered,  inadmissible.  Narrative  is  a 
form  or  genre  of  literature,  and  in  this  lies  its 
forceful  appeal,  for,  so  long  as  men  endure,  the 

[24] 


THE  NATURE  AND  SCOPE 
tale  of  what  men  have  done,  and  how  they  have 
striven,  will  never  lose  its  interest  and  attraction. 
Furthermore,  so  long  as  men  continue  to  question 
the  meaning  of  life,  the  attempt  will  be  contin- 
ually renewed  to  grasp  the  ultimate  significance 
of  the  course  taken  by  events  in  the  past.  But  be- 
yond the  romance  of  human  deeds,  and  quite 
apart  from  any  effort  to  penetrate  the  inscruta- 
bility of  fate,  there  remains  for  scientific  investi- 
gation the  vital  and  fundamental  problem  how 
man  in  all  his  diversity  has  come  to  be  as  we  find 
him  now. 

There  are  many  histories,  and  this  pluralism 
reveals  our  task  as  historical  students,  which  is 
not  to  explain  occurrences  by  the  intercalation  of 
hypothetical  motives,  or  to  create  narratives 
based  upon  the  selection  of  events  which  seem  to 
us  of  importance  in  view  of  some  unverified 
theory  of  progress,  but  to  compare  these  several 
histories  with  the  object  of  ascertaining  what  it 
is  they  hold  in  common.  The  fact  is  that  an  under- 
standing of  "how  things  have  come  to  be  as  they 
are"  can  be  arrived  at  only  through  a  study  of 
what  has  happened  in  the  past,  but  this  under- 
standing is  not  furthered  by  the  conventional 
construction  of  narratives.  What  is  requisite  is 

[25] 


PROCESSES    OF    HISTORY 


that  we  should  compare  the  events,  the  things 
that  have  happened,  without  the  intervention  of 
the  subjective  interests,  often  unacknowledged 
because  unconsciously  held,  of  historical  writers. 
Precisely  what  we  need  to  begin  with  are  great 
bodies  of  historical  data,  annals  or  fasti,  relating 
to  all  human  groups  without  distinction,  which 
have  not  been  subjected  to  the  selective  activities 
of  the  literary  artist  and  the  philosopher. 

Having  thus  seen  that  the  conventionalized 
method  of  the  historian  is  inadequate,  it  now  re- 
mains to  inquire  how  the  concrete  facts  of  history 
may  be  utilized  in  dealing  with  the  problem 
before  us. 

5.  As  it  is  imperative  for  us  to  arrive  at  an  un- 
derstanding of  the  method  to  be  employed  in 
dealing  with  the  problem  of  how  man  has  come 
to  be  as  he  is,  and  as  the  narrative  method  hitherto 
relied  upon  by  the  historian  sacrifices  the  wealth 
of  concrete  detail  to  the  personal  or  speculative 
interest  of  individuals,  it  may  be  well  to  observe 
how  men  in  other  fields  of  history,  such  as  Astron- 
omy, Geology,  and  Biology,  have  conducted 
their  investigations. 

In  the  first  place,  each  of  these  subjects  is  con- 
fronted with  the  complexity  of  a  present  status 

[26] 


THE  NATURE  AND  SCOPE 
which  is  assumed  to  be  the  outcome  of  all  the 
changes  that  have  taken  place  up  to  the  present 
time.  Secondly,  in  each  of  these  cases  the  object 
or  aim  of  the  investigation  is  to  arrive  at  an  un- 
derstanding of  how  this  present  status  has  come 
to  be  as  it  is,  and  the  inquiry  takes  the  form  of  an 
examination  of  the  nature  of  the  changes  which 
have  taken  place. 

What  disguises  the  identity  of  the  problem  that 
presents  itself  to  the  student  of  nature  and  the 
student  of  man  is  that  while  the  latter  is  provided 
with  a  great  body  of  dated  evidence  for  what  has 
happened  in  the  past,  the  former  is  left  without 
any  strictly  chronological  data,  and  is  forced  to 
be  content  with  a  merely  relative  time-order  in 
his  historical  facts.  In  short,  in  his  efforts  to  in- 
terpret the  records  of  the  past,  the  historian  of 
nature  is  deprived  of  the  assistance  of  the  testi- 
mony of  human  witnesses.  Nevertheless,  while 
this  handicap  has  immeasurably  increased  the 
difficulties  in  his  way,  it  has  not  prevented  him 
from  contributing  in  a  most  notable  manner  to 
the  sum  of  human  knowledge. 

It  may  fairly  be  said  that  the  greater  success  of 
the  student  of  nature  in  arriving  at  a  scientific 
method  for  dealing  with  any  history  has  been  due 

[27] 


PROCESSES    OF    HISTORY 

to  the  greater  difficulties  which  he  has  encoun- 
tered. Thus  while  the  historian  of  man  has  en- 
gaged his  efforts  in  creating  narratives  based 
upon  details  arranged  in  chronological  order, 
the  historian  of  nature  has  been  forced  to  prove 
that  the  facts  upon  which  he  must  rely  may  even 
be  regarded  as  historical  data.  Indeed,  this  proof 
was  the  main  endeavor  of  the  great  group  of 
scientists  in  the  first  half  of  the  nineteenth  century 
whose  work  may  be  said  to  have  culminated  in 
the  publication  of  Darwin's  Origin  of  Species  in 
1859.  The  difficulties  of  the  situation  in  which 
the  advocates  of  an  historical  point  of  view  were 
placed,  not  the  least  being  the  almost  universal 
acceptance  of  the  theory  of  creation,  necessitated 
a  careful  consideration  of  the  method  to  be  em- 
ployed, and  so  forced  the  recognition  of  the 
axiom  that  any  present  status  is  to  be  regarded  as 
the  outcome  of  the  continued  operation  of  natural 
processes,  which  was  accepted  as  the  task  of 
science  to  discover. 
Thus  the  geologist,  having  arrived  at  criteria 
for  determining  the  time-order  of  strata,  pro- 
ceeded to  examine  the  disposition  of  the  rocks 
in  every  accessible  area  of  the  earth's  surface. 
Now,  while  the  rocks  are  assumed  to  have  been 

[28] 


THE    NATURE   AND    SCOPE 

laid  down,  as  a  result  of  the  operation  of  natural 
processes,  in  horizontal  layers,  they  are  actually 
found  in  an  infinite  variety  of  positions.  Hence  it 
became  necessary  to  show  how  these  dislocations 
had  been  efTfected,  and  what  one  might  speak  of 
as  the  explanatory  "stock  in  trade"  of  the  geolo- 
gist consists  in  the  series  of  processes  which  are 
manifested  in  the  geological  history  of  the  earth. 
As  a  result  of  this  way  of  looking  at  things,  the 
geologist  comes  to  see  around  him  the  evidences 
of  how  the  earth  has  come  to  be  as  it  is,  and  he 
comes  to  regard  the  landscape  before  him,  not 
merely  as  a  static  disposition  of  picturesque  form, 
and  light  and  shadow,  but  as  an  embodiment  of 
constant  activities  which,  in  the  course  of  time, 
have  brought  this  scenery  to  its  present  aspect, 
and  will  continue  to  modify  it  throughout  all 
time  to  come.  He  can  still  feel  the  grandeur  of 
the  Alps,  and  still  appreciate  the  beauty  of  Fuji- 
yama, but  in  addition  to  the  aesthetic  pleasure, 
the  sights  convey  to  his  mind  an  added  wealth  of 
suggestion  regarding  the  ceaseless  workings  of 
Nature. 

Again,  the  biologist  has  in  all  times  endeavored 
to  account  for  the  infinite  variety  of  the  forms  of 
life,  but  even  in  the  eighteenth  century  no  further 

[29] 


PROCESSES    OF   HISTORY 


progress  had  been  made  than  is  represented  by 
the  belief  that  species  were  just  so  many  distinct 
and  permanent  creations  of  God.  In  the  nine- 
teenth century,  however,  a  new  perspective  was 
gained,  and  men  began  to  perceive  an  historical 
depth  in  the  relations  of  species.  When  the  sys- 
tematic classification  of  plants  and  animals  had 
been  carried  to  a  certain  elaboration,  it  was  dis- 
cerned, through  the  co-operation  of  geology,  that 
the  arrangement  in  order  from  simplest  to  most 
complex  represented  a  time-order  from  early  to 
late.  As  an  additional  result  of  the  close  associa- 
tion of  geologists  and  biologists,  the  latter  also 
adopted  from  their  co-workers  the  axiom  that 
things  had  come  to  be  as  they  are  through  the 
continued  operation  of  natural  processes.  Dar- 
win's method,  in  fact,  is  just  that  of  his  geological 
contemporaries  applied  to  a  new  subject-matter; 
and  his  object  was  the  discovery  of  the  process 
or  processes  through  which  new  species  have 
successively  come  into  existence.  In  other  words, 
what  he  planned  to  carry  out  was  an  analysis  of 
the  elements  of  biological  history. 
Whether  Darwin  was  successful  in  his  under- 
taking is  for  biologists  to  decide,  though  up  to 
the  present  time  they  have  not  given  sufficient 

[30] 


THE    NATURE   AND    SCOPE 

attention  to  his  method  and  to  the  nature  of  the 
assumptions  upon  which  his  theory  was  based. 
All  that  need  be  observed  in  the  present  connec- 
tion, however,  is  that,  in  putting  forward  his 
theory  of  "natural  selection,"  Darwin  believed 
that  he  had  described  the  process  through  which 
the  forms  of  life  have  come  to  be  as  they  are 
today.  Should  it  nevertheless  appear  that  "nat- 
ural selection"  is  inadequate  to  explain  the  origin 
of  species,  this  conclusion  would  not  invalidate 
the  fundamental  assumption  that  such  processes 
are  actually  in  operation;  it  would  simply  mean 
that  Darwin's  particular  attempt  at  analysis  was 
incomplete,  perhaps  even  erroneous  throughout. 
What  would  then  remain  to  be  done  would  be  to 
make  an  entirely  new  analysis  with  greater  re- 
gard to  precision  in  method.  It  must  be  remem- 
bered, whatever  the  decision,  that  the  theory  of 
"natural  selection"  has  created  an  interest  in  even 
the  lowliest  forms  of  life  that  did  not  previously 
exist,  and  that  it  has  opened  the  eyes  of  men,  in 
a  wholly  new  sense,  to  the  ways  by  which  Nature 
accomplishes  her  ever  varying  and  ever  wonder- 
ful results.  Nor  should  it  be  overlooked  that  the 
method  of  historical  inquiry  by  which  the  natu- 
ral scientist  has  attempted  to  explain  how  things 

[31] 


PROCESSES    OF    HISTORY 
have  come  to  be  as  they  are,  has  led  to  results 
which  have  been  of  the  highest  practical  impor- 
tance to  mankind. 

It  has  been  suggested  above  that  astronomers, 
geologists,  and  biologists  have  been  compelled  to 
conduct  historical  inquiries  without  the  aid  of 
specifically  dated  materials,  and  there  can  be 
little  doubt  that  this  deficiency  has  not  only  been 
difficult  to  overcome,  but  has,  in  the  case  of  biol- 
ogy, at  least,  led  to  far-reaching  controversies 
and  misunderstandings,  and  even  to  unconscious 
assumptions  which  have  become  stumbling- 
blocks  in  the  path  of  knowledge.  When,  there- 
fore, we  consider  the  obstacles  which  have  been 
encountered  by  the  students  of  nature,  it  must 
be  apparent  that  the  student  of  man  is  placed  in 
a  unique  and  enviable  position,  through  the  pos- 
session of  dated  evidence,  for  the  investigation  of 
the  elements  of  human  history.  Indeed,  the 
chronological  record,  incomplete  as  it  is,  frees 
the  human  historian  from  some  of  the  greater 
difficulties  by  which  the  historian  of  nature  is 
confronted. 

On  the  other  hand,  it  would  seem  that  this  un- 
paralleled aid  to  investigation  has,  in  itself, 
threatened  to  become  an  insurmountable  obstacle 

[32] 


THE    NATURE   AND    SCOPE 

to  the  advancement  of  science,  for  the  interest  ex- 
cited by  the  effort  to  perfect  this  record,  blinds 
us,  apparently,  to  the  infinite  possibilities  which 
it  places  in  our  hands.  The  historian,  fortified  by 
an  ancient  convention,  is  so  completely  absorbed 
in  the  details  before  him,  and  in  perfecting  his 
own  critical  technique,  that  he  leaves  to  one  side 
the  wider  problems  of  historical  method.  When, 
however,  these  problems  are  actually  taken  up, 
it  comes  to  be  seen  that  historical  method  is  the 
same  whatever  the  history  investigated — whether 
that  of  the  stellar  universe,  of  the  earth,  of  the 
forms  of  life  upon  the  earth,  or  of  man.  It  comes 
to  be  seen  that  in  each  case  the  problem  is  the 
same,  namely,  to  show  how  things  have  come  to 
be  as  they  are;  that  in  each  case  the  investigation 
presupposes  the  antecedence  of  innumerable 
series  of  historical  events;  that  in  each  case  the 
inquiry  is  based  upon  the  assumption  or  axiom 
that  things  have  come  to  be  as  they  are  through 
the  continued  operation  of  natural  processes,  and 
that  these  processes  are  to  be  discovered  only 
through  examination  of  what  has  happened  in 
the  past.  And  here  it  must  be  clearly  stated,  since 
this  is  a  point  upon  which  much  misunderstand- 
ing has  arisen  through  Darwin's  acceptance  of 

[33] 


PROCESSES    OF    HISTORY 


Lyell's  method,  that  the  investigation  of  the  pro- 
cesses of  change  must  be  based  upon  the  facts  of 
history,  and  cannot  be  discovered  by  examination 
of  the  results  given  in  the  present.  On  the  other 
hand,  if  our  inferences  from  the  historical  data 
are  correct,  they  should  be  verifiable  by  appli- 
cation to  things  as  they  are. 

6.  It  has  been  urged  repeatedly  that  the  en- 
deavor to  arrive  at  an  analysis  of  the  elements  of 
history  is  no  longer  ''history,"  since  this,  of  neces- 
sity, has  its  sole  end  in  narrative.  It  might  be 
urged  in  contravention  of  this  argument  that  the 
word  "history"  originally  meant  "inquiry,"  and 
only  secondarily  came  to  be  applied  to  the  em- 
bodiment of  the  results  of  inquiry  in  the  particu- 
lar form  of  narrative.  But,  in  reality,  the  situa- 
tion is  too  serious  to  admit  of  debate  in  regard 
to  the  application  of  a  word  having  already 
many  recognized  meanings.  "History,"  in  the 
widest  sense,  means  all  that  has  happened  in  the 
past,  and,  more  particularly,  all  that  has  hap- 
pened to  the  human  race.  Now,  the  v/hole  body 
of  historical  students  is  in  possession  of  a  vast 
accumulation  of  information  in  regard  to  the 
former  activities  and  experiences  of  mankind, 
and  the  problem  which  is  uppermost  at  the  pres- 

[34] 


THE    NATURE    AND    SCOPE 

ent  time  is  how  this  accumulated  information — 
which  already  far  exceeds  the  possibility  of  state- 
ment in  any  narrative  synthesis — may  be  utilized 
to  throw  light  upon  the  difficulties  that  confront 
mankind.  In  the  world  as  it  is  today,  is  the  his- 
torical scholar  to  look  forward  to  contributing 
the  results  of  his  specialized  researches  to  some 
later  Cambridge  Modern  History,  or  is  he,  on 
the  other  hand,  to  entertain  the  hope  that  his 
investigations  may  stand  beside  those  of  the 
biologist,  for  example,  as  contributing,  through 
an  added  knowledge  of  the  operations  of  nature, 
to  the  welfare  of  the  human  race? 
Yet,  while  there  are  many  who  insist  upon  the 
conventional  aim  of  reducing  all  historical  facts 
to  narrative,  there  are  unmistakable  evidences 
that  other  historical  students  are  seeking  a  new 
outlet  for  their  activities,  and  a  new  utilization 
for  their  knowledge.  It  is  only  necessary  to  ob- 
serve the  interest  accorded  to  Lord  Acton's  pro- 
ject for  a  History  of  Freedom,  it  is  only  neces- 
sary to  take  cognizance  of  the  studies  which  mul- 
tiply daily  on  the  religious,  economic,  geographi- 
cal, and  other  phases  of  modern  history  to  see 
that  men  are  reaching  out  in  directions  unknown 
to  the  older  historiography,  directions  which  are 

[35] 


PROCESSES    OF    HISTORY 

manifestly  tentative  approximations  to  a  scien- 
tific standpoint.  For  the  undercurrent  of  all  this 
awakened  interest  is  analytical;  and  whether  we 
set  ourselves  to  isolate  the  strand  of  "freedom" 
or  that  of  ''class  struggle,"  the  influence  of  "sea 
power"  or  that  of  "religious  revivals,"  we  are 
contributing,  in  the  long  run,  to  an  analysis  of 
the  elements  of  history. 

Only  an  optimist,  however,  would  suggest  that 
this  new  movement  in  historical  study  had  found 
itself,  and  was  thoroughly  conscious  of  its  meth- 
odological foundations.  The  fact  is  that  while  we 
are  gradually  escaping  from  the  dominance  of 
narrative  we  have  not  as  yet  acquired  the  width 
of  outlook  necessary  for  the  pursuit  of  analysis 
on  a  truly  humanistic  basis.  Our  vision  is  still 
focussed  upon  Europe  and  the  doings  of  Euro- 
peans, and  while  we  look  with  a  kindly  interest 
at  "the  map  of  the  world  as  known  to  Herodo- 
tus," we  seem  unable  to  appreciate  the  fact  that 
relatively  the  scope  of  our  own  historical  in- 
quiries is  less  extensive  than  his.  By  one  or  an- 
other eminent  contemporary  authority,  the  study 
of  history  has  been  regarded  as  limited  to  the  in- 
vestigation of  written  documents;  as  limited  to 
the  Christian  era;  as  limited  to  southern  and 

[36] 


THE    NATURE   AND    SCOPE 

western  Europe;  as  limited  to  political  events. 
Nevertheless,  there  has  long  been  a  tendency 
towards  a  wider  outlook,  but,  as  a  matter  of  fact, 
the  development  of  this  broader  interest  has  been 
forced  to  wait  upon  an  extension  of  knowledge 
which  has  only  been  achieved  within  the  last  few 
decades  through  the  progress  of  archaeological 
discoveries  and  of  Oriental  studies.  With  this  dif- 
ficulty removed,  we  may  face  the  situation  that 
the  analytical  study  of  history  must  be  founded 
upon  a  comparison  of  the  particular  histories  of 
all  human  groups,  and  must  be  actuated  by  the 
conscious  effort  to  take  cognizance  of  all  the 
available  facts.  If  this  seems  too  much,  let  us  re- 
member that  in  a  generation  we  have  moved  back 
from  Greece  to  Egypt,  from  Egypt  to  Babylonia, 
and  that  now,  thanks  to  the  Carnegie  Institution, 
an  even  more  remote  vista  has  been  opened  up  by 
the  excavations  at  Anau.  The  minimal  unit  of 
history  is  not  a  series  of  empires,  following  each 
other  in  time,  from  the  plain  of  Shinar  to  the 
British  Isles,  but  the  continental  mass  of  the 
Older  World  taken  as  a  whole,  and  throughout 
the  time  occupied  by  the  generations  of  men. 
Only  with  such  an  outlook  may  we  hope,  through 
the  application  of  analysis,  to  discover  the  factors 

[37] 


PROCESSES    OF    HISTORY 

and  processes  of  history,  and  thus  arrive  at  a 
scientific  knowledge  of  the  way  in  which  man 
has  come  to  be  as  he  is. 


Observation  of  the  groups  into  which  mankind 
is  broken  up  leads  us  to  question  how  the  dififer- 
ences  between  them  have  come  to  be  what  they 
are,  and  hence  to  examine  such  explanations  of 
the  problem  as  have  hitherto  been  advanced.  A 
consideration  of  certain  typical  solutions  that 
have  been  offered  brings  us  to  the  conclusion  that 
in  every  case  these  have  been  based  upon  a  re- 
stricted view  of  the  facts,  and  thus  forces  upon 
us  the  necessity  of  taking  up  the  entire  problem 
anew. 

Seeing,  however,  that  this  problem  is  one  of  the 
greatest  magnitude  and  difficulty,  it  would  seem 
to  be  a  proper  precaution,  in  advance  of  embark- 
ing upon  the  undertaking,  to  examine  the  meth- 
odological equipment  on  which  we  shall  be 
forced  to  rely.  As  a  result  of  such  an  examination, 
it  becomes  apparent  that  the  traditional  method 
still  adhered  to  by  the  historian,  the  statement  of 
what  has  taken  place  in  the  form  of  narrative, 
does  not  lead  to  any  explanatory  conclusion;  and 

[38] 


THE   NATURE    AND    SCOPE 

so,  if  the  whole  attempt  is  not  to  be  abandoned  as 
vain  and  chimerical,  it  becomes  necessary  to  find 
out  how  investigators  have  proceeded  in  other 
fields  of  history.  This  leads  to  the  discovery  that 
geologists  and  biologists  utilize  the  historical  in- 
formation at  their  command,  not  for  the  purpose 
of  constructing  narratives  of  happenings,  but  to 
determine  what  have  been  the  processes  through 
which  things  have  come  to  be  as  they  are. 
The  point  of  view  thus  gained  at  once  clarifies 
the  situation,  for  it  reveals  the  significance  of  the 
chronological  data  which  the  human  historian  of 
today  has  inherited  from  his  predecessors;  it 
throws  light  upon  the  nature  of  the  activities  of 
a  large  and  increasing  number  of  historical  stu- 
dents; and  it  displays  the  importance  and  utility 
of  the  great  residuary  body  of  historical  facts 
which  historiographers  have  been  unable  to  in- 
corporate in  their  narratives.  Furthermore,  it 
shows  that  the  objections  which  have  been  urged 
regarding  the  application  of  scientific  method 
as  falling  within  the  province  of  the  historical 
student  are  negligible,  for  a  knowledge  of  the 
factors  and  processes  of  history  can  be  arrived  at 
only  through  the  study  of  history,  and  this  type  of 

[39] 


PROCESSES    OF   HISTORY 

inquiry  provides  an  opportunity  by  which  the 
extraordinary  wealth  of  dated  material  that  is 
characteristic  of  human  history  may  be  made  to 
subserve  the  highest  interests  of  mankind. 


[40] 


II 

THE  GEOGRAPHICAL  FACTOR 
IN  HISTORY 

I.  Having  arrived  at  a  formulation  of  the  prob- 
lem to  be  investigated,  and  at  a  general  concep- 
tion of  the  method  to  be  followed,  it  next  becomes 
necessary  to  consider  the  character  of  the  evi- 
dence to  be  employed.  Freeman  was  far  from  be- 
ing alone  in  the  belief  that,  while  the  recovery  of 
the  ancient  records  of  Eastern  peoples  was  to  be 
regarded  with  pleasure,  the  historian  could  not 
accept  these  as  materials  for  the  study  which  was 
his  own.  This  is  an  artificial  distinction  and  an 
improper  limitation  to  research,  and,  indeed,  the 
greatest  obstacle  to  the  scientific  study  of  history 
has  been  the  conventional  attitude,  of  which  this 
is  an  example,  by  which  the  attention  of  histo- 
rians has  been  restricted  to  Europe  and  the  activ- 
ities of  Europeans,  for  such  limitation  would  im- 
pose an  absolute  bar  to  the  application  of  the 
comparative  method.  If,  however,  the  many  his- 
tories with  which  we  are  confronted,  histories  of 

[4-] 


PROCESSES    OF   HISTORY 

India,  China,  and  Europe,  are  to  be  compared, 
this  involves  the  assumption  that  the  essential 
content  of  history  is  everywhere  the  same,  that 
human  history  is  made  up  of  the  same  materials 
throughout,  and  v^oven  upon  the  same  loom. 
Simple  as  this  declaration  may  appear  to  be,  it 
involves  conclusions  of  such  far-reaching  im- 
portance that  it  becomes  essential  to  examine  the 
bases  for  an  acceptance  of  the  homogeneity  of 
history. 

Europe  and  Asia  are  indissoluble,  and  are  sepa- 
rated in  name  only.  When  we  stop  to  consider  the 
map  of  the  eastern  hemisphere  it  is  at  once  appar- 
ent that  Europe  is  just  a  westward  extension  or 
peninsula  of  the  great  land-mass  of  Eurasia.  The 
convention  by  which  we  regard  the  two  conti- 
nents as  divided  is  not  an  outgrowth  of  modern 
geographical  knowledge,  but  represents  simply 
a  traditional  nomenclature  which  we  have  in- 
herited from  immemorial  antiquity.  Physically, 
Europe  and  Asia  are  continuous :  the  great  north- 
ern plain  of  Asia  penetrates  into  the  heart  of 
Europe;  the  mountain  barrier  which,  alternately 
expanding  to  enclose  great  basins  like  those  of 
Hungary,  Persia,  and  Tibet,  and  focussing  in 
knots  like  the  Alps,  Ararat,  and  the  Pamirs, 

[42] 


GEOGRAPHICAL    FACTOR 

stretches  from  Atlantic  to  Pacific,  is  crossed  only 
by  occasional  passes;  the  line  of  depressions, 
conspicuous  in  the  Mediterranean,  runs  through 
the  Black,  the  Caspian,  and  the  Aral  seas, 
through  lakes  like  Balkash,  Issik,  Zaisan,  and 
Baikal,  from  west  to  farthest  east;  the  desert 
belt  lies  stretched,  a  veritable  cincture,  Sahara, 
Arabia,  Iran,  Turkestan,  and  Takla  Makan, 
across  the  body  of  the  older  world. 

Again,  if  we  consider  the  distribution  of  peo- 
ples, there  is  no  point  at  which  we  may  draw  a 
line  of  separation  between  Asia  and  Europe. 
There  are  representatives  of  European  stocks  to 
be  found  throughout  the  eastern  continent,  while, 
conversely,  in  the  West  there  is  no  nation  without 
its  quantum  of  Asiatic  blood :  there  are  Finns  in 
the  North,  Mongols  in  Central  Europe,  Arabs  in 
Spain,  Turks  on  the  Aegean,  and  Semites  every- 
where. 

Furthermore,  in  their  history,  the  two  parts  of 
Eurasia  are  inextricably  bound  together.  Mac- 
kinder  has  shown  how  much  light  may  be  thrown 
upon  European  history  by  regarding  it  as  sub- 
ordinate to  Asiatic;  and  while  we  may  question 
Ujfalvy's  saying  that  Rome  fell  because  the 
Chinese  built  a  wall,  we  cannot  deny  that  the 

[43] 


PROCESSES    OF    HISTORY 

ancient  history  of  Europe  is  as  incomprehensible 
without  a  knowledge  of  the  Nearer  East  as  medi- 
eval history  without  reference  to  the  migrations 
of  Asiatic  peoples  from  the  northern  steppes. 
The  oldest  of  historians  held  the  idea  that  the 
epochs  of  European  history  were  marked  by  al- 
ternating movements  across  the  imaginary  line 
that  separates  East  and  West;  to  us  these  move- 
ments are  distinguishable  in  remotely  prehistoric 
times,  they  have  left  their  legible  traces  on  the 
languages  we  speak,  they  are  evident  in  periods 
of  Greek  history  unknown  to  Herodotus,  and  are 
already  modern  with  the  expeditions  of  Darius 
and  Alexander,  with  the  appearance  of  Huns 
and  Moslems  in  the  West  and  of  Prankish  king- 
doms in  the  East.  The  tide  has  turned,  we  may 
say,  since  Russia  conquered  Siberia  and  Britain 
became  paramount  in  Hindustan,  but  the  East 
has  not  been  vanquished,  and,  possibly,  the  re- 
turning tide  may  not  long  be  delayed. 

Something  more  than  this  intimacy  of  relation, 
however,  is  necessary  in  order  to  demonstrate 
that  the  history  of  man  in  Europe  and  Asia  is 
homogeneous.  The  fundamental  basis  of  argu- 
ment for  holding  that  the  History  of  man  every- 
where is  of  the  same  fabric,  does  not  rest  upon 

[44] 


GEOGRAPHICAL    FACTOR 

the  interconnections  of  events,  but  may  be  stated 
in  the  form  that  the  varying  experiences  of 
human  groups  have  been  similarly  conditioned 
by  the  varying  aspects  of  the  conformation  of  the 
globe.  Man  cannot  escape  the  physical  world  in 
which  he  lives,  nor  its  infinite  diversification; 
this  is  obvious,  but  it  will  require  some  illustra- 
tion to  make  clear  the  fact  that  the  even-handed 
dominance  of  nature  leads  inevitably  to  widely 
different  results  in  the  lives  of  men. 

2.  Europe  is  visibly  a  projection  from  the  block 
of  Eurasia,  but  if  we  examine  the  configuration 
of  the  larger  area  it  will  be  found  that  there  are 
other  projections  to  the  south  and  east.  India,  in- 
deed, is  easily  recognizable  as  a  peninsula,  but 
China  lies  quite  as  completely  outside  the  quad- 
rilateral of  the  central  mass.  Comparing  these 
three,  which,  incidentally,  contain  together  by 
far  the  greater  part  of  all  the  inhabitants  of  the 
globe,  it  will  be  discovered  that  China  and  India, 
though  seemingly  more  closely  united  to  the  cen- 
tral block,  are,  from  the  point  of  view  of  human 
accessibility,  much  more  completely  set  apart 
than  Europe,  For  while  the  latter  lies  exposed 
and  open  to  the  center,  through  the  level  plains 
of  Russia  and  the  convenient  approach  of  the 

[45] 


PROCESSES    OF   HISTORY 

Aegean  and  the  eastern  Mediterranean,  the 
former  lie  behind  the  protecting  bulk  of  the 
highest  and  most  difficult  mountain  system  in  the 
world.  Hence  India  may  be  reached  only  by 
utilizing  one  or  other  of  a  few  tortuous  routes 
through  the  towering  mountains  on  its  north- 
western frontier,  while  China,  similarly,  enjoys 
the  protection  of  the  inaccessible  mountains  of 
Tibet  on  its  western  flank,  and  of  the  wide- 
extending  deserts  to  the  northwest.  In  either  case, 
the  routes  by  which  the  borders  of  the  country 
may  be  reached  are  few  and  strictly  defined,  and 
are  impracticable  in  face  of  an  organized  de- 
fence; and  it  will  also  be  observed  that  both  in 
China  and  in  India  the  entire  country  stretches 
away  from  the  gateway  by  which  alone  access 
may  be  gained,  and  the  defence  of  this  protects 
the  land  from  molestation.  In  the  case  of  Europe, 
on  the  other  hand,  all  this  is  changed,  for  here 
there  is  no  single  or  restricted  strategic  point  at 
which  the  whole  area  may  be  defended,  and,  as 
a  consequence,  its  penetration  to  the  farthest  re- 
cesses has  been  repeated  and  complete.  Here, 
then,  in  its  very  simplest  form  is  an  example  of 
homogeneity,  inasmuch  as  the  fortunes,  expressed 
in  history,  of  the  inhabitants  of  these  areas  have 

[46] 


GEOGRAPHICAL   FACTOR 

turned  primarily  upon  the  relative  accessibility 
of  the  land. 

The  principal  reason,  apart  from  the  concentra- 
tion of  attention  upon  the  affairs  of  Europe,  why 
this  close  dependence  of  history  upon  the  irregu- 
larities of  the  surface  of  the  earth  has  not  been 
fully  recognized,  seems  to  be  the  unavoidable 
tendency  to  regard  as  interchangeable  or  synony- 
mous the  geographical  name  of  a  land  and  the 
title  of  its  dominant  political  power.  Thus  we 
speak  of  "the  history  of  China"  thinking  at  once 
of  political  happenings  and  of  a  certain  area  of 
the  earth's  surface  which  we  Europeans  have 
agreed  to  call  by  this  name.  But  the  subject  of  the 
historian's  discourse  is  not  an  actual  physical 
land,  he  considers  this  only  as  the  seat  of  a  par- 
ticular political  organization,  and  hence  a  more 
careful  usage  would  distinguish  between  the  title 
of  the  political  unit  and  the  name  of  the  country 
over  which  its  jurisdiction  extends.  It  would, 
indeed,  obviate  misunderstanding  if  we  were  to 
speak  habitually  of  the  governmental  unit,  coin- 
cident with  the  geographical  area  which  we  call 
"China,"  as  the  "Middle  Kingdom,"  Chung 
Kwo,  Hwa  Kwo,  or  any  of  the  titles  used  by  the 
Li  Min  or  Han  Ten  themselves,  for  then  we 

[47] 


PROCESSES    OF    HISTORY 

would  recognize  more  easily  that  the  political 
organization  has  not  always  been,  and  strictly 
speaking  is  not  now,  equated  with  the  geographi- 
cal area. 

This  consideration  leads  to  the  recognition  of 
another  aspect  of  homogeneity,  which  is,  that  the 
political  organizations  dealt  with  in  History 
have  all  come  into  being  at  definite  and  restricted 
spots,  from  which,  subsequently,  they  have  ex- 
panded. Indeed,  no  intimate  knowledge  of  his- 
tory is  necessary  to  reveal  how  limited  were  the 
original  geographical  areas  from  which  grew  the 
political  units  known  as  the  Roman,  Chinese, 
Russian,  and  British  empires.  A  uniformity  of 
this  sort  is  clearly  of  interest  in  and  for  itself;  it 
becomes  of  great  significance,  however,  when  we 
turn  to  examine  the  elements  common  to  all  such 
cases,  and  to  see  in  these  small  beginnings  the 
universal  influence  of  geographical  factors. 

Various  attempts,  already  alluded  to,  have  been 
made  to  discover  common  elements  in  the  begin- 
nings of  early  civilizations.  The  diflSculty  in  all 
these  cases  has  been  that  the  investigator  has 
limited  his  observation  to  the  lands  of  the  Nearer 
East,  and  has  failed  to  extend  the  comparison  to 
all  known  instances  of  the  emergence  of  political 

[48] 


GEOGRAPHICAL    FACTOR 

units.  So,  while  at  first  sight  it  may  appear  that 
these  beginnings  have  some  relation  to  the  irri- 
gable valleys  of  rivers  like  the  Nile  and  the 
Euphrates,  further  consideration  will  show,  on 
the  one  hand,  that  there  were  valleys  of  this 
character  in  which  civilizations  did  not  arise, 
and,  on  the  other,  that  civilizations  have  made 
their  appearance  in  quite  different  situations. 
Some  part  of  the  difficulty  that  has  been  expe- 
rienced in  the  attempt  to  isolate  the  common 
factors  in  the  different  instances  of  the  emergence 
of  advanced  groups  is  unquestionably  due  to  the 
use  of  such  vague  and  all-inclusive  terms  as 
"civilization."  If,  however,  we  restrict  the  in- 
quiry, for  the  moment,  to  the  beginnings  of 
political  organization,  a  working  basis  for  com- 
parison will  be  obtained  which  will  be  found  to 
lead  to  definite  and  verifiable  results. 
When,  therefore,  we  come  to  compare  the  dif- 
ferent cases  in  which  political  units  can  be  seen 
to  emerge,  it  is  first  to  be  observed  that  these  units 
are  restricted  in  every  case  to  small  areas,  and, 
when  the  common  character  of  these  areas  is  ex- 
amined, it  is  demonstrable  that  they  are  termini 
of  routes  of  travel,  and  hence  points  of  pressure 

[  49  ] 


PROCESSES    OF   HISTORY 


which   have   been   strictly   determined   by   the 
physical  conformation  of  the  earth's  surface. 

It  may  be  well,  as  far  as  possible,  to  envisage  the 
situation.  South  of  the  great  Eurasian  plain,  the 
mountain  barrier  and  the  desert  belt  offer  very 
real  obstacles  to  human  movement;  the  actual 
ways,  restricted  to  practicable  passes  and  suffi- 
ciently watered  routes,  provide  but  limited  pos- 
sibilities in  lines  of  travel.  Hence  supposing  that 
any  considerable  body  of  men  should,  for  any 
reason  whatever,  be  driven  from  an  established 
habitat  to  seek  a  new  place  of  abode,  the  world 
would  be  "open"  to  it  only  in  the  most  general 
sense.  In  such  a  case,  indeed,  any  one  choice 
would  severely  restrict  all  the  movements  that 
were  to  follow,  and  with  each  step  in  any  given 
direction,  the  options  for  the  future  would  be- 
come ever  fewer.  If  now  we  turn  to  observe  the 
habitable  extremities  to  which  the  routes  lead,  it 
is  manifest  that  a  theoretical  first  migrating 
group  will  settle  down  where  conditions  are  en- 
durable, but  a  second  will  find  itself  confronted 
by  the  first  as  occupants  in  possession.  In  what- 
ever manner  this  situation  may  be  met,  and  in 
certain  cases  there  is  evidence  that  the  earlier 
group  moved  on,  the  time  comes  when  the  ques- 

[50] 


GEOGRAPHICAL    FACTOR 

tion  of  occupancy  must  be  fought  out  at  the  gate- 
way. In  other  words,  while  a  little  effort  will 
serve  to  move  a  single  railroad  car  on  the  track, 
a  long  line  of  cars  lying  ahead  cannot  be  set  in 
motion  by  any  amount  of  mere  human  pressure 
exerted  at  one  end. 

Where  these  conditions  have  been  fulfilled, 
political  organizations  have  arisen,  sooner  or 
later,  throughout  the  Eurasian  continent.  Thus 
in  China  and  in  India,  which,  as  has  already  been 
pointed  out,  are  pockets  on  a  gigantic  scale,  the 
earliest  appearance  of  political  units  is  just  with- 
in the  entrance  or  opening.  Something  of  the 
same  general  character  is  to  be  seen  in  England, 
where  the  earliest  political  units  came  into  exist- 
ence along  the  line  of  greatest  exposure  to  the 
continent,  while,  just  as  in  China  and  India,  the 
population  of  the  more  remote  and  inaccessible 
areas  of  the  kingdom  have  scarcely  been  politi- 
cized up  to  the  present  day. 

All  the  termini  of  routes  are  not,  however,  of 
this  Indo-Chinese  pattern,  and  Mesopotamia  af- 
fords an  example  of  a  different  kind.  Here,  in- 
deed, is  a  land  which  is  accessible  from  every 
quarter,  so  that  it  may  be  regarded  as  the  focus 
of  routes  leading  in  from  different  directions. 

[SI] 


PROCESSES    OF    HISTORY 

Nevertheless,  the  phenomena  exhibited  are  of 
exactly  the  same  character;  political  organiza- 
tions come  into  existence  at  the  point  of  pressure, 
and  the  only  difference  between  this  case  and  the 
former  is  a  difference  in  the  degree  of  exposure, 
which  turns,  not  upon  the  activity  of  men,  but 
upon  the  physical  disposition  of  mountains, 
rivers,  and  deserts.  Furthermore,  if  we  think  of 
the  Euphrates  and  Tigris,  we  may  see  that  as 
water  would  rise  in  a  river  in  presence  of  some 
obstacle,  political  units  make  their  appearance 
higher  and  higher  upstream  as  successive  en- 
trants make  their  way  along  the  different  avenues 
of  approach. 

Stated  thus,  even  in  the  most  general  terms,  it 
becomes  evident  that  everywhere  the  beginnings 
of  political  organization  have  been  determined 
by  the  physical  disposition  of  the  land.  It  will 
have  been  observed,  however,  that  this  determi- 
nant influence  of  routes  has  been  dependent  upon 
the  presence  of  human  beings,  that  it  comes  into 
play  only  in  case  of  the  movement  of  peoples. 
Hence  the  origin  of  these  movements  becomes  a 
matter  of  primary  importance,  more  particu- 
larly as  the  homogeneity  of  history  is  further  ex- 

[52] 


GEOGRAPHICAL    FACTOR 

hibited  in  the  dependence  of  these  movements  or 
migrations  upon  man's  physical  surroundings. 

3.  With  practical  uniformity,  the  view  taken  of 
the  origin  of  migrations  is  that  these  movements 
have  been  the  necessary  outcome  or  manifesta- 
tion of  the  "natural  increase"  or  "automatic  ex- 
cess" of  population.  Nothing  indeed  could  well 
appear  simpler  to  the  modern  mind  than  this 
transference  to  earlier  times  of  the  typically 
nineteenth-century  picture  of  ever  flowing 
streams  of  emigration  finding  their  way  to  distant 
colonies.  Yet,  convincing  as  it  may  seem,  the  ex- 
planation conceals  a  problem  of  some  magnitude 
and  complexity. 

To  reach  the  core  of  the  difficulty,  it  may  be 
pointed  out  that  the  great  rise  in  European  popu- 
lation during  the  last  century  and  a  half  is  an 
altogether  exceptional  phenomenon.  At  its  very 
beginning,  this  increase  deeply  impressed  the 
minds  of  thoughtful  contemporaries,  and,  among 
others,  Malthus  took  up  the  problem,  setting 
himself  "to  investigate  the  causes  that  have 
hitherto  impeded  the  progress  of  mankind."  The 
object  of  the  present  inquiry  might  almost  be 
stated  in  the  same  terms,  but  Malthus,  possibly 
with  greater  discretion,  limited  his  field  of  re- 

[S3] 


PROCESSES    OF   HISTORY 

search  to  an  investigation  of  the  effects,  in  the 
case  of  man,  of  the  constant  tendency  in  all  life 
to  increase  beyond  the  available  means  of  sub- 
sistence. Of  this  tendency  there  can  be  little 
doubt,  and,  later  on,  Darwin  took  it  for  granted 
that  organic  beings  may  be  regarded  as  striving 
to  the  utmost  to  increase  in  numbers.  He  pointed 
out  that  the  progeny  of  a  single  pair  of  any  spe- 
cies, if  unhindered,  would  soon  cover  the  earth, 
and  Malthus  estimated  that,  under  favorable 
conditions,  the  human  race  might  double  itself 
four  times  in  every  hundred  years.  Manifestly, 
however,  no  such  "natural  increase"  takes  place, 
either  among  animals  or  men,  and  the  crucial 
point  in  the  investigations  both  of  Malthus  and 
of  Darwin  was  the  nature  and  effect  of  the 
''checks"  by  which  population  is  limited. 

It  was  argued  by  Darwin  that  each  organic 
being  lives  by  a  struggle  at  some  period  of  its  life, 
and,  adopting  the  view  expressed  by  Malthus 
that  those  who  labor  under  any  original  weakness 
or  infirmity  would  be  the  first  to  succumb,  he 
arrived,  by  inverting  the  idea,  at  the  conclusion 
that  the  survival  of  the  fittest  led  eventually,  not 
merely  to  a  maintenance  of  the  standard,  but  to 
the  development  of  new  species.  As  there  has 

[54] 


GEOGRAPHICAL    FACTOR 

been  a  marked  disposition  on  the  part  of  human- 
istic students  to  apply  Darwin's  hypothesis  to  the 
special  case  of  man,  it  may  be  urged  that  Dar- 
win's adaptation  of  Malthus'  ideas  should  not  be 
permitted  to  supersede  Malthus'  contribution  in 
its  own  field.  And  this  particularly  since,  not- 
withstanding the  common  tendency  of  animal 
and  human  population  to  increase,  the  difference 
in  the  nature  of  the  "checks"  applied  in  the  two 
cases  is  so  marked  as  to  make  separate  considera- 
tion imperative.  Among  animals,  as  Darwin  saw, 
the  struggle  is  a  direct  physical  effort,  and  results 
in  the  elimination  of  individuals  unable  to  bear 
their  part;  among  human  beings,  as  Malthus 
pointed  out,  actual  want  of  food  is,  practically 
speaking,  never  the  immediate  check.  Indeed, 
what  we  have  to  consider  in  the  latter  case  is  the 
means  adopted  for  the  prevention  of  increase, 
for  in  no  human  group  has  population  been  left 
to  grow  with  perfect  freedom  or  without  inter- 
ference. The  inquiry  in  the  case  of  man  must  con- 
cern itself,  then,  with  the  results  of  means 
adopted,  consciously  or  unconsciously,  for  the 
restriction  of  population;  and  hence  at  the  outset 
we  are  confronted  with  a  substitution  of  ideas  in 

[55] 


PROCESSES    OF    HISTORY 


place  of  the  physical  processes  represented  in 
"natural  selection." 

In  beginning  his  examination  of  the  influences 
which  have  retarded  human  advancement, 
Malthus  set  forth  certain  "propositions"  which 
he  regarded  as  axiomatic.  First,  he  considered 
that  "Population  is  necessarily  limited  by  the 
means  of  subsistence,"  and,  second,  that  "Popu- 
lation always  increases  where  the  means  of  sub- 
sistence increase."  To  the  first  of  these  an  adden- 
dum might  be  offered,  which,  though  by  no 
means  self-evident,  is  regarded  by  Bateson  as 
axiomatic  from  the  standpoint  of  the  biologist. 
This  may  be  stated  in  the  form  that,  as  popula- 
tion is  necessarily  limited  by  the  means  of  sub- 
sistence, in  normal  stable  conditions  it  remains 
stationary.  Now  it  will  readily  appear  that  if 
this  addendum  is  a  true  statement  of  the  case, 
mere  "natural  increase"  cannot  be  assigned  as  a 
reason  for  migration,  and  hence  some  other  ex- 
planation must  be  sought  to  account  for  this 
phenomenon.  It  follows,  therefore,  that  the  na- 
ture of  the  arguments  which  may  be  advanced 
in  support  of  the  added  "proposition"  must  be 
briefly  indicated. 

The  point  to  be  brought  out  is  that  owing  to  the 

[56] 


GEOGRAPHICAL    FACTOR 

restrictive  measures  employed,  primitive  groups 
do  not  multiply  to  such  an  extent  that  an  over- 
flow of  population  takes  place.  Among  animals, 
the  individual  arrives  on  the  scene  of  life  to  ac- 
cept the  chances  of  a  struggle  in  which  the  more 
vigorous  and  fortunate  have  an  advantage; 
among  primitive  peoples,  on  the  other  hand,  a 
continuance  of  the  life  of  the  individual  turns,  in 
the  first  instance,  upon  the  decision  of  older 
members  of  the  group  into  which  he  is  born,  and 
the  chances  of  survival  are  arbitrarily  limited  by 
the  forethought,  for  their  own  well-being,  of 
those  upon  whom  the  new  arrival  is  dependent. 
Writing  in  the  eighteenth  century,  Raynal  called 
attention  to  "that  multitude  of  singular  institu- 
tions which  retard  the  progress  of  population." 
To  convey  a  clear  impression  of  the  extent  to 
which  the  "natural  increase"  of  early  or  lower 
groups  was  restricted,  it  would  be  necessary  to 
consider  each  of  these  various  practices;  for  the 
present  purpose,  however,  it  will  be  sufficient  to 
take  as  an  example  the  influence  of  infanticide. 

First,  it  should  be  observed  that,  in  order  to 
render  population  stationary,  it  would  only  be 
necessary  that  the  restricting  practices  should  af- 
fect a  limited  and  variable  surplus  which  would 

[57] 


PROCESSES    OF   HISTORY 

remain  after  allowance  had  been  made  for  the 
normal  or  average  infant  mortality  of  a  given 
place  and  condition  of  life,  and  for  the  number 
actually  necessary  to  maintain  the  full  comple- 
ment of  the  group.  This  being  the  case,  it  is  of 
importance  to  notice  that  infanticide,  the  killing 
of  newborn  infants,  has  been  practised  univer- 
sally throughout  the  world  (until  superseded  in 
modern  times  by  more  remote  methods  for  ac- 
complishing the  same  ends). 

It  is  not  to  be  assumed  that,  in  its  earliest  appli- 
cation, the  practice  of  infanticide  was  inspired 
by  any  far-sighted  concern  for  the  food  supply 
of  later  years.  In  its  simplest  form,  the  practice 
seems  to  have  arisen  from  the  readily  appreci- 
able difficulty  that  a  mother  finds  in  caring  for 
more  than  one  infant  at  a  time  under  primitive 
conditions  of  life.  At  a  very  early  period,  how- 
ever, it  seems  to  have  been  definitely  recognized 
that  if  all  the  children  born  were  allowed  to  live 
there  would  not  be  food  enough  to  support  every- 
body. This  truth,  as  has  frequently  been  pointed 
out,  would  soon  force  itself  upon  the  attention  of 
islanders;  and  modern  observers  have  reported 
that  in  certain  islands  from  a  half  to  two-thirds 
of  all  infants  were  killed  at  birth.  When  fore- 

[58] 


GEOGRAPHICAL   FACTOR 


thought  had  once  come  to  play  a  part,  the  prac- 
tice of  infanticide  seems  to  have  assumed  some 
fairly  definite  form,  and  to  have  come,  in  a  meas- 
ure, under  public  surveillance.  So  w^hile  in  one 
group  the  first  or  even  the  first  tw^o  or  three  in- 
fants would  be  killed,  in  another  all  after  the  first 
three  or  four  vs^ould  be  done  away  with.  Twins, 
weakly  children,  those  born  on  unlucky  days  or 
for  whom  the  omens  were  inauspicious,  children 
whose  upper  teeth  came  first,  appear,  in  general, 
to  have  met  with  an  untimely  end.  Before  long 
the  selection  evidently  came  into  close  association 
with  some  conception  of  the  needs  of  the  group : 
,  Australian  women  are  said,  out  of  an  average  of 
six  children,  to  rear  as  a  rule  two  boys  and  a  girl, 
and  practically  everywhere  the  ratio  of  boys  and 
girls  is  a  matter  of  special  concern. 

Owing  to  the  interest  excited  by  M'Lennan's 
theory  of  the  origin  of  exogamy,  the  question  of 
the  prevalence  of  female  infanticide  has  to  a 
great  extent  overshadowed  the  more  general 
problem.  Here  it  may  be  observed  that  male  in- 
fanticide seems  to  stand  in  the  same  relation  to 
mother-rite  groups  that  female  infanticide  does 
to  patriarchal  groups.  In  the  former,  since  de- 
scent passes  through  the  female  side,  girls  are 

[S9] 


PROCESSES    OF    HISTORY 

preferred,  and  boys  are  less  desirable;  while,  in 
the  latter  case,  the  conditions  are  reversed.  So, 
too,  where  daughters  could  be  sold  for  a  good 
price  to  husbands,  they  would  be  valued,  but 
where  a  dower  had  to  be  given  they  would  be 
looked  upon  as  a  source  of  loss.  Conversely,  with 
the  introduction  of  the  custom  of  tracing  descent 
through  males,  boys  were  preferred,  more  espe- 
cially because  the  dead  were  dependent  upon 
heirs-male  for  the  sacrifices  associated  with 
ancestor-worship. 

If  the  influence  of  infanticide  in  restricting 
numbers  is  to  be  fully  appreciated,  it  must  be 
understood  that  the  practice  was  not  a  mere  mat- 
ter of  individual  caprice,  but  was  commonly  re- 
garded as  a  public  concern  of  moment  to  the 
group  as  a  whole.  The  decision  was  not  by  any 
means  universally  left  to  the  parents,  and  in  some 
places  the  carrying  out  of  the  sentence  was  en- 
trusted to  professional  practitioners.  The  most 
important  aspect  of  the  case,  however,  is  that  the 
infant  had  no  standing  in  the  group  into  which  it 
was  born — was  veritably  "a  little  stranger" — 
until  it  had  been  formally  accepted  into  the  kin. 
As  van  Gennep  has  pointed  out,  the  attitude  of 
the  group  towards  the  infant  was  one  of  self- 

[60] 


GEOGRAPHICAL    FACTOR 

defence,  and  it  was  necessary  that  the  newcomer 
should  undergo  purification,  and  remain  for  a 
period  in  a  state  of  probation,  before  the  rite  of 
admission  was  celebrated.  Very  generally,  it 
would  appear,  the  child  was  submitted  to  more 
or  less  public  inspection,  and  the  rite  of  accept- 
ance was  performed  by  the  headman  of  the  vil- 
lage or  the  head  of  the  family  group.  At  Athens 
the  decision  seems,  primitively,  to  have  been  ar- 
rived at  by  a  family  council;  later,  the  father 
made  official  announcement  before  the  altar  of 
Hestia  as  to  whether  the  child  was  to  be  accepted 
or  abandoned;  finally,  it  would  seem,  the  official 
ceremony  was  confined  to  acceptance — failure  to 
celebrate  the  birth  was  tantamount  to  rejection. 

Clearly,  then,  the  practice  of  infanticide  alone 
must  have  gone  far  towards  limiting  the  numbers 
of  earlier  groups  and  rendering  population  sta- 
tionary, and  it  must  not  be  overlooked  that  this  is 
but  one  of  a  number  of  such  practices.  That  these 
methods  of  keeping  population  within  bounds 
were  effective  may,  furthermore,  be  inferred 
from  the  stability  of  the  boundaries  between  dif- 
ferent primitive  groups,  and  from  the  wide- 
spread evidences  of  a  persistent  attitude  of  hos- 
tility towards  strangers.  The  boundaries  of  tribal 

[6i] 


PROCESSES    OF    HISTORY 

territory,  as  Grierson  has  shown,  are,  in  general, 
clearly  defined,  not  merely  by  the  natural  land- 
marks of  rivers,  lakes,  forests,  and  mountains, 
but  even  by  artificial  monuments.  The  borders 
are  jealously  defended,  and,  being  on  either  side 
placed  under  the  protection  of  supernatural 
powers  who  are  believed  to  take  upon  themselves 
the  punishment  of  venturesome  intruders,  are 
not  violated  without  trepidation.  Indeed,  beyond 
the  group  boundary,  the  world  was  necessarily 
full  of  menace,  for,  among  all  lower  peoples,  the 
stranger  was  feared  and  treated  as  an  enemy,  and 
the  relation  between  stranger-groups  was  one  of 
persistent  hostility.  So,  while  Holsti  has  shown 
conclusively  that  primitive  warfare  consisted 
more  of  shouting  and  terrifying  than  of  fighting 
with  intent  to  kill,  it  is  not  to  be  assumed  that  the 
hostility  was  factitious;  and  the  fact  that  peace- 
ful intercourse  between  neighboring  groups  was 
limited  in  the  extreme  is  shown  by  the  custom  of 
the  "silent  trade."  Singular  as  it  may  appear,  in 
this  mode  of  bartering,  traces  of  which  are  still 
to  be  found  in  every  quarter  of  the  globe,  the 
traffickers  not  only  do  not  address,  but  do  not 
even  see  one  another.  The  silent  trade  is  simply 
a  means  by  which  enemies  may  mutually  ex- 

[62] 


GEOGRAPHICAL    FACTOR 

change  goods,  and  at  the  same  time  remain  in 
safety;  "they,  indeed,  keep  faith  with  one  an- 
other, but  in  so  doing  they  are  actuated,  not  by 
any  feeling  of  amity,  but  wholly  by  the  wish  to 
serve  their  own  interests." 

It  cannot  be  asserted  that  the  addendum  offered 
to  the  first  proposition  of  Malthus  has  the  same 
axiomatic  character  as  the  statement  that  "Popu- 
lation is  necessarily  limited  by  the  means  of  sub- 
sistence" ;  nor  can  it  be  demonstrated  from  statis- 
tics that  "in  normal  stable  conditions  population 
remains  stationary" ;  nevertheless,  it  may  now  be 
urged  that  there  are  weighty  considerations 
which  tend  to  substantiate  such  a  conclusion.  So, 
as  the  longevity  of  the  savage  is  less  than  that  of 
civilized  man,  and  as  the  conditions  of  savage 
life  undoubtedly  have  an  appreciable  influence 
upon  fecundity,  the  prevalence  of  such  customs 
as  infanticide,  not  to  speak  of  the  influence  of 
various  forms  of  marriage,  must  have  made  any- 
thing like  rapid  increase  of  population  impos- 
sible. Furthermore,  all  we  know  of  the  habits  of 
lower  groups,  more  particularly  their  dread  of 
strange  places  and  strange  people,  tends  to  con- 
firm the  view  that  such  groups  have  long  re- 
mained practically  stationary  in  numbers.  Fi- 

[63] 


PROCESSES    OF   HISTORY 

nally,  Keane  points  out  that  most  African  negroes 
south  of  the  equator,  most  Oceanic  negroes 
(Melanesians  and  Papuans),  all  Australian  and 
American  aborigines  have  remained  in  their 
original  habitats  ever  since  what  may  be  called 
the  first  settlement  of  the  earth  by  man;  and, 
after  an  exhaustive  inquiry,  Willcox  arrives  at 
the  conclusion  that  where  the  influence  of  Eu- 
rope has  not  been  deeply  felt,  notably  in  China, 
and  in  Japan  before  its  opening  to  Western  in- 
fluence, population  has  been  nearly  or  quite  sta- 
tionary or  has  actually  decreased. 

4.  Presuming,  then,  that  population  in  normal 
stable  conditions  remains  stationary,  that  among 
primitive  peoples  there  is  no  "natural  increase" 
which  would  lead  inevitably  to  migrations,  it  be- 
comes pertinent  to  inquire  how  movements  of 
peoples  have  been  brought  about. 

This  suggests  the  second  proposition  of  Mal- 
thus,  that  "Population  always  increases  where 
the  means  of  subsistence  increase."  If  this  be  true, 
then,  obviously,  its  converse  must  be  true,  and 
population  will  decrease  when  the  means  of  sub- 
sistence diminish.  The  initial  point  for  consider- 
ation, it  will  thus  be  seen,  is  not  so  much  the  rise 
and  fall  of  numbers  as  the  increase  and  decrease 

[64] 


GEOGRAPHICAL    FACTOR 

of  the  food  supply.  Unfortunately,  Malthus  took 
up  the  case  of  diminution  of  numbers,  not  in  rela- 
tion to  contraction  of  food  supply,  but  merely  as 
illustrating  the  recuperative  power  of  popula- 
tion after  such  visitations  as  plague,  pestilence, 
and  famine.  The  direction  of  his  interest  led  him 
to  concern  himself  primarily  with  the  mode  by 
which  subsistence  is  increased,  and  so  he  points 
out  that  population  multiplies  rapidly  when,  in 
new  colonies,  the  knowledge  and  industry  of  an 
old  state  are  applied  to  the  unappropriated  land 
of  a  new  country.  The  most  notable  rise  in  popu- 
lation of  which  we  have  historical  knowledge 
has  followed  upon  modern  improvements  in 
agricultural  methods,  whether  in  old  countries 
or  in  new.  We  may  say,  in  short,  that  increase  of 
population,  in  modern  times,  follows  upon  in- 
creased production  of  food. 

It  must  now  be  observed  that  while  increase  of 
the  food  supply  will  permit  more  people  to  live 
upon  the  same  area,  there  is  no  reason  to  suppose 
that  this  increase  will  lead  to  migration.  And 
accepting  the  fact  that  we  know  of  no  period  at 
which  the  earth  was  not  filled  up  to  the  limit  of 
existing  conditions — Keane  dates  the  complete 
occupation  of  the  globe  by  man  in  the  early  pleis- 

[65] 


PROCESSES    OF    HISTORY 

tocene  epoch — and  assuming,  from  what  has 
been  said,  that  any  local  advance  would  simply 
mean  that  a  greater  number  would  be  supported 
on  a  given  territory,  we  are  still  left  without  a 
clue  to  the  explanation  of  the  movements  of  peo- 
ples. If,  however,  we  turn  to  consider,  not  the 
efifect  of  an  increase  of  the  means  of  subsistence, 
but  the  effect  of  a  decrease,  the  difficulty  will,  I 
think,  be  seen  to  disappear.  If,  briefly,  it  can  be 
shown  that  populations  have  actually  been  driven 
forth  in  consequence  of  a  shrinkage  of  food  sup- 
ply due  to  a  lessening  of  the  productivity  of  the 
land,  a  satisfactory  explanation  would  be  pro- 
vided for  the  historical  movements  of  peoples. 
While  the  productivity  of  the  land  is  increased 
by  human  activity,  it  may  also  be  afifected  inju- 
riously by  the  same  means.  Population  shifts,  for 
example,  when  the  methods  employed  have  led 
to  the  working  out  of  the  soil,  leaving  as  a  me- 
morial "the  abandoned  farm."  So,  too,  popula- 
tion has  declined  in  more  than  one  area  when  an 
invasion  has  been  followed  by  a  lapse  to  inferior 
methods  of  cultivation,  as  in  the  Euphrates- 
Tigris  valley;  or  when,  as  in  the  Turkish  do- 
minions, forms  of  taxation  have  been  introduced 
which  bear  with  undue  severity  upon  the  agri- 

[66] 


GEOGRAPHICAL    FACTOR 

cultural  class.  It  is  obvious,  however,  that  these 
cases  are  incidental  to  a  relatively  advanced  civil- 
ization, and  cannot  be  utilized  to  throw  light 
upon  earlier  situations. 

What  would  appear  to  be  a  simple  illustration 
of  food  shrinkage,  with  its  accompanying  results, 
is  provided  by  Livy  when  he  states  that  in  Gaul, 
in  the  time  of  Ambigatus,  whoever  he  may  have 
been,  a  succession  of  abundant  harvests  led  to  a 
rapid  increase  in  numbers,  and  that  subsequently, 
to  relieve  the  country  from  the  burden  of  over- 
population, a  considerable  body  was  sent  out  to 
seek  a  new  home.  Paulus  Diaconus  relates  that 
the  same  experiment  was  resorted  to  by  the 
Langobardi,  who,  he  says,  divided  their  whole 
group  into  three  parts,  and  determined  by  lot 
which  part  should  go  forth.  Machiavelli,  im- 
proving upon  this,  regards  the  increase  as  con- 
stant, and  the  method  of  division  and  emigration 
as  an  established  custom.  He  seems,  like  many 
later  writers,  to  have  been  impressed  by  Paul's 
explanation  that  the  North,  being  colder  than 
the  South,  is  more  healthy,  and  better  fitted  for 
the  propagation  of  nations.  He  thought,  indeed, 
that  the  whole  country  was  called  "Germania" 
because  such  great  multitudes  sprang  up  there,  a 

[67] 


PROCESSES    OF    HISTORY 

theory  which  evidently  takes  its  rise  in  the  ety- 
mology of  Isodore,  who  imagined  that  the  word 
"Germany"  was  derived  from  "germinare";  the 
same  idea  is  represented  in  Jordanes,  who  traces 
the  Goths  to  this  "hive  of  races  or  womb  of  na- 
tions." While  Malthus  was  inclined  to  follow 
Paul  and  Machiavelli,  Gibbon  doubted  the  regu- 
larity of  these  outpourings,  and  we  can  now  see 
that  the  entire  series  of  explanations,  from  Livy 
down,  is  simply  an  effort  to  account  for  the  one 
known  fact  that  migrations  occur.  Modern  schol- 
ars, like  Chadwick,  prefer  to  attribute  the  move- 
ments in  question  to  pressure  from  behind  rather 
than  to  the  effects  of  sporadic  cases  of  over- 
population. 

Climate  is  everywhere  variable,  and  wet  spells 
succeed  dry  spells  in  a  halting  rhythm.  Good 
seasons  may  possibly  stimulate  population,  but, 
after  all,  sporadic  influences  of  this  sort  are  not 
likely  to  have  changed  the  face  of  the  world  by 
inaugurating  the  great  migrations  known  to  his- 
tory as  "the  wandering  of  the  peoples."  A  more 
significant  effect  may  be  attributed  to  a  succes- 
sion of  bad  seasons,  particularly  when  these  take 
the  form  of  long-continued  droughts.  To  observe 
the  full  effect  of  such  occurrences  it  is  necessary 

[68] 


GEOGRAPHICAL    FACTOR 

to  turn  from  Europe  to  Asia.  Thus  in  the  North- 
western Provinces  of  India,  the  meeting-point  of 
the  two  great  rain  currents,  scarcity  of  moisture 
is  frequent,  and  from  time  to  time  the  autumn 
rains  fail  completely.  Then  famine  ensues,  and 
the  stricken  people,  to  escape  destruction,  move 
blindly  "in  the  direction  of  Malwa,  that  Cathay 
or  land  of  plenty,  where,  in  the  imagination  of 
the  North  Indian  rustic,  the  fields  always  smile 
with  golden  grain  and  poverty  is  unknown."  So, 
too,  in  southern  India  the  inhabitants,  similarly 
impelled,  have  been  known  to  travel  in  thou- 
sands towards  the  distant  hills.  Here  then  is  a 
force  strong  enough  to  overcome  the  most  deeply 
ingrained  immobility,  and  to  break  down  even 
the  strongest  barriers  of  caste.  Nevertheless,  it  is 
difficult  to  discover  in  an  exodus  of  disorganized 
and  starving  beings  more  than  a  semblance  of 
e  movements  which  have  played  so  conspicu- 
part  in  the  history  of  man.  If,  however,  we 
consi^_er  the  conditions  existing  in  Central  Asia, 
other  important  factors  will  be  found  to  present 
themselves. 

Since  the  end  of  the  eighteenth  century  the  idea 
has  been  widely  entertained  by  linguistic  schol- 
ars that  the  distribution  of  languages  in  Europe 

[69] 


PROCESSES    OF   HISTORY 

is  best  to  be  explained  on  the  hypothesis  of  a  se- 
ries of  migrations  of  peoples  from  Central  Asia. 
While  the  literature  of  this  discussion  is  extraor- 
dinarily extensive,  there  does  not  appear  to  have 
been  any  concerted  effort  on  the  part  of  philolo- 
gists to  inquire  into  the  origin  of  migrations, 
though  as  early  as  1820  passages  from  the  Zend- 
Avesta  had  been  cited  to  show  that  a  sudden  low- 
ering of  temperature  in  northern  Asia  (attribu- 
ted later  to  the  coming  of  the  Ice  Age  in  Siberia) 
had  compelled  the  population  to  seek  a  warmer 
habitat.  On  this  basis,  seemingly,  the  phrase 
''climatic  change"  has  retained  its  place  without 
substantiation  from  direct  investigation.  A  new 
view  of  the  matter  was  introduced  in  1892  when 
James  Bryce,  discussing  the  origin  of  migrations, 
pointed  out  that  "a  succession  of  dry  seasons, 
which  may  merely  diminish  the  harvest  of  those 
who  inhabit  tolerably  humid  regions,  will  pro- 
duce such  a  famine  in  the  inner  parts  of  a  conti- 
nent like  Asia  as  to  force  the  people  to  seek  some 
better  dwelling-place."  It  was  not,  however,  until 
the  narratives  of  recent  explorers  like  Sven 
Hedin  and  Aurel  Stein,  at  the  opening  of  the 
twentieth  century,  had  called  attention  anew  to 
the  presence  of  sand-buried  ruins  in  Central  Asia 

[70] 


GEOGRAPHICAL    FACTOR 

that  the  underlying  problem  was  vigorously  at- 
tacked, and,  this  time,  by  geographers. 
The  active  discussion  of  the  origin  of  the  migra- 
tions from  Central  Asia  may  be  said  to  have  been 
inaugurated  in  1904  by  two  memorable  papers 
in  the  Geographical  Journal.  In  the  earlier  of 
these,  Mackinder  laid  emphasis,  first,  upon  the 
aridity  of  the  heart  of  the  Eurasian  land-mass, 
its  system  of  internal  drainage,  and  the  fact  that 
it  is  not  a  continuous  desert  like  the  Sahara,  but 
a  steppe-land  with  alternations  of  desert  areas 
and  river-fed  oases.  Secondly,  he  pointed  to  the 
mobility  of  its  horse-riding  inhabitants — a  fac- 
tor which  has  also  been  dwelt  upon  by  Demolins 
and  Vidal  de  la  Blache.  In  the  discussion  which 
followed,  Holdich  raised  the  question  of  the  rea- 
son for  the  overflow  of  peoples  from  Central 
Asia,  and  was  emphatic  in  his  opinion  that  one  of 
the  great  compelling  reasons  for  all  these  migra- 
tions had  been  a  distinct  alteration  in  the  physical 
conditions  of  the  country.  It  is  of  some  interest  to 
notice,  as  showing  the  views  held  so  recently  as  a 
decade  ago,  that  Mackinder,  in  reply,  considered 
that  when  you  had  the  evidence  of  this  constant 
succession  of  descents,  it  was  quite  unnecessary  to 
ask  for  any  explanation  of  it. 

[7"] 


PROCESSES    OF    HISTORY 

In  the  later  paper,  Prince  Kropotkin  developed 
the  theory,  on  a  broad  geological  foundation, 
that  Central  Asia  is  in  a  state  of  rapid  desicca- 
tion; and,  adverting  to  the  existing  evidences  of 
a  greater  population  in  times  past,  stated  the 
theory  that  "it  must  have  been  the  rapid  desicca- 
tion of  this  region  which  compelled  its  inhabi- 
tants to  rush  down  to  the  Jungarian  Gate,  down 
to  the  lowlands  of  the  Balkash  and  the  Obi,  and 
thence  pushing  before  them  the  original  inhabi- 
tants of  the  lowlands,  to  produce  those  great  mi- 
grations and  invasions  of  Europe  which  took 
place  during  the  first  centuries  of  our  era."  Here 
again  the  discussion  brought  out  important  con- 
siderations. Mackinder,  while  accepting  Kropot- 
kin's  general  contention,  thought  that  there  was 
a  tendency  to  exaggerate  the  rapidity  of  the  des- 
iccation during  the  historical  period;  he  was  in- 
clined to  doubt  that  the  invasions  of  Europe  had 
originated  in  desiccation,  but  accepted  Hedin's 
conclusion  that  the  shifting  of  sand  by  the  wind 
had  frequently  brought  catastrophe  to  human  set- 
tlements. Freshfield,  citing  various  climatolo- 
gists,  was  convinced  that  oscillation,  not  desicca- 
tion, in  climate  was  what  all  the  records  pointed 
to.  Mill  called  attention  to  the  constancy  of  the 

[72] 


GEOGRAPHICAL    FACTOR 

total  rainfall  during  historical  time,  and  ex- 
pressed the  opinion  that  there  was  a  drying-up  of 
the  plateau  regions  of  all  the  continents,  compen- 
sated for  by  an  increase  of  precipitation  else- 
where. Evans  insisted  that  the  general  question 
of  the  desiccation  of  the  globe  should  be  kept  dis- 
tinct from  that  of  the  drying-up  of  Central  Asia, 
and  pointed  to  recent  changes  in  the  physical 
geography  of  the  latter  region  which  rendered 
inevitable  the  desiccation  of  the  country.  The 
whole  problem  was  thus  opened  up,  with  an  evi- 
dent consensus  of  opinion  that  some  change,  con- 
tinuous or  fluctuating,  had  taken  place  in  the  cli- 
mate of  Central  Asia.  At  the  end  of  a  decade, 
during  which  the  question  of  desiccation  was 
warmly  debated,  Gregory  presented  an  exhaust- 
ive review  of  the  opinions  embodied  in  the  litera- 
ture. From  this  it  would  appear  that  the  co- 
operation of  geologists  and  geographers  had 
been  able  to  reach  no  more  definite  result  than 
that  as  an  increased  rainfall  had  been  demon- 
strated for  many  parts  of  the  world,  there  was  a 
predisposition  in  favor  of  a  compensating  de- 
crease in  Central  Asia,  though  the  conflict  of 
opinion  on  this  point  might  be  explained  on  the 

[73] 


PROCESSES    OF    HISTQRY 

hypothesis  that  the  desert  is  widening  in  some 
places  and  contracting  in  others. 

Now  it  must  be  evident  that  if  the  discussion  of 
the  relation  of  change  of  climate  to  migration  is 
not  to  remain  permanently  (like  its  philological 
counterpart)  on  the  basis  of  the  advocacy  of  per- 
sonal views,  actual  investigation  of  the  archaeo- 
logical evidence  must  be  carried  out  upon  the 
ground,  for  in  this  way  only  may  direct  proof  be 
obtained.  It  is  to  the  high  credit  of  Raphael 
Pumpelly  that  he  envisaged  the  problem  in  this 
way;  and  it  is  fortunate  that  grants  from  the 
Carnegie  Institution  made  possible  two  expedi- 
tions to  Turkestan,  in  1903  and  1904,  under  his 
direction.  It  should  be  understood  that  these  ex- 
peditions were  organized,  and  the  grants  made, 
for  the  specific  purpose  of  investigating  the 
theory  that  the  great  civilizations  of  the  East  and 
West  had  their  origins  in  Central  Asia,  and  of 
examining  the  evidence  for  the  supposed  occur- 
rence of  changes  of  climate  in  the  same  region. 
The  results  arrived  at  in  regard  to  these  ques- 
tions, therefore,  were  not  by-products  of  some 
other  undertaking,  and  are  further  guaranteed 
by  the  fact  that  the  work  was  carried  on  by  a  se- 
lected group  of  specialists.  (It  may  be  noted  that 

[74] 


GEOGRAPHICAL    FACTOR 

Ellsworth  Huntington,  whose  Pulse  of  Asia  has 
enjoyed  a  wide  popularity,  was  an  assistant  on 
the  two  expeditions.)  In  the  present  connection 
it  is  unnecessary  to  enter  into  detail  in  regard  to 
Pumpelly's  successes;  what  is  of  importance  here 
is  the  fact  that  evidence  was  accumulated  to  show 
that,  in  Turkestan,  organized  town  life,  with 
agriculture  and  the  breeding  of  animals,  goes 
back  for  many  thousands  of  years  before  the 
Christian  era,  and  that  after  these  investigations 
no  doubt  remains  that  the  inhabitants  of  the  sites 
explored  had  been  repeatedly  driven  forth  by 
destructive  changes  of  climate. 

Population,  then,  is  limited,  in  any  given  habi- 
tat, by  the  means  of  subsistence;  it  remains  sta- 
tionary in  normal  stable  conditions,  but  may  in- 
crease without  disturbing  the  equilibrium  if  the 
food  supply  be  increased  through  improvements 
in  the  methods  of  production.  On  the  other  hand, 
the  inhabitants  of  a  given  area  will  be  forced  out 
when,  through  the  operation  of  natural  agencies, 
such  as  a  diminution  of  rainfall,  the  means  of 
subsistence  decrease,  and  from  this  compulsory 
movement  ensue  migrations.  Clearly,  therefore, 
it  is  unnecessary  to  assume  that  among  certain 
groups  population  has  been  permitted  to  grow 

[75] 


PROCESSES    OF    HISTORY 


^ 


without  restraint,  or  to  imagine  some  "mighty 
hive"  from  which  nations  have  emerged  in 
"swarms,"  or  to  suppose  the  existence  of  specifi- 
cally "restless"  peoples.  It  is  of  some  interest  to 
recollect,  at  this  point,  that  any  disturbance  of 
conditions  will  manifest  itself  in  an  increase  of 
population,  and  it  can  scarcely  be  doubted  that 
migratory  movements  lead  to  the  multiplication 
of  population,  instead  of  being  the  product  of 
overpopulation  in  an  established  community. 
Finally,  migrations  are  not  to  be  attributed  to  a 
spirit  of  enterprise;  peoples  do  not  wander  forth 
seeking  for  they  know  not  what.  We  cannot  as- 
sume in  groups  long  fixed  in  habitat  and  ideas  the 
sudden  desire  for  booty,  or  freedom,  or  glory,  or 
for  "something  unattainable."  Nor  may  we  ac- 
cept the  hypothesis  that  man  is  primarily  a  mi- 
gratory, restless  being,  and  that  his  fossilization 
ensues  only  when  he  is  temporarily  debarred 
from  pursuing  his  natural  impulses,  and  is 
brought  to  a  standstill.  Man  is  prone  to  remain 
where  he  is,  to  fixity  in  ideas  and  in  ways  of  doing 
things,  and  only  through  nature's  insistent  driv- 
ing has  he  been  shaken  out  of  his  immobility  and 
set  wayfaring  upon  the  open  road. 
5.  So  far,  then,  it  has  been  shown  that  political 

[76] 


GEOGRAPHICAL    FACTOR 

units  have  arisen  at  certain  definitely  circum- 
scribed places.  These  places  have  not  been  con- 
sciously selected  or  decided  upon  by  men,  but 
have  been  determined  by  the  conformation  of  the 
earth's  surface,  that  is,  by  the  localization  of 
habitable  areas  and  the  possibilities  of  travel. 
The  common  element  to  be  observed  in  all  cases 
is  that  the  places  where  political  organizations 
have  come  into  being  have  been  points  of  pres- 
sure; they  have  not  merely  been  lands  upon 
which  one  group  after  another  might  have  set 
covetous  eyes,  but  have  been  the  termini  of  routes 
which,  of  necessity,  have  been  followed  by  suc- 
cessive migrant  groups.  The  dependence  of  man 
upon  his  physical  surroundings,  thus  exhibited, 
is  made  even  clearer  when  it  is  observed  that  the 
human  movements  which  lead  eventually  to  the 
beginning  of  political  organization  have  had 
their  origin,  not  in  man's  foresight  or  planning, 
or  as  a  result  of  the  "automatic  increase"  of  popu- 
lation, but  in  changes  of  climate  within  a  definite 
area. 

If,  now,  we  accept  this  statement  of  the  depend- 
ence of  man  upon  his  physical  surroundings,  it 
obviously  becomes  necessary  to  inquire  how  mi- 
grations have  operated  to  bring  political  organi- 

[77] 


PROCESSES    OF    HISTORY 

zations  into  existence.  This  inquiry  will  have  the 
additional  advantage  of  showing  the  uniform 
dependence  of  history  upon  a  second  set  of  natu- 
ral factors,  namely,  the  fundamental  character- 
istics of  man  himself. 


[78] 


Ill 

THE  HUMAN  FACTOR  IN  HISTORY 

I.  Political  organization  is  a  comparatively 
recent  phenomenon  which  has  made  its  appear- 
ance among  men  in  certain  restricted  places  at 
definite  moments  in  time,  and  has  spread  but 
slowly  from  different  points  of  origin.  This  fact 
has  hitherto  had  little  significance  for  the  histo- 
rian, for,  owing  to  his  preoccupation  with  the 
study  of  documents,  he  has  been  more  interested 
in  questioning  the  credibility  of  ancient  narra- 
tives than  in  examining  the  antecedent  conditions 
from  which,  in  all  cases,  political  units  have 
sprung.  When,  however,  the  matter  is  explicitly 
brought  up,  it  is  evident  that  political  organiza- 
tion is  an  exceptional  thing,  characteristic  only 
of  certain  groups,  and  that  all  peoples  whatso- 
ever have  once  been  or  still  are  organized  on  a 
different  basis.  Furthermore,  it  is  also  evident 
that  political  organization  has  been  but  imper- 
fectly extended  over  the  population  of  the  areas 
where  it  is  dominant,  and,  consequently,  that 

[79] 


PROCESSES    OF    HISTORY 

"survivals"  of  the  earlier  regime  are  to  be  found 
even  in  the  most  highly  developed  countries.  It 
will,  therefore,  be  seen  that  the  examination  of 
the  problem  presented  by  the  emergence  of  po- 
litical organization  is  essential  to  an  understand- 
ing of  how  man  has  come  to  be  as  he  is,  and  that 
the  uniformity  of  origin  exhibited  in  this  emer- 
gence is  a  further  justification  for  maintaining 
the  fundamental  homogeneity  of  history. 

If  we  compare  "primitive"  and  "civilized" 
groups  of  men  as  we  find  them  in  the  world 
today,  almost  the  first  point  of  difference  that 
will  strike  the  observer  is  that,  among  the  former, 
the  individual  identifies  himself  by  particular- 
izing his  blood-relationships,  whereas,  in  the 
latter,  the  individual  defines  his  status  in  terms 
of  relation  to  a  given  territory.  For  example, 
"the  Saxons  brought  with  them  across  the  Nar- 
row Seas  an  organization  according  to  families, 
hundreds,  and  tribes,  dependent,  that  is  to  say,  on 
blood-relationship.  But  the  settlement  of  these 
units  in  the  conquered  land  gave  rise  to  the  later 
parishes,  hundreds,  and  counties.  Gradually  the 
idea  of  domicile  replaced  that  of  clan  as  the  prin- 
ciple of  social  order,  and  whereas  the  family,  or 
the  hundred  of  families  were  formerlv  respon- 

[80] 


THE    HUMAN    FACTOR 

sible  for  the  malefactor,  the  modern  police  have 
power  of  arrest  within  clearly  defined  county  or 
municipal  areas.  Thus,  while  in  later  history  the 
physical  features  of  the  country  are  in  some  ways 
less  coercive,  administrative  divisions  have 
grown  more  precise,  and  have  become  more  con- 
stant elements  in  the  machinery  of  government." 

This  striking  difference  seems  first  to  have  been 
emphasized,  in  1861,  by  Sir  Henry  Maine,  and 
was  dealt  with,  later,  from  the  point  of  view  of 
the  anthropologist,  by  Lewis  Henry  Morgan. 

Archaic  law,  Maine  remarks,  "is  full,  in  all  its  ^. 
provinces,  of  the  clearest  indications  that  society 
in  primitive  times  was  not  what  it  is  assumed  to 
be  at  present,  a  collection  of  individuals.  In  fact, 
and  in  the  view  of  the  men  who  composed  it,  it 
was  an  aggregation  of  families."  If,  then,  kin- 
ship in  blood  is  the  original  basis  of  organization, 
there  is  no  revolution  known  to  us,  he  continues,  /- 
"so  startling  and  so  complete  as  the  change  which 
is  accomplished  when  some  other  principle — 
such  as  that,  for  instance,  of  local  contiguity — 
established  itself  for  the  first  time  as  the  basis  of 
common  political  action."  "The  idea  that  a  num- 
ber of  persons  should  exercise  political  rights  in 
common  simply  because  they  happened  to  live 

[81] 


PROCESSES    OF    HISTORY 

within  the  same  topographical  limits  was  utterly 
strange  and  monstrous  to  primitive  antiquity." 
*'The  most  recent  researches  into  the  primitive 
history  of  society,"  he  says  in  a  later  book,  "point 
to  the  conclusion  that  the  earliest  tie  which 
knitted  men  together  in  communities  was  con- 
sanguinity or  kinship."  "We  have  next  to  con- 
sider the  epoch,  reached  at  some  time  by  all  the 
portions  of  mankind  destined  to  civilization,  at 
which  .  .  .  the  land  begins  to  be  the  basis  of 
society  in  place  of  kinship.  The  change  is  ex- 
tremely gradual,  and  in  some  particulars  it  has 
not  even  now  been  fully  accomplished,  but  it  has 
been  going  on  through  the  whole  course  of  his- 
tory. The  constitution  of  the  family  through 
actual  blood-relationship  is  of  course  an  observ- 
able fact,  but,  for  all  groups  of  men  larger  than 
the  family,  the  land  on  which  they  live  tends  to 
become  the  bond  of  union  between  them,  at  the 
expense  of  kinship,  ever  more  and  more  vaguely 
conceived." 

Morgan,  after  describing  the  earlier  form  of 
organization,  goes  on  to  say  that  the  later  form  is 
"founded  upon  territory  and  upon  property,  and 
may  be  distinguished  as  a  state  (civitas).  The 
township  or  ward,  circumscribed  by  metes  and 

[82] 


THE    HUMAN    FACTOR 

bounds,  with  the  property  it  contains,  is  the  basis 
or  unit  of  the  latter,  and  political  society  is  the 
result.  Political  society  is  organized  upon  terri- 
torial areas,  and  deals  with  property  as  well  as 
with  persons  through  territorial  relations.  .  .  . 
In  ancient  society  this  territorial  plan  was  un- 
known. When  it  came  it  fixed  the  boundary  line 
between  ancient  and  modern  society." 

Now,  while  the  forms  and  problems  presented 
by  the  facts  of  kindred  organization  are  repre- 
sented in  anthropology  by  an  extensive  literature, 
and  while  the  forms  and  problems  of  political 
organization  have  been  described  and  discussed 
by  all  the  generations  of  historians  and  political 
theorists  from  Herodotus  and  Aristotle  to  the 
present  day,  I  am  unaware  of  any  sustained  ef- 
fort that  has  been  made  to  investigate  the  transi- 
tion from  the  one  to  the  other  by  comparison  of 
all  the  available  data.  The  question  of  the  rela- 
tions of  the  different  types  of  kindred  organiza- 
tion forms  one  of  the  major  interests  of  anthro- 
pology; on  the  other  hand,  it  is  with  the  expe- 
rience of  men  under  the  conditions  of  the  new 
organization  that  History,  in  the  accepted  mean- 
ing of  the  term,  deals,  and  it  must  be  apparent 
now  that  the  only  satisfactory  approach  to  the 

[83] 


PROCESSES    OF   HISTORY 

study  of  History  will  lie  through  the  investiga- 
tion of  the  phenomena  of  transition  wherever  this 
may  have  taken  place.  But  while  the  transition 
has  not  yet  been  made  the  subject  of  extended 
research,  there  is  one  fact  at  least  which  stands 
out  with  such  distinctness  that  it  may  be  utilized, 
at  once  to  exhibit  the  homogeneity  of  history,  and 
to  reveal  the  source  of  the  most  notable  charac- 
teristics of  modern  life. 

2.  To  observe  this  fact  in  its  proper  setting,  it  is 
necessary  to  see  that,  while  the  distinction  be- 
tween kindred  and  political  units  may  readily  be 
defined,  the  description  of  the  difference  does  not 
explain  how  the  later  condition  sprang  from  the 
earlier.  In  other  words,  there  is  some  step  or 
process  involved  in  the  transition  which  neither 
Maine  nor  Morgan  has  brought  to  light. 

To  comprehend  the  situation  fully,  we  may 
begin  by  saying  that  kindred  organization,  in 
whatever  form  it  may  assume,  reflects  the  natural 
facts  of  human  generation.  What  follows  imme- 
diately from  this  is  a  commonplace  of  the  study 
of  primitive  man  which  must  be  constantly  borne 
in  mind,  for  kindred  organization  implies  the 
unquestioned  and  unremitting  dominance  of  the 
group  over  the  individual,  and  this  leads  to  the 

[84] 


THE    HUMAN    FACTOR 

tenacious  and  uncompromising  maintenance  of 
customary  ways  and  ideas.  It  will  thus  be  seen 
that  the  despotism  of  custom  negatives  the  idea 
that  kindred  organization  could  have  been  given 
up  voluntarily,  or  exchanged,  after  deliberation, 
for  something  invented  or  considered  better.  The 
change,  as  I  have  pointed  out,  has  been  forced 
upon  men  at  certain  geographical  points,  deter- 
mined by  the  physical  distribution  of  land  and 
water,  and  by  a  series  of  exigencies  which  go 
back  to  specific  changes  in  climate  within  a  defi- 
nite area  of  the  earth's  surface.  Furthermore,  the 
immediate  occasion  of  the  break-up  of  kindred 
groups  has  been  the  collision  and  conflict,  at  the 
termini  of  routes,  which  have  ensued  from  the 
migrations  of  men;  and  apparently  it  has  re- 
quired repeated,  long-sustained,  and  bitter  con- 
flict, such  indeed  as  Gilbert  Murray  has  depicted 
in  The  Rise  of  the  Greek  Epic,  to  overcome,  even 
in  a  limited  degree,  the  adherence  of  such  groups 
to  old  customs,  old  ways  of  doing  things,  and  old 
ideas.  Wherever  political  organizations  have 
come  into  existence  these  conflicts  have  taken 
place,  so  that  there  is  a  direct  historical  relation 
between  war  and  this  particular  step  in  human 
advancement. 

[85] 


PROCESSES    OF    HISTORY 

Now,  there  is  a  strong  temptation  to  turn  aside 
here,  under  the  guidance,  let  us  say,  of  Chad- 
wick's  Heroic  Age,  and  dwell  upon  the  story  of 
these  struggles,  dimly  conveyed  to  us  through 
the  alluring  haze  of  epic  poetry,  but  it  is  essen- 
tial, in  the  present  connection,  to  keep  clearly 
before  us  what  it  is  that,  in  these  cases,  war  has 
destroyed.  The  cardinal  point  is  that  the  conflict, 
in  breaking  up  the  older  organization,  liberated 
the  individual  man,  if  but  for  a  moment,  from 
the  dominance  of  the  group,  its  observances,  its 
formulae,  and  its  ideas.  Briefly,  a  situation  was 
created  in  which  the  old  rites  and  ceremonies 
could  not  be  performed,  one  in  which  the  old 
rules  of  action  were  manifestly  inadequate,  and 
hence  one  in  which  the  individual  became,  in 
some  measure,  a  law  unto  himself.  This,  at  bot- 
tom, is  the  fact  upon  which  all  history  turns. 

It  is  difficult  for  the  modern  man  to  realize  that, 
in  the  earlier  period,  individuality  did  not  exist; 
that  the  unit  was  not  the  single  life,  but  the 
group;  and  that  this  was  the  embodiment  of  a 
relatively  fixed  system,  from  which  escape  was 
normally  impossible.  So  completely  was  the  indi- 
vidual subordinated  to  the  community  that  art 
was  just  the  repetition  of  tribal  designs,  literature 

[86] 


THE    HUMAN    FACTOR 

the  repetition  of  tribal  songs,  and  religion  the 
repetition  of  tribal  rites.  Conversely,  the  break- 
up which  resulted  from  the  ultimate  conflict  of 
alien  groups  had,  as  its  most  essential  feature,  the 
release  of  personal  initiative,  the  creation  of  per- 
sonal responsibility,  and  the  recognition  of  per- 
sonal worth  and  individuality.  These  appear  in 
actual  life  under  the  form  of  individual  self- 
assertion,  which,  in  all  later  developments,  re- 
mains a  significant  phenomenon.  And  here,  par- 
enthetically, it  may  be  pointed  out  that  we  accept 
readily  enough  as  characteristic  of  the  transition 
epoch  the  spirit  of  boasting  which  pervades  the 
literature  of  such  periods,  and  we  set  down  as  the 
all-pervading  motive  of  action  the  hunger  to  win 
personal  glory,  but  when  we  come  to  the  discus- 
sion of  our  own  times  we  show  no  disposition  to 
analyze  the  conventions  that  now  define  the  ave- 
nues through  which  the  same  spirit  may  find  out- 
let, nor  do  we  seek  to  discover  the  means  by 
which  this  spirit  is  kept  in  check  under  modern 
conditions,  nor  the  relation  that  its  expression 
bears  to  opportunity.  Needless  to  say  the  question 
has  never  been  taken  up  as  to  the  delimitation  of 
the  channels  through  which  self-assertion  might 
properly  realize  itself  in  desirable  activities. 

[87] 


PROCESSES    OF    HISTORY 

We  are  now  in  a  position  to  see  that  the  release 
of  individual  self-assertion  through  the  tempo- 
rary overthrow  of  the  domination  of  customary 
restraints  has  been  the  necessary  prelude  to  the 
emergence  of  territorial  organization  and  the 
institution  of  personal  ownership.  However  far 
apart  these  two  elements  may  appear  to  be  in 
modern  life,  in  the  beginning  they  are  identical, 
for  the  fundamental  characteristic  of  political 
organization  is  the  attitude  of  personal  owner- 
ship assumed  by  the  ruler  towards  the  land  and 
the  population  over  which  he  has  gained  con- 
trol— an  attitude  expressed  to  this  day  in  the  J 
phrases  "my  army"  and  "my  people."  What  we 
have  uniformly  at  the  beginning  of  the  historical] 
period  in  different  lands  is  the  assumption  ofj 
sovereign  ownership  by  an  individual  leader  orj 
king  who  relies  upon  the  aid  of  a  military  group, 
caste,  or  aristocracy  to  hold  in  subjection  a  sub- 
ordinate population  of  which  little  is  heard ;  andj 
later  History  is,  primarily,  the  record  of  the  un- 
ceasing efforts  of  kings  to  extend  what  they  re- 
gard as  their  personal  possessions.  Even  today,] 
the  most  advanced  political  theory  (of  German 
origin,  naturally)  accepts  the  view  that  the  state'l 
is  an  institution  imposed  by  a  victorious  group] 

[88] 


THE    HUMAN    FACTOR 

upon  those  whom  it  has  conquered,  with  the 
single  object  of  regulating  the  authority  of  the 
victor  over  the  vanquished,  and  guarding  against 
internal  rebellion  and  external  assault.  Ruler- 
ship,  in  this  view,  has  no  further  purpose  than 
the  economic  exploitation  of  the  conquered  by 
the  conquerors. 
The  crucial  point  to  be  observed  here  is  that 
kingship  and  territorial  organization  represent 
simply  the  institutionalization  of  a  situation 
which  arose  out  of  the  opportunity  for  personal 
self-assertion  created  by  the  break-up  of  primi- 
tive organizations.  And  it  should  be  understood 
that  just  as  the  relative  stability  of  the  older  units 
follows  from  the  fact  that  every  human  being  is 
born  into  a  given  group  and  becomes  assimilated 
to  this  in  speech,  manners,  and  ideas,  so,  in  the 
new  organization,  the  status  quo  operates  to  per- 
petuate itself,  and  the  mere  fact  of  its  existence 
becomes  an  argument  for  regarding  it  as  ordained 
by  some  super-mundane  power.  Thus,  through- 
out the  past,  we  are  presented  with  the  anomaly 
of  men  fighting  to  maintain  the  institutionalized 
vestiges  of  the  self-assertion  of  aggressive  indi- 
viduals on  occasions  of  long-past  upheavals.  On 
the  other  hand,  it  must  also  be  observed  that — 

[89] 


PROCESSES    OF    HISTORY 

under  conditions  which  it  is  of  paramount  im- 
portance for  the  historian  to  make  clear — the 
spirit  of  self-assertion  has  arisen  from  time  to 
time  in  the  subordinate  elements  of  composite 
groups.  Indeed,  what  we  ordinarily  designate 
"constitutional  history"  is  largely  occupied  with 
the  efforts  put  forth  by  one  or  another  element, 
class,  or  order  included  within  a  political  group 
to  contest  the  dominance  of  a  ruling  minority, 
and  the  theory  of  sovereign  ownership.  From 
this  internal  contest  has  arisen  the  theory  of  indi- 
vidual "rights"  (of  which  perhaps  the  most  fun- 
damental is  that  of  preventing  other  people  from 
interfering  with  a  man's  use  of  his  own  prop- 
erty), and  the  theory  that  political  authorities 
may  be  tested  and  reformed  in  accordance  with 
current  ideas.  But,  while  these  matters  constitute 
the  marrow  of  history,  we  must  leave  them  here 
to  concern  ourselves  more  particularly  with 
other,  less  generally  recognized,  results  of  the 
initial  self-assertion. 

3.  The  object  we  have  in  view  is  to  discover,  if 
possible,  how  man  everywhere  has  come  to  be  as 
he  is.  From  what  has  been  said  it  will  appear  that 
this  involves  a  consideration  of  the  facts  of 
"transition"  and  "release,"  and  a  vivid  realiza- 

[90] 


THE    HUMAN    FACTOR 

tion  that  these  phenomena  have  made  their  ap- 
pearance only  at  certain  geographical  points  and 
at  certain  moments  of  time.  It  has  been  shown  al- 
ready that  political  organizations  have  arisen  at 
points  definitely  localized  and  determined  by  the 
physical  features  of  the  earth's  surface,  and  it 
follows  explicitly  that  the  release  of  the  indi- 
vidual from  the  dominance  of  the  group,  and  the 
stimulus  and  opportunity  necessary  for  the  emer- 
gence of  individual  initiative  and  self-assertion 
have  been  similarly  restricted.  Hence  we  arrive 
at  an  aspect  of  the  case  which  is  of  fundamental 
importance  for  an  understanding  of  the  present 
condition  of  mankind,  namely,  that  individual- 
ization, and  the  politicization  of  groups  has 
never  been  other  than  irregular  and  incomplete. 
The  origin  of  this  irregularity  is,  simply,  that 
pressure  and  conflict,  coming  at  specific  points, 
have  never  been  evenly  distributed  geographi- 
cally; and  the  break-up  of  kindred  organization, 
never  having  been  designed,  has  never  been  fully 
and  deliberately  carried  out.  Of  necessity,  some 
lands  and  some  people,  being  nearer  the  imme- 
diate seat  of  conflict,  have  been  more  deeply  in- 
volved in  the  struggle,  and  hence  more  com- 
pletely exposed  to  the  disturbing  influences.  Of 

[91] 


PROCESSES    OF    HISTORY 

necessity,  too,  release,  being  ultimately  personal, 
has  opened  different  paths  of  opportunity  to  dif- 
ferent members  of  the  community. 

The  manifestations  of  the  irregularity  have 
been  of  the  most  varied  character.  Within  the 
groups  primarily  affected,  for  example,  the 
breakdown  of  the  old  organization  has  not  been 
accompanied  by  the  revelation  of  any  "best  pos- 
sible" substitute,  and  so,  in  the  stress  of  emer- 
gency, the  old  forms  are  made  over  to  do  service 
as  best  they  may,  new  forms  are  called  by  old 
names,  and  new  ideas  masquerade  in  faded  habil- 
iments. Furthermore,  when  the  turmoil  begins 
to  subside,  the  lately  disturbed  groups,  as  readily 
as  their  forefathers,  turn  to  impose  their  newly 
acquired  modes  of  thought  and  action  upon  the 
rising  generations,  and  hence  the  arrangements 
of  a  given  moment  are  perpetuated  indefinitely. 

Outside  the  original  political  group,  again,  the 
influences  of  the  upheaval  spread,  as  from  a 
center,  in  ever  widening  and  diminishing  waves. 
To  observe  the  results  of  this  extension,  it  is 
necessary  to  make  a  distinction  which,  I  think, 
has  not  hitherto  been  observed.  If,  avoiding  the 
complexity  of  the  situation  presented  in  the 
countries  ordinarily  included  in  "ancient"  his- 

[92] 


THE    HUMAN    FACTOR 

tory,  we  turn  our  attention  to  China  and  India, 
it  will  be  seen  that  a  political  organization  comes 
into  being  in  the  midst  of  non-political  commu- 
nities. Typically,  the  new  political  unit  may  be 
regarded  as  maintaining  contact  with  tribal  or 
kindred  organizations  on  two  frontages,  and  the 
distinction  to  be  made  arises  from  differences  in 
the  activities  which  follow  from  the  conditions 
in  the  two  cases.  It  has  already  been  pointed  out 
that,  in  China  and  India,  political  units  make 
their  appearance  just  within  the  exposed  fron- 
tier; the  result  of  this  is  that  the  new  organiza- 
tion has  behind  it,  rearwards,  an  extensive  coun- 
try with  a  quiescent  population  grouped  on  the 
old  lines,  and,  in  front,  outwards,  similar  groups, 
subject,  however,  to  perennial  uneasiness  and 
disturbance.  From  this  situation  there  arise  two 
different  types  of  activity  on  the  part  of  the 
middle  group — and  it  is  not  without  significance 
that  in  other  countries  besides  China  there  has 
been  a  recognized  "middle  kingdom." 

If,  then,  we  consider  the  relations  of  the  politi- 
cal unit  towards  the  "native"  population  in  its 
rear  (avoiding  the  error  of  identifying  an  asser- 
tion of  territorial  dominion  with  the  politiciza- 
tion  of  a  population),  it  will  readily  become  ap- 

[93] 


PROCESSES    OF    HISTORY 

parent  that  there  is  practically  no  case  on  record 
in  which  this  population  has  been  wholly  in- 
corporated into  the  political  organization,  or  in 
which  the  kindred  organization  has  been  com- 
pletely broken  down.  This  condition  is  manifest 
in  China  and  India,  but  the  statement  holds  true 
equally  of  Great  Britain,  and  is  conspicuous  in 
the  New  World.  The  occasion  of  this  unequal 
politicization  of  geographically  protected  peo- 
ples may  be  traced  to  the  aggression  or  self- 
assertion  of  small  bodies  of  men,  representing 
individuals  who  have  not  submitted  themselves 
to  the  process  of  re-stabilization  in  the  political 
organization.  It  has  been  usual  to  classify  these 
men,  somewhat  invidiously,  as  "adventurers," 
but  in  reality  they  are  individuals  for  whose 
awakened  initiative  and  desire  for  purposive 
action  the  new  arrangement  provides  no  ade- 
quate opportunity.  It  is  the  case,  everywhere  and 
in  all  times,  of  "The  man  who  would  be  king" : — 
"we  will  go  away  to  some  other  place  where  a 
man  isn't  crowded  and  can  come  to  his  own." 
So,  in  India,  the  Aryan  settlement  of  the  Punjab 
was  followed  by  the  rise  of  small  Aryan  king- 
doms in  the  neighboring  Ganges  valley,  and  the 
footsteps  of  the  adventurers  may  even  be  traced, 

[94] 


THE    HUMAN    FACTOR 


still  farther  south,  in  the  Deccan.  Precisely  the 
same  course  of  action  is  to  be  seen  in  China,  and 
is  exemplified,  frequently,  in  later  times,  in  the 
colonial  expansion  of  European  peoples. 
Turning  next  to  the  policy  of  the  "middle" 
kingdom  in  regard  to  the  outward  or  frontier 
groups,  a  wholly  different  situation  comes  into 
view,  for,  in  this  case,  the  aggression  or  pressure 
is  directed  against  the  central  political  organiza- 
tion, and  not  exerted  by  it.  What  is  here  to  be 
considered  primarily  is  the  means  of  defence 
adopted  by  the  political  unit  against  migrant  in- 
vaders. In  ancient  times,  it  would  seem  that  one 
of  the  earliest  expedients  for  protecting  the  ex- 
posed frontier  was  the  wall,  and  the  barrier 
erected  by  the  Chinese  is  but  one  instance  of  a 
practice  which  has  been  followed  throughout 
Asia  and  Europe.  On  the  other  hand,  it  was  dis- 
covered at  a  remote  period,  for  example,  by  the 
Chinese  under  the  Han  dynasty,  that  a  more 
effective  defence  of  the  land  might  be  provided 
by  a  military  occupation  and  control  of  the 
frontier  territory  lying  beyond  the  actual  bound- 
ary of  the  organized  political  unit;  and  thence- 
forward the  Chinese  government  has  followed 
the  policy  of  maintaining  its  hold  upon  the  prov- 

[95] 


PROCESSES    OF    HISTORY 


inces  of  Mongolia  and  Sin  Kiang.  In  this  pro- 
cedure we  have  an  example  of  a  strategic  policy 
which  has  played  a  most  significant  part  in  the 
history  of  the  world,  and  is  even  now  a  subject  of 
debate  in  every  "foreign  office"  on  the  globe.  It 
is  of  interest  to  observe  that  the  Romans  should 
have  relied,  in  general,  upon  the  earlier  expe- 
dient of  the  wall,  with  its  accompaniment  of  a 
march  or  "no  man's  land"  in  front.  But  after  the 
long  series  of  barbarian  invasions  which  brought 
about  the  disruption  of  the  Western  Empire,  the 
newer  political  organizations  which  arose  upon 
its  foundations  adopted  the  later  Chinese  policy 
and  erected  for  defensive  purposes,  across  Cen- 
tral Europe,  that  series  of  marken — frontier 
provinces  under  military  control — from  which 
have  sprung  the  German  and  Austrian  govern- 
ments of  the  present  day. 

Clearly,  then,  the  extent  of  the  influence  exerted 
by  the  "middle"  kingdom,  and  its  central  politi- 
cal organization,  will  differ  radically  in  each  of 
these  typical  cases;  and  we  may  see,  in  brief,  that 
the  present  condition  of  the  great  contrasting 
groups  of  East  and  West,  of  China  and  India  on 
the  one  hand,  and  of  Europe  on  the  other,  springs 
from  the  manner  in  which  the  results  of  localized 

[96] 


THE    HUMAN    FACTOR 

transitions  from  kindred  to  political  organiza- 
tion have  affected  neighboring  populations.  In 
the  case  of  interiorly  situated  groups,  the  more 
obvious  institutions  of  the  new  regime  are  ex- 
tended, through  the  forceful  activity  of  indi- 
viduals, without  the  earlier  organization  of  the 
groups  brought  under  subjection  being  greatly 
disturbed,  or  the  individual  members  of  these 
groups  being  influenced  by  any  awakening.  Thus 
the  institution  of  kingship,  with  its  accompany- 
ing theory  of  sovereign  ownership,  is  imposed  in 
new  areas  without  an  attendant  break-up  of  kin- 
dred organization,  and  without  a  resultant  stimu- 
lus to  personal  initiative.  In  the  case  of  exteriorly 
situated  peoples,  the  influence  exerted  is,  on  the 
other  hand,  altogether  indirect.  Beyond  the  wall, 
there  is  no  extension  of  politicization.  The  fron- 
tier is  a  declaration  of  personal  ownership,  and 
with  the  internal  condition  of  the  exterior  bar- 
barians the  king  has  no  concern.  But  the  barrier 
or  pale,  whether  of  masonry  or  of  armed  men, 
obviously  exerts  a  pressure  of  its  own;  it  acts 
effectively  as  a  dam  against  which  weight  accu- 
mulates, and  so  creates  a  point  of  pressure  for 
those  outside.  In  the  end,  the  barrier  breaks,  and 
with  the  inundation  a  new  situation  is  created  in 

[97] 


PROCESSES    OF    HISTORY 


which  new  tribal  units  are  broken  up,  new  indi- 
viduals awake  to  self-assertion,  and  a  new  redis- 
tribution of  ownership  takes  place. 

I  have  remarked  earlier  that  "transition"  has 
not  been  made  the  subject  of  extended  compara- 
tive research,  and  all  that  has  been  done  here  is 
to  suggest  the  fundamental  importance  of  the 
study.  Nevertheless,  even  a  superficial  inquiry 
brings  to  light  certain  points  of  great  interest, 
and  we  see  that  transition  is  in  all  cases  the  result 
of  pressure  and  conflict  at  geographical  points 
which  are  absolutely  determined  by  the  con- 
figuration of  the  earth's  surface,  and  that  this 
localization  of  transition,  in  place  and  time,  leads 
everywhere  to  irregularity  and  unevenness  in  the 
distribution  of  political  institutions.  Most  sig- 
nificant of  all,  the  central  feature  of  transition  is 
not  merely  the  substitution  of  territory  for  blood- 
relationship  as  the  basis  of  unity  in  human 
groups,  but  the  emergence  of  individuality  and 
of  personal  self-assertion,  and  hence  it  follows 
that  human  advance  rests  ultimately  upon  the 
foundation  of  individual  initiative  and  activity. 

4.  At  an  earlier  point  in  this  discussion  it  was 
found  necessary,  in  order  to  escape  from  the 

[98] 


THE  HUMAN  FACTOR 
vagueness  of  such  terms  as  "civilization,"  to  re- 
strict the  inquiry,  for  the  moment,  to  the  begin- 
nings of  political  organization.  If,  however,  we 
are  ever  to  understand  how  man  has  come  to  be 
as  he  is,  the  investigation  cannot  be  limited  in 
this  manner;  for  while  human  life  is,  unquestion- 
ably, conditioned  by  the  organization  under 
which  it  is  conducted,  the  actual  content  of  life 
cannot  be  summed  up  or  expressed  in  terms  of 
organization.  The  differences  which  are  to  be 
observed  between  groups  at  the  present  moment, 
between  earlier  and  later  generations  of  the  same 
group,  between  individuals,  and  between  earlier 
and  later  periods  in  the  life  of  the  same  indi- 
vidual, cannot  be  epitomized  in  any  description 
of  the  forms  of  human  association. 

Here,  for  the  sake  of  clearness,  it  may  be  pointed 
out  that  the  practice  of  any  art  involves  the  ac- 
ceptance of  specific  limitations  and  the  recogni- 
tion of  conventional  forms  within  which  the 
artist's  expression  is  confined.  No  student  of 
sculpture  or  poetry,  for  example,  will  confuse  the 
technique  of  a  statue  or  a  sonnet  with  the  thought 
and  emotion  which  it  attempts  to  convey.  In 
short,  the  work  of  art  is  something  more  than  the 
technical  rules  by  which  it  is  conditioned.  Now 

[99] 


PROCESSES    OF    HISTORY 

the  conduct  of  life  is  an  art,  and  is  limited  by 
specific  rules  and  conventions,  but  there  appears 
to  be  a  preponderant  disposition  on  the  part  of 
students  of  man  to  regard  the  exterior  rules  and 
conventions,  laws  and  social  usages,  as  the  essen- 
tial matter  for  consideration.  This  is  made  clear 
when  we  observe  that  legislators,  publicists,  and 
"social  workers"  hold  tenaciously  to  the  opinion 
that  the  advancement  of  man  is  to  be  effected  by 
the  simple  expedient  of  modifying  the  existing 
regulations.  Whether  this  be  true  or  not,  there 
can  be  no  question  that  in  the  investigation  of  the 
elements  of  human  history  we  must  set  ourselves 
to  inquire,  not  merely  how  the  forms  and  con- 
ventions of  human  aggregates  have  reached  their 
present  status,  but  how  the  content  of  life  has 
come  to  possess  the  infinite  variety  which  it  ex- 
hibits today. 

In  pursuit  of  this  broader  inquiry,  we  may 
begin  by  saying  that  what  differentiates  man 
from  animal  cannot  be  what  he  shares  in  common 
with  his  closest  non-human  relations,  and  hence 
that,  in  seeking  to  account  for  human  advance- 
ment, the  common  possessions  of  animal  and  man 
must  be  eliminated  from  consideration.  Fortu- 
nately, there  is  practical  agreement  among  all 


THE    HUMAN    FACTOR 

classes  of  investigators,  psychologists,  logicians, 
and  anthropologists,  that  the  differentia  of  man 
consists  in  his  possession  of  articulate  speech  or 
spoken  language.  Speech  is  a  difference  easily 
determinable,  and  has  in  itself  proved  to  be  a 
subject  of  profound  interest  to  scholars,  but  the 
success  that  has  attended  the  study  of  words  and 
languages  during  the  last  century  has  somewhat 
obscured  the  important  fact  that  speech  does  not 
exist  in  and  for  itself.  The  interest  that  has  been 
taken  in  the  changes  of  form,  sound,  and  mean- 
ing of  words  has  hindered,  until  quite  recently, 
a  just  appreciation  of  the  fact  that  the  study  of 
words  cannot  be  separated  from  the  study  of 
what  they  designate.  Speech  comes  into  exist- 
ence in  response  to  the  desire  on  the  part  of  a 
human  being  to  make  himself  understood  by 
someone  else,  and  is  an  instrument  for  the  com- 
munication of  ideas.  Language  is  a  conveying 
medium,  and  the  aim  of  speech  is  the  convey- 
ance of  ideas,  not  the  mere  interchange  of  words. 
Hence  the  humanist,  or  student  of  man,  will  in- 
terest himself  not  merely  in  the  form  of  expres- 
sion, but  in  what  is  expressed;  he  will  pass  from 
the  individual  words  of  a  language  to  examine 
the   ideas   conveyed.    Linguistic   scholars   have 

[lOl] 


PROCESSES    OF    HISTORY 

rendered  invaluable  service  in  the  composition 
of  grammars  and  vocabularies,  but  they  have,  not 
infrequently,  lost  sight  of  the  circumstance  that 
any  given  language  is  the  medium  through  which 
a  particular  system  of  ideas  finds  expression. 
While,  then,  we  may  accept  speech  as  the  dis- 
tinguishing mark  of  humanity,  we  cannot  but 
recognize  that  the  fundamental  object  of  inquiry 
will  be  the  system  of  ideas  represented  in  a  given 
language  at  a  given  time. 

If,  then,  we  come  to  compare,  not  man  and 
brute,  but  the  differing  groups  that  go  to  make 
up  the  human  population  of  the  globe,  the  dis- 
tinguishing feature  of  any  group  will  be,  not  its 
language,  implements,  or  institutions,  but  its  par- 
ticular idea-system,  of  which  these  other  mani- 
festations of  activity  are  varying  expressions. 
Without  exception,  the  products  of  human  ac- 
tivity are  expressions  or  aspects  of  the  entire  men- 
tal content  of  the  group  or  individual.  This  men- 
tal content,  moreover,  is  not  to  be  conceived  of  as 
a  mere  assemblage  of  disparate  units  placed  in 
juxtaposition,  but  as  cohering  in  an  idea-system. 
Ideas  are  not  simply  accumulated  or  heaped  up; 
on  the  contrary,  every  *'new"  idea  added  not  only 
modifies,  but  is  in  turn  modified  by  the  existing 

[  102] 


THE    HUMAN    FACTOR 

system  into  which  it  is  incorporated.  Thus  it  ap- 
pears that  no  idea-system,  any  more  than  an 
actual  spoken  language,  is  a  deliberate  construc- 
tion. Languages  are  made  up  of  words,  but  these 
are  not  consciously  and  systematically  elabo- 
rated; like  the  names  in  a  scientific  classification 
they  come  into  existence  only  as  occasion  de- 
mands, and  are  elicited  by  objects,  actions,  and 
events.  Before  ''plowing,"  "sowing,"  and  "reap- 
ing" could  have  been  named  these  actions  must 
have  been  performed  and  recognized.  Similarly, 
the  idea-system  of  a  group  is  not  to  be  attributed 
to  foresight  or  planning,  but  to  the  pressure  of 
circumstance.  It  will  appear,  then,  that  if  we  are 
to  consider  the  content  of  life  in  addition  to  the 
exterior  forms  of  human  association,  the  study 
before  us  must  concern  itself  with  the  factors  and 
processes  through  which  the  idea-systems  of  dif- 
ferent groups  have  come  to  be  as  we  find  them 
today. 

In  justification  of  thus  postulating  idea-systems 
as  a  basis  for  the  comparative  study  of  man,  it 
may  be  pointed  out  that  what  we  find  in  "civili- 
zation" is  not  the  product  of  primary  emotions, 
which  man  shares  with  animals,  but  of  some  ac- 
tivity which  he  has  developed  in  a  characteristic 

[  103  ] 


PROCESSES    OF    HISTORY 

manner.  This  activity  may  be  described  as  the 
formation  and  expression  of  ideas.  The  physical 
and  psychological  constitution  of  man  being 
"given" — a  point  to  which  reference  will  subse- 
quently be  made — what  varies  from  group  to 
group  is  not  this  foundation,  but  the  results  of 
mental  activity;  and  we  want  to  know  how  these 
results  have  come  to  exhibit  the  differences  we 
find  in  the  world  today.  Thus  human  "evolution" 
is,  fundamentally,  intellectual  "evolution,"  and 
the  diversity  of  status  in  human  groups  at  the 
present  time  is  to  be  traced  to  differences  in  men- 
tal activity.  This  basis  of  study  will  be  found  to 
meet  all  the  requirements  of  the  comparative 
method  as  exhibited  in  biological  evolution, 
which  is  founded  upon  a  comparison  of  the 
phylogenetic  or  historical  series,  the  ontogenetic 
or  biographical  series,  and  the  facts  of  present 
geographical  distribution,  and  the  investigation 
of  how  man  has  come  to  be  as  he  is  must  be  placed 
upon  such  a  basis  as  will  make  the  utilization  of 
these  categories  possible.  Furthermore,  this  basis 
has  already  been  found  necessary  in  different 
lines  of  humanistic  inquiry.  Human  "advance- 
ment" is  not  measurable  in  terms  of  any  one  of 
the  classes  or  categories  under  which  human 

[  104] 


THE    HUMAN    FACTOR 

activities  have  been  grouped  for  purposes  of 
study.  When  we  consider  any  one  subject  like 
religion,  art,  language,  or  political  organization, 
by  itself,  we  simply  impose  a  voluntary  limita- 
tion upon  our  personal  attention;  in  actual  life, 
on  the  other  hand,  the  mental  activity  of  man  has 
never  been  divided  into  separate  compartments. 
Hence  in  dealing  with  these  separate  studies  we 
require  some  more  general  basis  of  comparison. 
So  Hobhouse,  tracing  the  "evolution"  of  morals, 
takes  as  a  foundation  "the  collective  stock  of 
knowledge,  the  equipment  of  method  and  gov- 
erning conceptions  which  constitute  the  working 
intellectual  capital  of  any  community."  Simi- 
larly, S.  A.  Cook  points  out  that  "for  the  study 
of  religion  it  is  necessary  to  observe  the  tendency 
of  man  to  blend  into  one  whole  his  tested  and 
untested  knowledge,  his  own  experience  and  that 
of  others."  "A  'body'  or  system  of  beliefs,  prac- 
tices, and  the  like,  depends  upon  people;  it  is 
part  of  their  larger  total  'body'  of  thought,  and 
undergoes  development."  "The  development  of 
a  man's  life  and  that  of  his  total  world  of  thought 
are  interconnected ;  and  since  his  profoundest  and 
most  valued  beliefs  are  not  unchangeable,  the 
most  vital  part  of  his  physical  being  and  that  of 

[105] 


PROCESSES    OF    HISTORY 

his  world  of  thought  are  both  capable  of  develop- 
ment. Each  depends  upon  the  other,  and  the 
whole  evolves." 

All  the  more,  therefore,  when  we  come  to  take 
up  the  broad  problem  of  how  man  has  come  to  be 
as  he  is  will  it  be  necessary  to  adopt  the  canon 
that  judgment  in  regard  to  the  mental  activity  of 
a  given  group  can  be  based  only  upon  the  totality 
of  the  various  mental  phases  of  culture — lan- 
guage, custom,  myth,  and  art.  And  this  position 
is  fortified  by  McDougall's  opinion  that  "man, 
since  he  became  man,  has  progressed  in  the  main 
by  means  of  the  increase  in  volume  and  improve- 
ment in  quality  of  the  sum  of  knowledge,  belief, 
and  custom,  which  constitutes  the  tradition  of 
any  society.  It  is  to  the  superiority  of  the  moral 
and  intellectual  tradition  of  his  society  that  the 
superiority  of  civilized  man  over  existing  sav- 
ages and  over  his  savage  forefathers  is  chiefly,  if 
not  wholly,  due." 

As  a  result  of  these  considerations,  we  arrive  at 
the  view  that  the  study  of  how  existing  idea- 
systems  have  come  to  be  what  they  are  provides 
a  feasible  basis  for  an  investigation  of  the  ad- 
vancement of  man.  The  alternative  bases  of  study 
which   ordinarily   are   adopted   concern   them- 

[io6] 


THE    HUMAN    FACTOR 

selves,  on  the  one  hand,  with  the  physical  consti- 
tution of  human  beings,  and,  on  the  other,  with 
the  exterior  forms  of  human  association.  The 
first  of  these  leads  at  once  to  the  theory  that  there 
have  been  and  are  innately  superior  races,  in- 
nately superior  classes,  and  innately  superior  in- 
dividuals, and  that  human  advancement  has  fol- 
lowed from  the  spontaneous  activity  of  these 
higher  elements.  As,  however,  no  effort  has  been 
made  to  account  for  the  sporadic  emergence  of 
these  exceptions  to  the  general  rule  of  backward- 
ness and  stagnation,  in  the  long  run  the  argument 
is  just  an  assertion  of  the  physical  superiority  of 
those  who  have  become  conspicuous.  The  second 
basis  of  study  fixes  attention  upon  the  forms  of 
group  organization,  and  provides  no  opening  to 
a  broader  consideration  of  the  content  of  human 
life;  whereas  the  basis  here  proposed  brings 
under  one  view  the  entire  range  of  activities  rep- 
resented in  religion,  art,  literature,  philosophy, 
science,  and  co-ordinates  these  activities  with  the 
facts  of  history  and  of  group  organization. 

5.  If  we  turn  to  examine  the  relation  of  idea- 
systems  to  group  organization,  a  remarkable 
parallelism  in  development  becomes  apparent. 
It  has  already  been  pointed  out  that  under  primi- 

[  107  ] 


PROCESSES    OF    HISTORY 


tive  conditions  organization  is  relatively  stable, 
and  that  the  individual  is  bound  by  the  authority 
of  the  group.  The  idea-systems  of  primitive 
groups  are  highly  restricted  in  content,  but,  in 
addition  to  this  limitation,  the  traditional  ideas 
entertained  have,  in  general,  been  transmuted 
into  customary  actions  and  ways  of  doing  things. 
So,  religious  ideas  are  concentrated  in  rites  and 
observances,  and  explanations  of  natural  phe- 
nomena are  embodied  in  symbolic  ceremonies. 
In  short,  the  w^hole  body  of  custom  and  tradition 
represents  ideas  fixed  in  action.  Since  these  modes 
of  action,  which  are  associated  with  all  the  essen- 
tial activities  of  life,  must  be  prosecuted  with 
rigid  adherence  to  precedent,  it  is  evident  that 
any  reconsideration  of  the  validity  of  the  ideas 
upon  which  they  rest  is  practically  out  of  the 
question.  Primitive  man  does  not  "think,"  he 
performs  definitely  prescribed  actions  under  the 
eye  of  the  community,  which,  in  turn,  is  vitally 
concerned  in  the  exactness  with  which  the  repe- 
tition of  formula  or  ceremony  is  carried  out.  It 
will  thus  be  observed,  as  Professor  Shotwell  sug- 
gests, that  a  study  of  the  relation  of  custom  and 
observance  to  idea-systems,  and  of  the  conditions 
under  which  they  become  "survivals"  when  the 

[.08] 


THE    HUMAN    FACTOR 

latter  have  changed,  must  ultimately  constitute 
an  essential  feature  of  this  inquiry,  but  as  yet 
such  study  has  not  been  undertaken. 

It  has  been  indicated  that  the  breakdown  of 
kindred  organization,  following  upon  migration 
and  collision,  tended  to  release  the  individual 
from  the  domination  of  the  group,  and  to  create 
a  situation  in  which  personal  initiative  and  self- 
assertion  became  possible.  It  has  now  to  be 
pointed  out  that,  while  this  release  may  be  re- 
garded as  affecting  primarily  the  submission  of 
the  individual  to  the  mandatory  authority  of  the 
group,  essentially  it  opens  for  the  individual  the 
possibility  of  thinking  for  himself  without  refer- 
ence to  group  precedent.  The  emergence  of  indi- 
viduality, with  its  accompanying  manifestations 
of  personal  initiative  and  self-assertion,  is  inti- 
mately associated  with  the  beginnings  of  inde- 
pendent mental  activity,  of  thinking  which  may 
lead  the  individual  to  question  the  validity  of 
inherited  group  ideas. 

This  striking  result,  it  must  be  understood,  is 
not  achieved  by  the  individual  of  his  own  voli- 
tion or  accord ;  it  is  thrust  upon  him  by  the  force 
of  circumstances.  To  make  the  point  clear,  we 
may  say,  speculatively,  that  had  there  ever  been 

[  109] 


PROCESSES    OF   HISTORY 

but  one  system  of  ideas  common  to  all  men,  ad- 
vancement would  have  been  impossible,  for 
progress  in  ideas  springs  from  comparison,  and 
a  sense  of  difference  could  not  arise  from  con- 
templation of  different  instances  of  the  same 
thing.  Conversely,  the  critical  spirit  is  easily 
enough  aroused  by  the  juxtaposition  of  different 
means  for  attaining  the  same  end;  so  that  differ- 
ent observances  for  effecting  the  same  result,  dif- 
ferent mythological  explanations  of  the  same 
phenomena,  when  brought  into  contact,  may  be 
expected  to  lead  to  questionings  and  comparisons. 
That  some  such  path  has  actually  been  followed 
in  the  past  seems  clear.  Ernst  Curtius  pointed 
out,  long  ago,  that  the  influence  of  sea-navigation 
upon  the  development  of  the  Greeks  had  been 
very  marked,  as  it  suddenly  brought  face  to  face 
men  who  had  been  living  under  widely  different 
conditions,  and  hence  induced  an  endless  com- 
paring, learning,  and  teaching.  A  more  drastic 
form  of  the  same  process  is  exhibited,  however, 
when  successive  migrating  groups  invade  the 
land,  be  it  ancient  Greece  or  medieval  Italy,  and 
a  time  ensues  of  "constant  war-paths  and  uproot- 
ings  of  peoples."  In  such  circumstances,  the 
whole  traditional  bodv  of  customs,   rites,  and 

[i".o] 


THE    HUMAN    FACTOR 

observances  tends  to  be  overthrown,  for  the  tur- 
moil no  longer  permits  of  opportunity  to  pro- 
pitiate the  slain,  or  to  maintain  the  sacrifices  for 
the  dead ;  the  lines  of  kindred  are  broken,  and 
new  groups,  composed  of  men  whom  chance  has 
thrown  together,  are  formed  under  the  leader- 
ship of  some  individual  whose  self-assertion, 
backed  by  strength  or  craft,  seems  to  offer  pro- 
tection. This  is  the  essence  of  all  "Dark  Ages," 
in  which,  through  swiftly  moving  change,  con- 
trasts are  made  vividly  apparent,  men  awake  to 
the  perception  of  dififerences  in  ideas,  and  criti- 
cism is  born. 

At  the  present  time  the  view  is  very  widely  en- 
tertained that  human  advancement  is  the  out- 
come of  the  commingling  of  ideas  through  the 
contact  of  different  groups.  Thus  Henry  Balfour 
says,  typically,  "This  process  of  grafting  one  idea 
upon  another,  or,  as  we  may  call  it,  the  hybridiza- 
tion of  ideas  and  experience,  is  a  factor  in  the 
advancement  of  culture  whose  influence  cannot 
be  overestimated.  It  is,  in  fact,  the  main  secret  of 
progress."  So,  too,  F.  W.  Maitland  holds  that 
"the  rapidly  progressive  groups  have  been  just 
those  which  have  not  worked  out  their  own  sal- 
vation,   but    have    appropriated    alien    ideas." 

[Ill] 


PROCESSES    OF    HISTORY 

While,  in  the  main,  accepting  these  statements, 
it  must,  nevertheless,  be  insisted  that  the  great 
advances  of  mankind  have  been  due,  not  to  the 
mere  aggregation,  assemblage,  or  acquisition  of 
disparate  ideas,  but  to  the  emergence  of  a  certain 
type  of  mental  activity  which  is  set  up  by  the 
opposition  of  different  idea-systems.  This  is  il- 
lustrated in  Jastrow's  remark  that  civilization 
is  everywhere  the  result  of  the  stimulus  evoked 
by  the  friction  of  one  group  upon  another.  The 
stimulus  is  mental,  and  the  friction  springs  from 
the  contact  of  differing  customs  and  explana- 
tions. The  simple  commingling  of  ideas  un- 
doubtedly takes  place,  but  the  important  point  is 
that  different  ideas  in  regard  to  the  same  subject, 
when  maintained  in  opposition  by  members  of 
the  same  group,  necessarily  evoke  comparison 
and  critical  discussion.  The  outcome  of  this  is  not 
always,  nor  even  generally,  a  choice  between  two 
alternatives,  for  the  debate  will  leave  neither  of 
the  original  positions  wholly  unchanged,  and 
hence  a  new  idea-system  will  arise  which  is  not 
a  selection  of  materials  drawn  from  various 
sources,  but  a  resultant  of  the  juxtaposition  of 
different  bodies  of  thought. 
We  may  see,  then,  that,  under  primitive  condi- 

[112] 


THE    HUMAN    FACTOR 

tions,  the  type  of  organization  operates  to  main- 
tain a  fixity  of  relations,  customs,  and  ideas; 
under  transitional  conditions,  however,  the  domi- 
nant factor  is  the  release  of  the  individual,  mani- 
festing itself  in  the  self-assertion  which  gives  to 
the  new  organization  its  characteristic  form,  and 
in  the  personal  criticism  through  which  the  older 
idea-systems  are  modified  and  changed. 

6.  If,  as  would  thus  appear,  differences  in  idea- 
systems  have  been  of  crucial  importance  in  the 
history  of  mankind,  the  question  as  to  how  these 
differences  have  arisen  will  naturally  force  itself 
upon  our  consideration. 

Differences  in  idea-systems  are,  fundamentally, 
man's  response  to  differences  in  his  surroundings. 
This  fact  has  been  obscured,  in  general  estima- 
tion, by  the  somewhat  exaggerated  use  which  has 
been  made  of  it  by  men  like  Buckle  and  Spencer, 
who,  for  example,  have  attributed  the  growth  of 
superstition  to  the  terror  inspired  by  the  threat- 
ening aspects  of  nature  in  tropical  countries.  If, 
however,  we  keep  to  a  less  speculative  level,  it 
will  readily  be  admitted  that  the  surroundings 
in  which  their  respective  lives  are  passed  will 
present  very  different  objects  for  consideration 
to  the  Eskimo  and  to  the  Arab;  and  so,  while 

["3] 


PROCESSES    OF    HISTORY 

the  language  of  the  one  has  many  different  words 
for  "seal,"  that  of  the  other  displays  a  similar 
elaboration  of  terms  for  the  "camel."  This  form 
of  dependence  of  the  group  upon  its  habitat  is  so 
far  recognized  as  unequivocal  and  precise  that 
it  has  been  made  the  basis  of  extended  philologi- 
cal research  with  the  object  of  determining  the 
earliest  seat  of  various  peoples,  notably  the 
"Aryans";  for  where  the  names  of  natural  ob- 
jects, such  as  trees  and  animals,  have  been  bor- 
rowed from  other  languages  it  is  assumed  that 
these  could  not  have  been  known  to  the  particu- 
lar group  in  its  original  home.  It  is  true  that  ob- 
jections have  been  urged  to  this  course  of  reason- 
ing, but  the  fact  remains  that,  where  the  condi- 
tions of  life  lead  men  to  pursue  the  occupation  of 
fishing,  the  foreground  of  their  interest  will  be 
dominated  by  terms  and  ideas  which  would  be 
entirely  different  if  the  same  individuals  were 
engaged  in  cattle-raising  or  farming.  In  short, 
the  surroundings  in  which  a  group  is  placed  de- 
termine its  primary  interests,  and  these,  as  Boas 
has  pointed  out,  affect  the  entire  character  of  its 
vocabulary  and  the  make-up  of  its  system  of 
ideas. 
This  fact  is  illustrated,  for  example,  in  Jas- 

[114] 


THE    HUMAN    FACTOR 

trow's  study  of  Sumerian  and  Babylonian  ideas 
of  beginnings,  "which  may  be  summed  up,"  he 
says,  "in  the  statement  that  in  the  early  Sumerian 
view  the  chief  factor  in  the  Creation  myth  is  the 
bringing  about  of  vegetation  and  fertility,  where- 
as in  the  later  Babylonian  or  Akkadian  tale  the 
main  stress  is  laid  upon  the  substitution  of  law 
and  order  for  primitive  chaos  and  lawlessness." 
Again,  it  is  difficult  to  refrain  from  calling  at- 
tention, in  however  condensed  a  form,  to  the 
examination  of  "The  Background  of  Greek 
Science"  by  J.  L.  Myres,  in  which  he  endeavors 
"to  recover  some  of  the  limiting  conditions  under 
which  any  scheme  of  scientific  knowledge  and 
scientific  method  necessarily  came  into  being  in 
Greek  lands." 

Considered  as  a  theatre,  a  place  for  observing 
nature,  he  says,  Greek  lands  offer  in  some  re- 
spects unequalled  facilities.  They  are  a  region  of 
abrupt  contrasts,  and  frank  revelations  of  what 
nature  is,  in  its  infinitely  various  detail.  Its  clear 
air  decimates  distances — witness  Lucretius'  re- 
mark that  far-off  lights  do  not  grow  smaller;  but 
its  strong  contrasts  of  hot  and  cold,  due  to  in- 
tensity of  sunlight  and  rapidity  of  radiation,  con- 
tinually present  the  atmosphere  as  a  perceptible 
[IIS] 


PROCESSES    OF    HISTORY 

fluid,  with  shimmering  ripples  over  each  roasted 
rock,  and  with  an  upper  surface,  emphatic  as  a 
sea-level,  on  which  the  wool-pack  clouds  sit  like 
snowflakes  on  a  window  pane.  In  such  a  climate, 
too,  'wet'  and  'dry'  are  as  clearly  defined  in  their 
antagonism  as  'hot'  and  'cold';  for  wet  and  dry 
are  not  only  natural  opposites,  but  are  engaged  in 
perpetual  struggle  here,  in  alternating  seasons  of 
rain  and  rainlessness.  With  the  other  great  an- 
titheses of  the  physical  philosophy,  light  and 
darkness,  hard  and  soft,  sweet  and  bitter,  it  is  the 
same;  but  most  striking  of  all,  perhaps,  is  the 
extraordinary  rapidity  both  of  decomposition 
and  of  organic  growth.  All  these,  Myres  con- 
tinues, "challenge  curiosity  about  the  origin  and 
the  nature  of  life,  with  peculiar  insistence,  and 
apparent  facility  of  experiment.  Who,  then,  or 
what,  maintains  the  world?  This,  for  men,  as 
for  Olympians,  if  Olympians  thought  about  such 
things,  was  the  supreme  question  to  be  asked  of 
nature.  It  was  a  question  of  minor  interest,  and 
merely  historical  value,  'Who  made  the  world?' 
and  'What  shall  it  be  in  the  end  thereof?'  This 
indifference  to  cosmogony  and  eschatology  is 
characteristic  of  Greek  physical  speculation,  and 
greatly  lightened  its  task.  It  stands  in  the  strong- 

[ii6] 


THE    HUMAN    FACTOR 

est  contrast  to  the  Oriental,  and  particularly  the 
Babylonian,  insistence  on  origins,  and  interest 
in  creation  myths;  and  enhances  the  Greek  in- 
sistence on  questions  about  the  structure,  the 
maintenance,  and  the  current  behavior  of  the 
world;  questions  which  Oriental,  and  particu- 
larly Babylonian  thought,  neglects,  or  glozes 
over." 

Fundamentally,  then,  differences  in  idea-sys- 
tems are  determined  by  differences  in  man's 
physical  surroundings,  and  these  differences  are 
maintained  through  the  discipline  exercised  by 
the  group  over  the  individual.  When,  however, 
we  come  to  examine  the  factors  in  human  ad- 
vancement, it  appears  that  radical  changes  in 
idea-systems  follow  upon  the  collision  of  groups 
from  dissimilar  habitats.  So,  it  was  not,  as  has 
been  thought,  because  he  rode  a  horse  that  the 
nomad  from  Central  Asia  influenced  greatly  the 
lives  of  the  dwellers  in  the  outer  circle  of  Eura- 
sian lands,  but  because  the  conditions  of  his  life 
developed  a  system  of  ideas  which  was  wholly 
different  from  theirs.  And  here  it  is  of  the  high- 
est importance  to  observe,  with  Hogarth,  that  the 
relatively  small  and  well-marked  area  of  the 
Ancient  East,  in  which  the  earliest  marked  ad- 
[i'7] 


PROCESSES    OF    HISTORY 

vancement  of  mankind  appears  to  have  taken 
place,  contains  within  itself  no  less  than  six 
divisions  characterized  by  large  differences  of  a 
geographical  nature.  These  are  Asia  Minor, 
Armenia,  Syria,  Arabia,  Mesopotamia,  and 
western  Iran,  and  I  am  unable,  at  the  moment, 
to  recall  any  area  similarly  restricted  in  which 
so  many  distinct  types  of  habitat  are  placed  in 
close  association.  Neither  lapse  of  time,  nor 
uniformity  of  government  has  been  able  to  over- 
come the  striking  differences  which  the  varia- 
tions in  habitat  have  promoted  in  the  idea-sys- 
tems of  the  inhabitants  of  these  regions.  As  has 
already  been  indicated,  the  lower  valley  of  the 
Euphrates  and  Tigris  represents  the  natural 
focal  point  of  human  movement  in  these  lands, 
the  terminal  of  many  routes  of  travel,  and  we 
may  now  see  that  while  this  central  position  im- 
plies a  maximum  exposure  to  attack,  it  implies 
also  a  maximum  exposure  to  different  systems  of 
ideas. 

Finally,  in  confirmation  of  the  hypothesis  that 
the  changes  which  have  contributed  to  human 
advancement  have  ensued  from  the  collision  of 
groups  from  widely  different  habitats,  and  hence 
of  different  idea-systems,  we  may  point  to  the 

[ii8] 


THE    HUMAN    FACTOR 

initial  stages  of  those  great  outbursts  of  intel- 
lectual activity  which  have  distinguished  every 
people  which  has  risen  above  the  level  of  primi- 
tive man.  So,  the  historian  of  China  is  forced  to 
repeat,  from  chapter  to  chapter,  the  formula : 
"first  the  successful  invasion,  the  destruction  of 
the  old  power,  and  then  the  formation  of  new 
nations,  governments,  and  types  of  men" ;  and  the 
summary  of  results  in  each  case  is  typified  in  the 
statement  that  "not  the  least  of  the  Mongols'  gifts 
to  China  was  the  stimulus  and  fertilization  of  the 
native  intellect  in  the  domain  of  the  imagina- 
tion." Similarly,  Vincent  Smith,  the  latest  his- 
torian of  India,  remarks  that  "the  rule  of  the 
able  and  long-lived  monarchs  of  the  Gupta 
dynasty  coincided  with  an  extraordinary  out- 
burst of  intellectual  activity  of  all  kinds.  The 
personal  patronage  of  the  kings  no  doubt  has 
some  effect,  but  deeper  causes  must  have  been  at 
work  to  produce  such  results.  Experience  proves 
that  the  contact  or  collision  of  diverse  modes  of 
civilization  is  the  most  potent  stimulus  to  in- 
tellectual and  artistic  progress,  and,  in  my  opin- 
ion, the  eminent  achievements  of  the  Gupta 
period  are  mainly  due  to  such  contact  with 
foreign  civilizations,  both  on  the  east  and  on  the 

[119] 


PROCESSES    OF    HISTORY 

west."  Again,  the  entire  history  of  Babylonia  and 
Assyria  is  an  epitome  of  such  situations,  and  this 
leads  a  recent  historian  to  observe:  ''it  may  be 
put  down  as  an  axiom  that  nowhere  does  a  high 
form  of  culture  arise  without  the  commingling 
of  diverse  ethnic  elements."  "The  Euphrates 
valley  from  the  time  that  it  looms  up  on  the  his- 
torical horizon,"  he  continues,  "is  the  seat  of  a 
mixed  population.  Egyptian  culture  is  the  out- 
come of  the  mixture  of  Semitic  with  Hamitic 
elements.  Civilization  begins  in  Greece  with  the 
movements  of  Asiatic  peoples,  partly  at  least 
non-Aryan,  across  the  Aegean  sea.  In  Rome  we 
find  the  old  Aryan  stock  mixed  with  a  strange 
element,  known  as  Etruscan.  In  modern  times, 
France,  Germany,  and  England  furnish  illus- 
trations of  the  process  of  the  commingling  of 
diverse  ethnic  elements  leading  to  advanced 
forms  of  civilization."  Ultimately,  attention  may 
be  called  to  Petrie's  conclusion  in  his  memorable 
study  of  The  Revolutions  of  Civilisation  that 
"every  civilization  of  a  settled  population  tends 
to  incessant  decay  from  its  maximum  condition; 
and  this  decay  continues  until  it  is  too  weak  to 
initiate  anything,  when  a  fresh  race  comes  in, 
and  utilizes  the  old  stock  to  graft  on,  both  in 

[  120] 


THE    HUMAN    FACTOR 

blood  and  culture.  As  soon  as  the  mixture  is  well 
started,  it  rapidly  grows  on  the  old  soil,  and  pro- 
duces a  new  wave  of  civilization.  There  is  no  new 
generation  without  a  mixture  of  blood,  parthe- 
nogenesis is  unknown  in  the  birth  of  nations." 

7.  At  this  point,  it  is  necessary  to  revert  for  a 
moment  to  a  theory  which  has  gained  wide  ac- 
ceptance in  modern  times,  namely,  that  human 
advancement  has  been  the  direct  result  of  war. 
Thus  Brinton,  himself  a  veteran  of  the  Civil 
War,  urges  that  "in  spite  of  the  countless  miseries 
which  follow  in  its  train,  war  has  probably  been 
the  highest  stimulus  to  racial  progress.  It  is  the 
most  potent  excitant  known  of  all  the  faculties. 
The  intense  instinct  of  self-preservation  will 
prompt  to  an  intellectual  energy  which  nothing 
else  can  awake.  The  grandest  works  of  imagina- 
tion, the  immortal  outbursts  of  the  poets,  from 
Homer  to  Whitman,  have  been  under  the  stimu- 
lus of  the  war-cry  ringing  in  their  ears."  It  will 
not  be  necessary  to  epitomize  the  views  to  which 
this  idea  has  given  rise,  or  to  indicate  the  variety 
of  the  arguments  which  have  been  adduced  in  its 
support.  From  all  that  has  here  been  said,  it  is 
obvious  that  war  has  played  a  most  significant 
part  in  the  advancement  of  mankind,  but  the 

[121] 


PROCESSES    OF   HISTORY 

benefits  it  has  conferred  have  been  confined  to 
the  break-up  of  crystallized  systems  of  organi- 
zation and  of  thought.  Since  man  has  not  become 
sufficiently  self-conscious  of  the  natural  processes 
which  dominate  his  life,  he  continues  to  submit 
to  the  fixative  influences  of  group  discipline,  and 
throws  all  his  weight  in  favor  of  maintaining  the 
status  quo.  It  follows  that,  in  the  past,  the  gate- 
way of  human  advance  has  been  the  violent  con- 
flict of  the  representatives  of  old  and  new  ways 
of  thought  and  action,  whether  the  old  and  new 
be  embodied,  for  the  occasion,  in  states,  in  groups 
within  a  given  state,  or  in  single  individuals.  It 
must,  therefore,  be  regarded  as  a  shortsighted 
view  which  imagines  the  conflict  thus  precipi- 
tated as  in  itself  a  desirable  thing,  though,  here- 
tofore, man's  ignorance  of  himself  has  made  such 
conflicts  inevitable.  On  the  other  hand,  this 
opinion  emphasizes,  as  perhaps  nothing  else 
could  at  the  present  moment,  the  supreme  impor- 
tance of  an  understanding  of  the  elements  of  his- 
tory. To  reach  this  desideratum  it  has  been  neces- 
sary, first  of  all,  to  show  that  the  history  of  man 
is  homogeneous  throughout,  and  to  point  out  the 
factors  which  exercise  a  determinant  influence 
upon  the  course  of  events;  but  to  gain  a  knowl- 

[  122] 


THE  HUMAN  FACTOR 
edge  which  may  be  of  direct  service  in  the  con- 
sideration of  human  afifairs  we  must  now  turn 
our  attention,  more  specifically,  to  the  processes 
through  the  operation  of  which  man  everywhere 
has  come  to  be  as  he  is. 


[  123] 


IV 

METHOD  AND  RESULTS 

I.  The  task  of  science  in  the  presence  of  a  his- 
tory, be  it  the  history  of  the  physical  universe,  of 
the  earth,  of  the  forms  of  life  upon  the  earth,  or 
of  man,  is  the  discovery  of  the  processes  through 
vv^hich  things — stars,  strata,  and  species — have 
come  to  be  as  they  are,  and  each  of  the  major 
sciences,  such  as  Astronomy,  Geology,  and  Biol- 
ogy, has  entered  upon  the  modern  phase  of  its 
activities  with  the  recognition  of  this  funda- 
mental problem.  Commonly,  this  new^  departure 
is  associated  in  men's  minds  with  the  acceptance 
of  the  idea  of  "evolution,"  which,  in  its  most 
general  form,  implies  simply  that  things  have 
come  to  be  as  they  are  through  a  sequence  of 
changes  undergone  in  the  past.  As  a  consequence, 
it  has  been  affirmed  that  "evolution"  is  just  the 
projection  of  the  idea  of  human  history  upon  the 
world  of  nature ;  but  the  restricted  sense  in  which 
this  notion  is  true  is  that  men  have  come  to  ob- 
serve the  phenomena  of  nature  in  a  time  relation 

[  124] 


METHOD    AND    RESULTS 

or  perspective.  If,  on  this  account,  the  student  of 
organic  nature  may  be  said  to  have  applied  the 
idea  of  human  history  to  his  own  subject-matter, 
he  has  in  no  sense  adopted  the  historian's  method. 
He  does  not  attempt  to  write  a  narrative  of  what 
has  happened  in  the  past.  In  fact,  it  is  not  open 
to  him  to  present  his  results  in  chronological 
form,  since  the  biological  record  is  entirely  lack- 
ing in  specific  dates  for  happenings.  From  this 
deficiency  most  important  consequences  have  en- 
sued, for,  on  the  one  hand,  the  evolutionist  has 
been  forced  to  devote  himself  to  the  investigation 
of  the  processes  of  history,  while,  on  the  other, 
in  presence  of  an  undated  record  he  has  assumed 
an  eventless  world. 

The  outcome  of  this  situation  is  apparent  in  the 
series  of  assumptions  upon  which  Darwin  based 
his  work.  In  a  thoroughly  scientific  spirit  he  set 
himself  to  discover  the  process  or  processes  mani- 
fested in  the  emergence  of  new  species.  Never- 
theless, accepting  the  authority  of  Sir  Charles 
Lyell,  he  began  by  assuming  that  "Time  is  to 
Nature  endless  and  as  nothing,"  and  from  this 
proceeded  to  his  second  assumption  that  new 
species  have  arisen  only  through  the  slow  cumu- 
lation of  infinitely  slight  modifications.  Further- 

[I2S] 


PROCESSES    OF    HISTORY 

more,  he  took  over  from  Lyell  the  methodologi- 
cal theory  that  we  must  interpret  the  past  history 
of  the  earth  and  its  inhabitants  by  the  present, 
that  we  must  seek  for  an  explanation  of  what  has 
happened  by  the  study  of  what  is  happening,  on 
the  assumption  that  the  processes  manifested 
have  never  been  different  in  kind  or  degree  from 
what  they  are  now.  Lastly,  he  believed  that  there 
had  been  but  one  process  involved  in  the  origin 
of  all  species,  that  of  "natural  selection." 
What  Darwin  attempted  was  to  describe,  as 
simply  and  directly  as  possible,  the  mode  by 
which,  in  one  particular  field  of  nature,  inter- 
actions result  in  something  new.  The  character 
of  his  theory  is  immediately  traceable  to  the  ab- 
sence of  specific  dates  in  the  historical  materials 
«pon  which  he  was  forced  to  rely;  had  dated  evi- 
dence been  available,  his  conception  of  unmarked 
time,  of  time  as  an  unbroken  flow,  could  not  have 
arisen.  It  follows  that,  having  dated  events  to 
work  from,  the  historian  of  man,  when  he  comes 
to  investigate  processes,  will  adopt  a  procedure 
widely  different  from  that  followed  by  Darwin 
and  his  contemporaries.  Instead  of  confining  his 
attention  to  the  present,  utilizing  the  facts  of  the 
past  for  purposes  of  verification  only,  he  will 

[126] 


METHOD   AND   RESULTS 


begin  by  examining  the  evidence  for  the  actual 
changes  that  have  taken  place.  Hence  the  pro- 
cedure v^hich  is  bound  up  with  the  conception 
that  the  present  is  the  key  to  the  past  will,  if  one 
might  so  say,  be  reversed,  and  "History"  will 
remain  the  study  of  the  past  with  a  view  to  the 
elucidation  of  the  processes  manifested  in  the 
present. 

2.  The  scientific  student  of  human  history  can- 
not accept  Darwin's  assumptions  and  procedure 
as  a  model  upon  which  to  pattern  his  inquiry,  but 
he  is  not  therefore  left  without  guidance.  An 
alternative  method  for  approaching  the  investi- 
gation of  how  things  have  come  to  be  as  they  are 
was  suggested  by  Huxley.  The  great  exponent 
of  Darwinism  pointed  out  that  any  hypothesis  of 
progressive  modification  must  take  into  consid- 
eration the  fact  of  persistence  without  progres- 
sion through  indefinite  periods,  and,  further- 
more, urged  upon  Darwin's  attention  the  pos- 
sibility of  occasional  "rapid  leaps"  or  changes  in 
nature.  In  short,  Huxley  recognized  three  differ- 
ent sets  of  processes  as  contributory  to  the  emer- 
gence of  the  present  status:  first,  those  repre- 
sented in  fixity,  stability,  or  persistence;  second, 
those  manifested  in  slow  continuous  modifica- 
[127] 


PROCESSES    OF    HISTORY 

tions;    and,    third,    those    revealed    in    explicit 
changes  or  events. 

In  later  discussion  the  elements  unrecognized 
by  Darwin  have  more  and  more  forced  them- 
selves into  the  foreground  of  debate,  and  have 
colored  the  views  held  by  all  investigators.  Thus 
De  Vries  supposed  that  after  periods  of  relative 
fixity,  during  which  they  are  subject  only  to 
fluctuating  variations,  living  beings  may  pass 
through  shorter  periods  when  their  forms  are 
abruptly  modified  in  different  directions  by  dis- 
continuous changes.  So,  too,  George  Darwin  ex- 
pressed the  opinion  that  the  study  of  stability  and 
instability  furnishes  the  problems  which  the 
physicist  and  biologist  alike  attempt  to  solve,  and 
he  envisaged  the  course  of  "evolution,"  not  as  uni- 
form and  slow,  but  as  divided  between  a  sequence 
of  slight  continuous  modifications  accumulating 
through  a  long  period,  and  somewhat  sudden 
transformations  which  would  appear  as  histori- 
cal events.  Again,  his  brother,  Francis  Darwin, 
regarded  "evolution,"  not  as  a  process  of  modi- 
fication, but  as  a  process  of  drilling  organisms 
into  habits,  and  thought  of  an  organism  as  a  ma- 
chine in  which  energy  can  be  set  free  by  some 
kind  of  releasing  mechanism.  This  latter  idea, 

[128] 


METHOD    AND    RESULTS 

as  will  appear  later,  has  been  carried  further  by 
William  Bateson,  who  also  believes  that  varia- 
tion occurs  as  a  definite  event,  and  that  we  can 
see  no  changes  in  progress  around  us  in  the  con- 
temporary world  which  can  be  imagined  likely 
to  culminate  in  the  evolution  of  forms  distinct 
in  the  larger  sense.  Finally,  not  to  multiply  in- 
stances unnecessarily,  the  essential  feature  of 
what  I  have  called  the  alternative  mode  of  ap- 
proach is  brought  out  by  Hans  Gadow  in  asking 
why  it  is  that  mammalian  material  can  produce 
what  is  denied  to  the  lower  classes.  Why  have 
they  not  all  by  this  time  reached  the  same  grade 
of  perfection?  "Because,"  he  says,  "every  new 
group  is  less  hampered  by  tradition,  much  of 
which  must  be  discarded  by  the  new  departure, 
and  some  of  its  energy  is  set  free  to  follow  up  this 
new  course,  straight,  with  ever-growing  results, 
until  in  its  turn  this  becomes  an  old  rut  out  of 
which  a  new  jolt  leads  once  more  into  fresh 
fields." 

In  the  study  of  man,  the  contemporaries  of  Dar- 
win maintained  a  tradition  of  evolutionary  in- 
quiry which  investigators  likeTylor  and  M'Len- 
nan  regarded  as  completely  independent  of  biol- 
ogy. This,  indeed,  is  evident  when  we  find  that 
[  129] 


PROCESSES    OF    HISTORY 

Tylor  considered  the  essential  points  for  inquiry 
to  be  "permanence,  modification,  and  survival." 
Maine  had  before  this  insisted  that  the  stable 
part  of  our  mental,  moral,  and  physical  consti- 
tution is  the  largest  part  of  it,  and  offers  a  resist- 
ance to  change  that  is  rarely  overcome.  Clifford, 
while  imbued  w^ith  the  newer  biological  concep- 
tions of  his  time,  instituted  a  contrast  between 
positive  and  negative  conditions  of  development: 
"a  race,"  he  says,  "in  proportion  as  it  is  plastic 
and  capable  of  change,  may  be  regarded  as  young 
and  vigorous,  while  a  race  which  is  fixed,  per- 
sistent in  form,  unable  to  change,  is  as  surely 
effete,  worn  out,  in  peril  of  extinction."  Bagehot, 
again,  who  wrote  his  Physics  and  Politics  to  il- 
lustrate the  application  of  the  principles  of 
"natural  selection"  and  "inheritance"  to  political 
society,  recurs  throughout  his  book  to  the  in- 
fluences which  have  made  nations  "stationary." 
He  sees  in  revolutions  the  outbreak  of  passions 
long  repressed  by  fixed  custom,  but  starting  into 
life  as  soon  as  that  repression  had  been  catas- 
trophically  removed.  Furthermore,  he  sets  a 
question  which  must  be  regarded  as  funda- 
mental: "If  fixity  is  an  invariable  ingredient  in 

[  130] 


METHOD    AND    RESULTS 


early  civilizations,  how  then  did  any  civilization 
become  unfixed?" 

It  is,  however,  in  the  study  of  the  history  of  lan- 
guage that  this  alternative  method  has  been  most 
clearly  defined.  So  Whitney,  whose  Life  and 
Growth  of  Language  may  be  regarded  as  the 
classic  presentation  of  this  subject  in  English, 
utilizes  explicitly  the  three  types  of  processes 
mentioned  above.  Thus,  while,  as  is  usual  in  the 
writings  of  philologists,  he  devotes  the  greater 
part  of  his  book  to  a  description  of  the  processes 
through  which  language  has  been  slowly  and 
continuously  modified  in  transmission  from  gen- 
eration to  generation,  he  calls  attention  to  the 
operation  of  processes  which  tend  to  maintain 
every  spoken  dialect  the  same  from  age  to  age, 
and  points,  as  in  a  third  category,  to  the  fact  that 
occasionally  whole  communities  have  been  led 
to  adopt  the  speech  of  another  people  as  a  result 
of  some  great  revolution.  Indeed,  it  may  be  said 
that,  so  far  as  method  is  concerned,  the  historical 
study  of  language  is  one  of  the  few  subjects  in 
the  whole  range  of  evolutionary  inquiry  that  has 
been  placed  upon  a  satisfactory  basis. 

Here  it  may  be  observed,  by  way  of  addendum, 
how  frequently  the  idea  has  been  expressed,  as 

[131] 


PROCESSES    OF    HISTORY 

by  Bagehot  and  L.  H.  Morgan,  that  portions  of 
the  human  race  have  been  halted  at  certain  stages 
of  progress.  Henry  Balfour,  for  example,  is  of 
opinion  that  the  heterogeneity  of  groups  may 
readily  be  explained  by  assuming  that  while  the 
progress  of  some  races  has  received  relatively 
little  check,  the  culture  development  of  others 
has  been  retarded  to  a  greater  or  less  extent. 
Hocart,  again,  attributes  "stagnation"  to  the  fail- 
ure of  some  factor  or  factors  (described  by  him 
as  "constant  in  their  operation")  which  make  for 
continuous  progression.  This  point  of  view,  how- 
ever, embodies  the  assumption  that  "progress" 
is  to  be  anticipated,  an  opinion  which  Maine  was 
at  pains  to  controvert,  and  which  is  in  no  way 
justified  by  the  evidence.  "Progress"  is  excep- 
tional; hence  our  first  concern  must  be  with  the 
processes,  which  are  universal  in  their  operation, 
that  make  for  fixity  and  stagnation.  Having  de- 
termined what  these  processes  are,  it  will  then  be 
possible  to  observe  the  influences  of  other  pro- 
cesses through  which  modification  and  change 
are  brought  about. 

3.  Before  proceeding  further,  there  is,  however, 
a  point  of  some  importance  which  must  be  dealt 
with  parenthetically.  Expressed  in  the  simplest 

[  132] 


METHOD    AND    RESULTS 

terms,  this  may  be  stated  in  the  question :  What 
are  the  limits  of  humanistic  inquiry?  The  query 
must  be  faced,  for  humanists  in  all  branches  of 
the  study  of  man  seem  to  feel  it  necessary  to  base 
their  discussions  upon  what  they  conceive  to  be 
the  conclusions  of  modern  biology.  In  this  way 
the  unavoidable  difficulties  of  the  study  of  man 
have  been  needlessly  complicated,  and  the  stu- 
dent involves  himself  in  debates  over  highly 
technical  matters  with  which  he  is  not  compe- 
tent to  deal.  Every  science  involves,  as  a  funda- 
mental condition  of  its  pursuit,  the  conscious  re- 
striction of  attention  to  a  particular  set  of  facts, 
and  the  success  of  any  scientific  undertaking 
turns  upon  the  consistency  and  definiteness  with 
which  this  initial  restriction  is  observed.  For 
scientific  purposes,  every  investigation  must  be 
confined  within  definite  limits;  no  science  pre- 
tends to  deal  with  the  whole  complex  of  natural 
phenomena,  and  in  the  study  of  man  there  are 
obvious  reasons  why  the  field  of  inquiry  should 
be  limited  wherever  possible. 
The  problem  before  us  is  to  find  out  how  man 
has  come  to  be  as  he  is  everywhere  throughout 
the  world  today.  The  fundamental  restriction 
upon  the  limits  of  the  inquiry  is  that  the  hu- 

[  133] 


PROCESSES    OF    HISTORY 
manist  will  accept  man  "as  given,"  and  leave  all 
questions  as  to  his  origin  and  physical  differences 
to  the  biologist. 

While,  at  first  sight,  this  may  appear  a  radical 
departure,  there  is  ample  justification  for  the 
step,  over  and  above  the  fact  that  neither  the 
biologist  nor  the  humanist  is  in  a  position  to  deal 
successfully  with  the  entire  field.  There  is,  in 
short,  an  important  body  of  evidence  which  in- 
dicates the  "psychic  unity  of  mankind."  A  typi- 
cal example  may  be  found  in  the  remarks  of 
Stefansson  on  the  Eskimo:  "Commonly,"  he 
says,  "primitive  people  are  supposed  to  have  cer- 
tain mental  qualities,  designated  as  instinctive, 
through  which  they  vastly  excel  us  along  certain 
lines ;  and  to  make  up  for  this  excellence  they  are 
supposed  to  be  far  our  inferiors  in  certain  other 
mental  characteristics.  My  own  observations  in- 
cline me  to  believe  that  there  are  no  points  in 
which  they,  as  a  race,  are  any  more  inferior  to  us 
than  might  be  expected  from  the  environment 
under  which  they  have  grown  up  from  child- 
hood ;  and  neither  have  they  any  points  of  supe- 
riority over  the  white  man,  except  those  which 
are  developed  directly  by  the  environment.  Of 
course  an  Eskimo  can  find  his  way  about  in  the 

[134] 


METHOD    AND    RESULTS 

wilderness  better  than  the  city  dweller  or  the 
sailor,  but  he  is  likely  to  fall  behind  the  white 
man  of  experience  in  just  about  the  proportion 
you  would  expect,  from  knowing  the  greater  ad- 
vantage of  training  in  logical  thinking  which  the 
white  man  has  had."  Similarly,  writing  of  the 
Sea  Dyaks  of  Borneo,  Gomes  says:  "Allowing 
for  differences  in  environment,  and  consequent 
difference  of  similes,  the  idea  expressed  in  many 
Dyak  proverbs  is  precisely  similar  to  that  of 
some  well  known  among  the  English."  "The 
radical  fundamental  thoughts  and  passions  of 
mankind  all  over  the  world,  in  every  age,  are 
much  the  same." 

Judgments  such  as  these  may  be  found  in  the 
reports  of  observers  in  every  part  of  the  world, 
and  the  general  view  expressed  is  widely  ac- 
cepted by  anthropologists.  It  is  entirely  possible 
that  the  obvious  physical  differences  between 
men  may  be  accompanied  by  corresponding 
psychical  difTferences,  but  even  admitting  that 
there  are  congenital  differences  in  "races,"  and 
that  the  influences  of  these  differences  may  ulti- 
mately become  an  important  study,  in  our  present 
state  of  ignorance  these  differences  are  negligible 

quantities,  and  man  may  be  treated  as  an  un- 

[■3S] 


PROCESSES    OF   HISTORY 

changing  quantity.  The  opinion  of  anthropolo- 
gists coincides,  in  general,  with  that  of  psycholo- 
gists like  McDougall,  who  thinks  that  the  pri- 
mary innate  tendencies,  which  are  the  essential 
springs  of  motive  powers  of  all  thought  and 
action,  are  common  to  men  of  every  race  and  of 
every  age.  So  investigators  widely  separated  in 
their  immediate  interests  reach  the  same  conclu- 
sion, namely,  that  we  have  every  reason  to  think 
that  the  mind  of  the  savage  and  the  mind  of  the 
civilized  are  fundamentally  alike.  "There  can 
be  no  doubt,"  Boas  states,  "that  in  the  main  the 
mental  characteristics  of  man  are  the  same  all 
over  the  world."  "The  working  of  the  human 
mind,"  Gomme  believes,  "is  on  the  same  plane 
wherever  and  whenever  it  operates  or  has  op- 
erated." 

It  must  be  admitted,  however,  that  even  this 
unanimity  does  not  remove  all  possibility  of 
question  or  debate,  and  therefore  it  is  that  we 
accept  Morgan's  axiom  of  "the  specific  identity 
of  the  brain  of  all  the  races  of  mankind,"  and 
Temple's  "law  of  the  constancy  of  human  rea- 
soning," not  as  self-evident  or  demonstrated 
truths,  but  as  methodological  assumptions  set  up 
for  the  purposes  of  a  particular  investigation. 

[136] 


METHOD    AND    RESULTS 

We  delimit  our  field  by  taking  man  "as  given," 
by  assuming  that  all  human  groups  have  started 
from  the  same  level,  that  in  every  case  the  same 
capacity  for  "advancement"  has  been  present, 
that  man  is,  and  has  been,  very  much  the  same 
all  the  world  over. 
4.  Turning,  then,  to  consider  the  processes 
manifested  in  fixity  or  stagnation,  we  may  ob- 
serve that  the  mental  activity  of  any  individual 
is  conditioned  at  every  step  by  the  idea-system 
of  which  he  stands  possessed.  Now,  at  bottom, 
this  conditioning  body  of  ideas  is  not  a  product 
of  the  individual's  own  activity,  but  is  imparted 
to  him  by  the  group  into  which  he  is  born,  and 
in  which  he  is  brought  up.  Every  individual 
comes  into  existence  in  association  with  some 
group,  and  is  subjected  from  the  commencement 
of  his  career  to  a  discipline  or  drilling  in  the 
modes  of  thinking,  feeling,  and  acting  of  the 
group.  Thus  at  the  foundation  of  his  life  there 
lies  a  great  body  of  conclusions,  motives,  and 
customs  for  which  he  is  in  no  manner  responsible, 
but  in  accordance  with  which  his  behavior  is  un- 
consciously regulated.  "He  accepts  from  the 
group,"  as  Brinton  says,  "the  ideas,  conclusions, 
and  opinions  common  to  it,  and  the  motives  of 
[  137] 


PROCESSES    OF    HISTORY 

volition,  such  as  customs  and  rules  of  conduct, 
which  it  collectively  sanctions." 

This  normal  condition  of  dependence  is  most 
easily  discernible  in  the  case  of  primitive  man, 
for  the  lower  we  descend  in  the  scale  of  civiliza- 
tion the  more  strictly,  to  all  appearance,  is  the 
individual  controlled  by  the  group  of  which  he 
forms  a  part.  Indeed,  the  savage  is  completely 
hedged  about  by  conventions,  at  once  minute  and 
obligatory,  the  violation  of  which  is  attended  by 
drastic  penalties.  Hence,  as  McDougall  remarks, 
"in  primitive  societies  the  precision  of  the  cus- 
tomary code  and  the  exact  coincidence  of  public 
opinion  with  the  code,  allow  no  occasion  for 
deliberation  upon  conduct,  no  scope  for  indi- 
vidual judgment  and  choice."  "We  see  the  same 
result  among  all  savage  communities  still  exist- 
ing on  the  earth,  and  among  all  peoples  of  whom 
we  have  any  record  at  the  dawn  of  civilization. 
Their  actions,  whether  individual  or  collective, 
are  hampered,  controlled,  or  enforced  at  every 
step  by  custom."  It  is,  unquestionably,  due  to  this 
rigid  enforcement  of  custom  that  the  lower 
groups  have  remained  for  long  periods  of  time 
in  a  fixed  or  stationary  condition,  that  their  man- 

[•38] 


METHOD    AND    RESULTS 

ners,  customs,  and  modes  of  life  have  continued 
almost  unaltered  for  generations. 

While,  however,  the  discipline  of  the  individ- 
ual by  the  group  may  be  more  immediately  ap- 
parent in  groups  less  advanced  than  our  own,  the 
same  process  is  visibly  operative  in  modern  life. 
For,  indeed,  what  we  mean  by  "civilization"  and 
"culture"  is  neither  more  nor  less  than  the  store 
of  ideas,  beliefs,  conventional  opinions,  and 
tastes  which  is  transmitted  from  each  generation 
to  the  next,  and  into  which  each  member  of  the 
community  is  inducted  by  his  elders.  And  while 
the  modern  teacher,  but  recently  become  self- 
conscious  of  his  function,  has  much  to  say  of  the 
responsibility  of  the  community  for  the  "educa- 
tion" of  the  child,  there  has  been,  as  Cook  re- 
marks, a  pretty  successful  education  of  the  race 
from  the  days  of  primitive  prehistoric  man.  It  is 
but  formulating  the  practice  of  the  ages  to  say 
that  the  resources  of  government  and  law,  reli- 
gion and  morality,  must  be  enlisted  to  constrain 
the  individual  in  order  to  procure  a  common 
likeness  in  impulses,  habits,  and  ideas  within  the 
group. 

It  follows  from  this  unsought  initiation  into  the 
idea-system  of  his  ancestors  that,  even  in  the  most 

[  139] 


PROCESSES    OF    HISTORY 

backward  group,  the  individual  enters  upon  life 
at  a  relatively  high  stage  of  human  advancement; 
he  stands  upon  a  platform  which  has  been  labo- 
riously constructed  by  his  unremembered  prede- 
cessors. At  the  same  time,  it  must  be  recognized 
that,  even  in  the  most  advanced  groups,  this  in- 
itiation imposes  severe  limitations.  At  best,  the 
platform  is  narrow;  and  the  individual  acquires 
habits  of  thought  and  a  fixity  of  ideas  which  ren- 
der him  unduly  tenacious  of  what  has  been  incul- 
cated in  him,  and  unduly  suspicious  and  obsti- 
nate in  presence  of  what  may  appear  to  him  to  be 
different  or  new.  While,  then,  the  educative  dis- 
cipline tends  to  preserve  what  has  been  acquired, 
it  presents  a  very  real  obstacle  to  further  advance. 
In  face  of  this  consideration,  the  theory  com- 
monly expressed,  that  "the  inheritance  of  the 
permanent  achievements  of  one  generation  by  the 
next  is  the  main  factor  of  progress,"  that,  in  fact, 
human  advancement  has  been  due  to  the  mainte- 
nance of  tradition,  to  the  drilling  through  which 
the  individual  has  been  put  in  possession  of  the 
acquisitions  of  the  group,  will  be  seen  to  express 
but  a  partial  truth,  for  if  this  process  had  been 
the  only  one  in  operation  advancement  would, 
manifestly,  have  been  impossible.  What,  how- 

[  140] 


METHOD    AND    RESULTS 

ever,  we  have  in  this  process  of  group  discipline 
is  the  fundamental  element  to  be  considered  in 
any  attempt  to  show  how  man  everywhere  has 
come  to  be  as  he  is  today.  This  it  is  that  produces 
that  condition  of  sameness,  stagnation,  fixity,  and 
persistence  which  has  been  dwelt  upon  by  all 
who  have  had  occasion  to  speak  of  backward 
peoples,  lower  classes,  and  illiterate  individuals. 
The  operation  of  this  process  tends  to  the  mainte- 
nance of  the  idea-system  of  the  group  or  indi- 
vidual as  it  exists  at  any  given  moment,  and  the 
study  of  man  involves,  as  its  next  step,  an  inquiry 
as  to  how  modifications  and  changes  in  idea- 
systems  have  been,  and  still  are,  brought  about. 

5.  Under  actual  conditions  this  fixity  of  ideas  is 
never  complete,  and  in  all  human  groups  there 
may  be  observed  in  operation  certain  processes 
through  which  idea-systems  are  being  slowly  but 
continuously  modified. 

The  processes  of  modification  are  of  various 
types  and  these  are  of  varying  degrees  of  in- 
fluence. In  the  first  place,  we  may  readily  see  that 
while  the  initial  discipline  of  any  two  individ- 
uals may  proceed  along  the  same  lines,  and  while 
their  lives  may  be  led  in  the  same  surroundings, 
their  experiences  in  life  will  never  be  identical, 

[141] 


PROCESSES    OF    HISTORY 


and  in  maturity  their  responses  to  any  given  ex- 
citation will  not  be  exactly  the  same.  The  differ- 
ence of  response  will  be  all  the  greater  if  the  lives 
of  the  two  men  have  been  passed  in  different  cir- 
cumstances. Again,  while  every  member  of  a 
primitive  group  is  drilled  in  its  traditional  ob- 
servances and  customs,  the  performance  of  these 
obligatory  acts  cannot  be  identically  transmitted 
from  generation  to  generation;  unconsciously 
and  unobserved,  modifications  will  creep  in. 
This  is  true  even  in  respect  to  verbal  formulae, 
the  value  of  which  is  believed  to  reside  in  their 
exact  repetition,  for  here,  in  addition  to  the  pos- 
sible treacheries  of  memory,  the  reproduction 
will  be  affected  by  the  unceasing  modifications  in 
the  use  of  words.  Language,  indeed,  provides  in 
itself  a  perfect  illustration  of  the  fact  that  use 
entails  wear,  and  it  is  in  language  that  the  pro- 
cesses of  modification  have  been  most  carefully 
observed. 

Furthermore,  while  it  is  taken  for  granted  that 
men  are  very  much  the  same  all  the  world  over, 
this  is  not  to  be  taken  to  mean  that  all  men  are 
identical.  They  are  the  same  on  the  average, 
which  implies  that  with  reference  to  any  given 
characteristic  or  faculty  a  certain  percentage  of 

[  142] 


METHOD    AND    RESULTS 

the  individuals  in  a  group  will  be  above  and 
below  the  mean.  It  follows,  for  example,  that  in 
any  group  there  will  be  some  individuals  of 
greater  personal  initiative  than  the  majority  of 
their  fellows.  These  undoubtedly  will  have  an  in- 
fluence, but  what  is  frequently  overlooked  is  that 
the  mental  equipment,  the  idea-system,  of  such 
individuals,  however  gifted  they  may  be,  is 
strictly  that  of  the  group  to  which  they  belong. 
For  more  than  one  reason,  indeed,  no  "genius" 
can  make  any  great  departure  from  the  idea- 
system  of  his  people;  the  individual  may  in- 
fluence the  group,  but  such  modifications  as  he 
may  succeed  in  introducing  will  proceed  along 
established  lines,  and  so  cannot  be  regarded  as 
significant  "changes." 

It  is  evident,  then,  that  the  idea-systems  of  all 
groups  are  subject  to  slow  continuous  modifica- 
tion through  the  operation  of  processes  which 
may  be  described  as  internal  or  self-contained. 
They  are  also  modified  in  varying  degrees  by 
"the  contact  of  peoples."  This  term  has  acquired 
a  special  significance  in  recent  years  as  identified 
with  the  hypothesis — based  upon  the  ethno- 
graphical study  of  the  distribution  of  culture 
objects,  designs,  and  practices — that  the  present 

[  H3  ] 


PROCESSES    OF    HISTORY 

status  of  any  group  is  to  be  explained  in  terms  of 
the  transmission  of  culture  elements  from  one 
group  to  another.  It  may  at  once  be  said  that  this 
hypothesis  describes  a  process,  practically  uni- 
versal in  its  application,  which  has  been  of  the 
greatest  importance  in  the  gradual  modification 
of  idea-systems,  but  one,  on  the  other  hand, 
which  cannot  be  accepted  as  providing  an  expla- 
nation of  the  phenomenon  of  "advance." 
To  make  this  distinction  clear,  it  is  necessary  to 
consider  that  the  process  of  modification  by  ex- 
terior contact  has  many  phases.  A  simple  form 
may  be  instanced  in  the  interchange  of  objects 
between  contiguous  groups,  and  by  this  means 
culture  objects  may  be  dispersed  over  great  dis- 
tances by  a  series  of  border  exchanges,  without 
the  coincident  transportation  of  individuals. 
An  extension  of  this  phase  comes  when  the  ob- 
jects or  practices  are  carried  from  one  group  to 
another  by  traders,  missionaries,  or  other  trav- 
ellers; and  one  has  but  to  consider  the  spread  of 
the  megalithic  monuments  to  recognize  the  an- 
tiquity of  this  mode  of  influence.  Another  stage 
is  reached  when  traders,  like  the  Cretans,  Phoe- 
nicians, and  Greeks,  establish  themselves  among 
alien  peoples;  and  the  furthest  step  on  these  lines 

[  144] 


METHOD    AND    RESULTS 

is  taken  when  backward  groups  are  brought 
under  subjection  by  others  of  superior  culture, 
as  when  the  inhabitants  of  Iberia  and  Gaul  were 
conquered  by  the  Romans,  or  those  of  Mexico 
and  Peru  by  Spain.  Now,  without  question,  an 
influence  is  exerted  in  all  these  cases  on  the  idea- 
system  of  the  recipient  group,  but  this  influence 
is  by  no  means  subversive  of  the  idea-system  af- 
fected. The  new  elements  enter  into  the  old  sys- 
tem, modifying  and  being  in  turn  modified  by  it, 
but  do  not  effect  its  disintegration;  for,  although 
any  idea-system  is  a  co-ordinated  whole,  separate 
new  ideas  may  be  taken  over  gradually  to  an 
almost  unlimited  extent  without  affecting  its 
predominant  characteristics.  This  is  notably  the 
case  where  material  objects  or  mechanical  inven- 
tions are  concerned,  and  the  introduction  of  the 
horse  and  gun  no  more  revolutionized  the  Amer- 
ican Indian's  ways  of  thinking  and  acting  than 
the  telephone  and  aeroplane  have  upset  our  own 
conventionalized  philosophy  of  life.  A  small 
body  of  immigrants  may  thus  have  an  influence 
on  the  recipient  group  out  of  all  proportion  to 
their  number,  and  it  would  be  wholly  impossible 
to  understand  the  present  condition  of  mankind 
[145] 


PROCESSES    OF   HISTORY 

without  taking  the  process  of  modification  by 
contact  into  consideration. 

Nevertheless,  when  we  turn  to  apply  this  pro- 
cess to  the  special  problem  of  advancement — 
exemplified  concretely  in  the  European  civiliza- 
tion of  the  present — it  affords  no  direct  explana- 
tory assistance.  The  reason  is  not  far  to  seek,  for 
while  the  contact  process  may  tend,  theoreti- 
cally, to  bring  all  groups  to  the  level  of  the  high- 
est, it  cannot  serve  to  place  any  one  group  far  in 
advance  of  the  rest.  Even  supposing  that  the  in- 
truding few,  like  the  British  in  India,  could  raise 
the  recipient  many  to  a  level  with  themselves 
(which  may  be  regarded  as  an  impossibility), 
this  would  not  raise  the  status  of  the  more  ad- 
vanced group  to  which  the  intruders  belong.  We 
may  say,  therefore,  that,  in  the  endeavor  to  dis- 
cover how  men  everywhere  have  come  to  be  as 
they  are  today,  we  must  take  into  account  the 
operation  of  a  whole  series  of  modifying  pro- 
cesses, but  we  must  admit  further  that  these 
processes  do  not  provide  an  explanation  of  the 
emergence  of  higher  idea-systems. 

6.  In  approaching  the  problem  of  "change,"  it 
is  above  all  things  important  that  the  investigator 
should  be  on  his  guard  against  the  widely  dis- 

[146] 


METHOD    AND    RESULTS 

seminated  idea  that  human  advancement  has 
been  due  to  human  volition.  We  must  beware  of 
projecting  ourselves  and  our  modern  intellectual 
interests  into  the  past,  and  of  imagining  ourselves 
freed  from  the  limitations  under  which,  as  we 
are  quite  ready  to  admit,  our  forefathers  labored. 
The  exercise  of  the  will  is  not  a  recent  acquire- 
ment, and  today,  as  formerly,  men  are  largely 
unconscious  of  the  factors  and  processes  that  lie 
back  of  their  most  consciously  determined  reso- 
lutions. No  theory  of  advancement  that  is  based 
upon  a  supposed  desire  for  betterment  can  be 
accepted  as  explanatory  of  how  man  has  come 
to  be  as  he  is.  Primitive  man  is  not  engaged  in  a 
struggle  to  emancipate  himself  from  tradition; 
his  efforts  are  not  directed  to  the  inauguration 
of  change,  but  to  the  maintenance  of  the  existing 
status — and  it  takes  some  radical  upheaval  to 
disturb  his  confidence  in  his  own  ways.  Again, 
despite  the  prepossessions  we  unconsciously  ab- 
sorb from  an  acquaintance  with  biological  dis- 
cussions, we  must  avoid  the  assumption  that 
human  history  displays  any  such  regular  and 
even  process  of  change  as  is  postulated  in  the 
Darwinian  conception  of  "evolution."  This  sup- 
position leads  inevitably  to  theories  of  slow  un- 

[147] 


PROCESSES    OF    HISTORY 

broken  progress  directed  towards  some  determin- 
able end,  but  the  evidence  before  us  provides  no 
basis  for  optimistic  philosophizing.  What  we 
find  actually  throughout  the  course  of  history  are 
the  unmistakable  results  of  constant  processes 
manifested  in  fixity  or  persistence,  tempered  by 
other  processes  which  gradually  efifect  a  modi- 
fication of  this  rigidity.  In  addition  to  these  two 
sets  of  processes,  however,  there  is  abundant  evi- 
dence of  the  fact  that  at  different  times  and  in 
different  places  certain  events  have  led  to  signifi- 
cant changes  in  the  groups  affected,  and  that 
these  changes  stand  in  direct  relation  to  the  phe- 
nomenon of  "advance." 

Investigation  in  different  fields  of  the  study  of 
man  has  led  many  contemporary  scholars — 
Petrie,  Haddon,  Rivers,  Mackinder,  Hogarth, 
Myres,  Temple,  Balfour,  Smith,  Hall,  Jastrow, 
Sollas,  to  mention  but  a  few — to  observe  that 
human  advancement  has  followed  upon  the  col- 
lision of  different  groups.  Pieced  together,  the 
conclusions  arrived  at  so  far  may  be  summarized 
in  the  statement  that  definite  advance  has  taken 
place  in  the  past  when  a  group,  forced  from  its 
habitat,  ultimately  by  a  change  in  climate,  has 
been  brought  into  collision  with  another  differ- 

[148] 


METHOD   AND    RESULTS 

ing  from  it  considerably  in  culture,  and  has  re- 
mained upon  the  invaded  territory.  It  is  prob- 
able that  this  statement  as  a  whole  would  not  re- 
ceive unquestioned  support  from  all  those  who 
have  contributed  to  it  in  part;  on  the  other  hand, 
it  is  to  be  understood  that  the  palaeontologist, 
geographer,  anthropologist,  archaeologist,  or 
historian,  as  the  case  may  be,  has  arrived  at  his 
conclusion,  one  may  say,  incidentally,  and  has 
not  turned  aside  from  the  matter  in  hand  to  give 
this  generalization  independent  consideration. 
Thus  in  any  given  instance  it  might  be  sufficient 
to  say  that  "the  dispossession  by  a  newcomer  of 
a  race  already  in  occupation  of  the  soil  has 
marked  an  upward  step  in  the  intellectual  prog- 
ress of  mankind,"  without  pursuing  the  question 
further.  As  a  consequence,  the  conclusions,  even 
in  the  consolidated  form  here  given,  have  not 
been  carried  to  a  point  at  which  they  might  con- 
stitute an  hypothesis  explanatory  of  human  ad- 
vancement. 

Indeed,  it  is  only  when  we  take  a  further  step, 
and  come  to  ask  how  conceivably  usurpation  of 
territory,  or  war,  or  admixture  of  peoples  could 
affect  intellectual  advancement,  that  the  under- 
lying problem  is  brought  to  light.  It  cannot  well 

[  149] 


PROCESSES    OF    HISTORY 

be  assumed  that  either  the  intermarriage  of  dif- 
ferent stocks  or  the  struggle  of  battle  will  of  itself 
bring  about  this  result;  and  while  it  is  said  that 
"if  you  would  change  a  man's  opinions — trans- 
plant him,"  it  does  not  follow  that  the  change 
will  be  effected  by  the  scenery.  In  short,  the 
"change"  that  leads  to  advancement  is  mental. 
What,  then,  is  of  importance  to  notice  is  that 
when  enforced  migration  is  followed  by  collision, 
and  this  by  the  alien  occupation  of  territory, 
there  ensues  as  a  result  of  the  conflict  the  break- 
ing down  or  subversion  of  the  established  idea- 
systems  of  the  groups  involved  in  the  struggle. 
The  breakdown  of  the  old  and  unquestioned  sys- 
tem of  ideas,  though  it  may  be  felt  as  a  public 
calamity  and  a  personal  loss,  accomplishes  the 
release  of  the  individual  mind  from  the  set  forms 
in  which  it  has  been  drilled,  and  leaves  men  op- 
portunity to  build  up  a  system  for  themselves 
anew.  This  new  idea-system  will  certainly  con- 
tain old  elements,  but  it  will  not  be  like  the  old, 
for  the  consolidated  group,  confronted  with  con- 
flicting bodies  of  knowledge,  of  observances,  and 
of  interpretations,  will  experience  a  critical 
awakening,  and  open  wondering  eyes  upon  a  new 
world.  Thus  it  is  not  the  physical  contact  of  men 

[150] 


METHOD    AND    RESULTS 

that  is  of  supreme  importance  in  human  advance- 
ment, but  the  overthrow  of  the  dominance  of  the 
traditional  system  in  which  the  individuals  com- 
posing the  group  have  been  trained,  and  which 
they  have  unconditionally  accepted;  though  ad- 
vancement seems  rarely  to  have  been  possible,  in 
the  past,  save  when  diverse  groups  have  been  set 
face  to  face  in  desperate  struggle. 

Here,  then,  is  a  process  which  differs  essentially 
from  those  previously  described,  for  it  is  mani- 
fested only  when  some  exterior  disturbance  or 
shock  has,  for  the  time  being,  weakened  or  over- 
come the  influence  or  effect  of  the  previously 
described  processes;  when  manifested,  however, 
this  process  is  the  same  in  all  cases.  The  hypothe- 
sis required  may  now  be  stated  in  the  form  that 
human  advancement  follows  upon  the  mental 
release,  of  the  members  of  a  group  or  of  a  single 
individual,  from  the  authority  of  an  established 
system  of  ideas.  This  release  has,  in  the  past,  been 
occasioned  through  the  breaking  down  of  pre- 
vious idea-systems  by  prolonged  struggles  be- 
tween opposing  groups  which  have  been  brought 
into  conflict  as  a  result  of  the  involuntary  move- 
ments of  peoples.  What  follows  is  the  building 
up  of  a  new  idea-system,  which  is  not  a  simple 

[151] 


PROCESSES    OF    HISTORY 

cumulation  of  the  knowledge  previously  ac- 
cepted, but  the  product  of  critical  activity  stirred 
by  the  perception  of  conflicting  elements  in  the 
opposed  idea-systems. 

7.  The  foregoing  statement  describes  only  in 
the  most  general  terms  the  processes  manifested 
in  human  history,  and  should  be  regarded  merely 
as  indicating  directions  in  which  investigation  is 
required,  for,  as  must  be  readily  apparent,  each 
of  these  sets  of  processes  demands  careful  analy- 
sis. While  this  further  analysis  will  not  be  con- 
tinued here,  it  is  of  some  importance  for  us  to 
arrive  at  an  understanding  as  to  the  means  which 
may  be  employed  to  verify  the  results  obtained. 

It  was  stated  earlier  that  any  theory  of  how  man 
has  come  to  be  as  he  is  must  be  applicable  to  all 
human  groups,  ''backward"  as  well  as  "ad- 
vanced"; must  apply  to  the  "backward"  and 
"advanced"  members  of  all  groups,  and  hence 
must  apply  to  the  experience  of  the  individual 
in  the  world  today.  It  follows,  therefore,  that  the 
processes  indicated  above  are  operative  in  our 
several  individual  lives,  and,  consequently,  that 
the  accuracy  of  the  description  may  be  tested  by 
each  investigator  from  the  resources  of  his  own 
personal  observation.  This,  it  must  be  clearly 

[152] 


METHOD    AND    RESULTS 

understood,  does  not  mean  that  the  individual  is 
in  a  position  to  discover  the  processes  manifested 
in  history  through  introspection;  it  does  mean, 
on  the  other  hand,  that,  when  results  have  been 
arrived  at  through  the  scientific  study  of  the  past, 
these  results  may  be  verified  by  reference  to  what 
is  going  on  within  and  around  us  in  the  present. 
Thus,  for  example,  if  we  consider  the  processes 
manifested  in  the  fixity  and  persistence  of  idea- 
systems  and  ways  of  doing  things,  no  one  can  be 
at  a  loss  to  discern  the  influence  upon  himself  of 
the  community  in  which  he  has  grown  up.  From 
the  beginning  of  life  each  one  of  us  has  been  sub- 
jected to  a  discipline  by  those  surrounding  us 
which  has  determined  and  defined  the  avenues 
open  to  us  for  self-assertion  or  individual  pur- 
posive activity.  Again,  each  one  of  us  is  conscious 
of  explicit  restrictions  in  mental  activity  due  to 
the  particular  selection  of  information  and  ideas 
which  has  been  imparted  to  him  at  the  outset  of 
his  career;  the  mental  equipment  which  each  one 
receives  represents  only  a  limited  selection  from 
the  whole  body  of  knowledge  at  the  command  of 
the  group,  and  yet  this  selection,  which  under 
any  other  circumstances  whatever  would  have 

[153] 


PROCESSES    OF    HISTORY 

been  different,  has  been,   and  must  remain,   a 
dominant  factor  in  our  lives. 

Notwithstanding  the  tenacity  with  which  we 
cling  to  mental  habits  once  acquired,  our  ideas 
and  ways  of  doing  things  are  continually  under- 
going modification,  the  actuality  of  which  we 
may  also  verify  by  direct  observation.  Indeed, 
this  process  is  particularly  noticeable  in  ad- 
vanced groups,  for  in  these,  while  group  disci- 
pline is  effective  in  maintaining  a  certain  uni- 
formity in  external  behavior,  the  idea-systems  of 
individuals  vary  within  wide  limits.  This  varia- 
bility is  due,  primarily,  to  the  vast  extent  of  the 
intellectual  heritage  of  modern  groups.  Among 
ourselves,  the  body  of  knowledge  immediately 
available  is  so  great  that  its  complete  transmission 
to  any  individual  is  wholly  unthinkable.  It  fol- 
lows that,  in  modern  groups,  the  participation 
of  the  individual  in  the  group  idea-system  is  ir- 
regular and  incomplete,  and  that  under  actual 
conditions  each  member  of  a  given  community 
acquires  a  personal  system  of  ideas  which  differs 
considerably  from  that  of  his  fellows,  though 
drawn  from  the  same  source.  As  a  consequence, 
the  contact  of  individuals,  being  accompanied  by 
the  interchange  of  differing  personal  views,  leads 

[154] 


METHOD   AND    RESULTS 

to  a  continual  criticism  and  modification  of  our 
outlook  upon  the  world;  and,  indeed,  the  atti- 
tude which  we  regard  as  specifically  character- 
istic of  members  of  advanced  groups  is  a  wide 
tolerance  of  these  differences  in  ideas,  and  a  con- 
scious admission  of  the  merely  tentative  validity 
of  our  most  cherished  convictions. 

Every  individual,  then,  may  verify  from  his 
own  experience  the  actuality  of  the  processes 
which  are  manifested,  first,  in  the  persistence, 
and,  second,  in  the  slow  modification  of  ideas  and 
ways  of  doing  things,  but  the  case  is  different 
when  we  come  to  consider  the  processes  and  fac- 
tors of  change  and  advance.  As  we  have  seen, 
change  ensues  upon  a  condition  of  relative  fixity 
through  the  interposition  of  shock  or  disturbance 
induced  by  some  exterior  incident.  Now,  while, 
historically,  advancement  has  been  dependent 
upon  the  collision  of  groups,  the  resultant  re- 
sponse has  taken  place  in  the  minds  of  individ- 
uals, and  so  we  are  led  to  see  that  all  transitional 
eras  are  alike  in  being  periods  of  individual  men- 
tal awakening,  and  of  the  release  or  emancipa- 
tion of  individual  initiative  in  thought  and  ac- 
tion. This  applies  equally  whether  we  consider 
the  past  or  the  present,  and,  consequently,  since 

[155] 


PROCESSES    OF    HISTORY 

the  antecedents  of  advance  are  realized  only  in 
exceptional  cases,  we  are  forced  to  rely,  for  the 
verification  we  are  now  discussing,  upon  the  tes- 
timony of  exceptional  individuals.  That  the  his- 
torical process  of  individualization  of  thought  is 
also  the  form  through  which  advancement  pro- 
ceeds today  would  best  be  shown  by  an  extended 
examination  of  the  biographies  of  notable  men, 
but  for  the  present  we  may  accept  the  evidence 
adduced  by  psychologists  and  other  investigators 
who  have  already  called  attention  to  the  facts. 

In  reality,  there  is  nothing  abstruse  about  the 
processes  involved,  for,  primarily,  as  S.  A.  Cook 
has  pointed  out,  we  hold  ideas  simply  because 
nothing  has  occurred  to  disturb  them ;  the  fact  is, 
in  the  words  of  Sir  Oliver  Lodge,  that  unless  we 
encounter  flaw  or  jar  or  change,  nothing  in  us 
responds.  So  Bateson,  seeking  for  an  alternative 
to  the  method  of  Darwin,  has  proposed  to  "con- 
sider how  far  we  can  get  by  the  process  of  re- 
moval of  what  we  may  call  'epistatic'  factors,  in 
other  words  those  that  control,  mask,  or  suppress 
underlying  powers  and  faculties."  "I  have  con- 
fidence," he  says  in  the  course  of  this  inquiry, 
"that  the  artistic  gifts  of  mankind  will  prove  to 
be  due  not  to  something  added  to  the  make-up  of 

[156] 


METHOD    AND    RESULTS 

an  ordinary  man,  but  to  the  absence  of  factors 
which  in  the  ordinary  person  inhibit  the  devel- 
opment of  those  gifts.  They  are  almost  beyond 
doubt  to  be  looked  upon  as  releases  of  powers 
normally  suppressed."  It  is,  however,  in  the  later 
writings  of  William  James  that  the  subject  re- 
ceives fullest  consideration.  Reviewing  Herbert 
Spencer's  Autobiography,  he  says,  "Mr.  Spencer 
himself  is  a  great  social  force.  The  effects  he 
exerts  are  of  the  nature  of  releases — his  words 
pull  triggers  in  certain  kinds  of  brain."  "In 
biology,  psychology,  and  sociology,"  he  con- 
tinues, "the  forces  concerned  are  almost  exclu- 
sively forces  of  release."  Furthermore,  at  this 
point  one  might  well  incorporate  entire  his  re- 
markable essay  on  "The  Energies  of  Men."  In 
this  he  points  out  that  "as  a  rule  men  habitually 
use  only  a  small  part  of  the  powers  which  they 
actually  possess  and  which  they  might  use  under 
appropriate  conditions."  "We  are  all,"  he  says, 
"to  some  degree  oppressed,  unfree.  We  don't 
come  to  our  own.  It  is  there,  but  we  don't  get  at 
it."  The  inhibition  is  due  to  the  influence  of  con- 
vention, and  he  remarks  that  "an  intellect  thus 
tied  down  by  literality  and  decorum  makes  on 
one  the  same  sort  of  impression  that  an  able- 

[157] 


PROCESSES    OF    HISTORY 

bodied  man  would  who  should  habituate  himself 
to  do  his  work  with  only  one  of  his  fingers,  lock- 
ing up  the  rest  of  his  organism  and  leaving  it 
unused."  To  what,  then,  he  asks,  do  men  owe 
their  escape?  and  to  what  are  improvements  due, 
when  they  occur?  In  general  terms,  he  says,  the 
answer  is  plain:  "Excitements,  ideas,  and  efforts 
are  what  carry  us  over  the  dam."  Ideas,  in  par- 
ticular, he  regards  as  notable  stimuli  for  unlock- 
ing what  would  otherwise  be  unused  reservoirs 
of  individual  initiative  and  energy.  This  effec- 
tiveness he  ascribes  to  the  fact,  first,  that  ideas 
contradict  other  ideas  and  thus  arouse  critical 
activity,  and,  second,  that  the  new  ideas  which 
emerge  as  a  result  of  this  conflict  unify  us  on  a 
new  plane  and  bring  to  us  a  significant  enlarge- 
ment of  individual  power.  Thus,  in  complete  un- 
consciousness of  the  historical  aspect  of  the  sub- 
ject, James  has  described,  from  the  point  of  view 
of  the  individual,  what  proves  to  be  the  essential 
element  in  the  process  through  which  human 
advancement  has  everywhere  been  made. 

8.  We  are  now  in  a  position  to  recognize  the 
nature  of  the  processes  which  have  been  opera- 
tive throughout  human  history,  and  to  see  how 
the  actuality  of  these  may  be  verified  under  pres- 

[158] 


METHOD    AND    RESULTS 


ent  conditions.  It  must  be  repeated,  however, 
that  the  statement  here  given  is  of  the  most  gen- 
eral character  and  that  continued  research,  en- 
tailing the  minute  examination  and  comparison 
of  eras  of  transition,  will  be  required  to  deter- 
mine fully  and  completely  the  elements  of  His- 
tory. Nevertheless,  it  may  be  urged  that  the  mode 
of  procedure  here  outlined  brings  into  one  con- 
nected view  bodies  of  fact  which  have  hitherto 
remained  disparate  and  intractable,  and  that  it 
opens  up  new  problems  and  new  fields  of  inquiry 
for  historical  investigation.  Indeed,  even  to  the 
student  who  regards  the  construction  of  narra- 
tives as  the  sole  and  proper  aim  of  History,  it 
offers  new  phases  of  interest,  suggests  new  aspects 
of  human  activities,  and  provides  a  basis  for  the 
treatment  of  "general"  history  which  renders 
him  independent  of  time-honored  philosophies. 
Nor  is  it  to  be  overlooked,  in  considering  the 
possibilities  of  this  approach  to  the  study  of  how 
man  has  come  to  be  as  he  is,  that,  in  addition  to 
the  stimulus  it  may  afiford  to  History,  it  makes 
feasible  a  mutual  understanding  and  co-opera- 
tion between  the  different  specialties  of  human- 
istic study.  It  must  be  admitted,  I  think,  that  the 
manner  in  which  studies  like  anthropology,  his- 

[159] 


PROCESSES    OF   HISTORY 

tory,  and  geography,  art,  literature,  and  religion, 
philology,  politics,  and  economics  have  been  car- 
ried on  in  separate  compartments  has  not  been 
conducive  in  the  highest  degree  to  the  advance- 
ment of  knowledge.  These  subjects  are  not  inde- 
pendent sciences;  they  are  aspects  of  the  study 
of  man  which  have  been  pursued  in  comparative 
isolation  because  of  the  circumstances  of  their 
several  origins,  and  because  they  have  not  been 
brought  into  relation  by  a  common  methodology. 
On  the  other  hand,  when  it  is  seen  that  the  under- 
taking in  which  they  are  one  and  all  engaged  is 
the  attempt  to  determine  how  the  idea-systems 
of  men  have  come  to  be  as  we  find  them  today, 
the  fundamental  unity  of  these  studies  at  once 
becomes  apparent;  and,  indeed,  as  an  illustration 
of  this  unity,  one  might  well  agree  with  the  sen- 
timent (though  certainly  not  with  the  wording) 
of  Ostwald's  statement  that  the  history  of  the 
sciences  furnishes  the  best  and  most  trustworthy 
materials  for  the  study  of  the  laws  that  govern 
the  development  of  humanity. 

Finally,  the  method  herein  described  brings  the 
study  of  History  into  direct  relation  with  the 
problems  of  life.  I  have  indicated  that,  through- 
out  the   past,   human   advancement   has,   to   a 

[i6o] 


METHOD  AND  RESULTS 
marked  degree,  been  dependent  upon  war. 
From  this  circumstance,  many  investigators  have 
inferred  that  war  is,  in  itself,  a  blessing — how- 
ever greatly  disguised.  We  may  see,  however, 
that  this  judgment  is  based  upon  observations 
which  have  not  been  pressed  far  enough  to  elicit 
a  scientific  explanation.  War  has  been,  times 
without  number,  the  antecedent  of  advance,  but 
in  other  cases,  such  as  the  introduction  of  Bud- 
dhism into  China,  the  same  result  has  followed 
upon  the  acceptance  of  new  ideas  without  the 
introductory  formality  of  bitter  strife.  As  long, 
indeed,  as  we  continue  to  hold  tenaciously  to  cus- 
tomary ideas  and  ways  of  doing  things,  so  long 
must  we  live  in  anticipation  of  the  conflict  which 
this  persistence  must  inevitably  induce. 

It  requires  no  lengthy  exposition  to  demonstrate 
that  the  ideas  which  lead  to  strife,  civil  or  inter- 
national, are  not  the  products  of  the  highest 
knowledge  available,  are  not  the  verified  results 
of  scientific  inquiry,  but  are  "opinions"  about 
matters  which,  at  the  moment,  we  do  not  fully 
understand.  Among  modern  peoples,  the  most 
important  of  these  opinions  are  concerned  with 
the  ordering  of  human  affairs;  and  in  this  area 
all  our  "settlements"  of  the  problems  which  con- 
[.6i] 


PROCESSES    OF    HISTORY 

front  us  must  continue  to  be  temporary  and  un- 
certain compromises  until  we  shall  have  come  to 
apply  the  method  of  science  in  their  solution. 
Science  is  not  a  body  of  beliefs  and  opinions,  but 
is  a  way  or  method  of  dealing  with  problems.  It 
has  been  said  by  a  notable  contemporary  that 
men  begin  the  search  for  truth  with  fancy,  after 
that  they  argue,  and  at  length  they  try  to  find  out. 
Scientific  method  is  the  term  we  use  for  the  or- 
derly and  systematic  effort  to  find  out.  Hitherto, 
the  most  serious  afifairs  of  men  have  been  decided 
upon  the  basis  of  argumentation,  carried,  not  in- 
frequently, to  the  utmost  limits  of  destruction 
and  death.  It  should  be  possible  to  apply  in  this 
domain  the  method  of  finding  out,  and  it  has 
been  my  hope  to  contribute,  in  however  tentative 
a  manner,  to  this  end. 


[162] 


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